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ABSTRACT 
The turn of the nineteenth century was an exciting time for urban transport 
innovation. Inventors and entrepreneurs sought a power source that was efficient 
and economical. In some towns, however, other considerations were equally 
important in choices about transport mode and subsequent operation. Technology, 
socio-cultural, political, and economic concerns, as well as environmental and 
aesthetic considerations were all factors. This research considers their influence in 
the social shaping of the design and implementation processes. 
Opposition to overhead tram traction was widespread but quickly overcome in 
most towns. However, after lengthy debates, five towns in England opted for the 
surface-contact system. Of these, Wolverhampton and Hastings are the main 
focus for this research because they occupy opposite ends of the social and 
political spectrum. Lincoln, Torquay, and Mexborough, where surface-contact 
traction survived for some time, are covered in less detail. 
Most historians of technology regard surface-contact tram traction as a failure and 
a temporary deviation from electric traction development. They maintain that 
surface-contact was technologically and economically unattractive compared to 
conventional overhead systems. More recent historians have suggested that 
aesthetic arguments were a surrogate for other interests. Through an analysis of 
primary and secondary source material, this thesis investigates those claims. It 
finds that despite technical difficulties, surface-contact traction survived for several 
years in the five towns, fulfilling the aesthetic ideals of the time and supporting 
economic and social development in the process. To this extent, the thesis judges 
surface-contact to have been a success. 
5 
The evolution of urban transport, the development of the towns, and social 
dynamics including networks of power are all covered, together with aesthetic, 
environmental and economic considerations, as well as political and commercial 
pressures. The thesis examines how these diverse issues influenced decisions, 
and concludes there was no single factor that prompted either adoption or 
abandonment. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
BET - British Electric Traction Company 
BoT - Board of Trade 
DS&W TC - The Dudley, Sedgley and Wolverhampton Tramways Company 
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LMBC - London Metropolitan Borough Councils 
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MTC - Midland Tramways Company 
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NECC - National Electric Construction Company 
WTC - Wolverhampton Tramways Company 
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1.1 Introduction 
CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION 
Surface-contact traction was 'one of the 
few striking engineering failures of the century'.1 
In the view of Klapper and some other transport historians, surface-contact traction 
for tramways was a failure and a deviation from the true path of electric traction 
development. They reached this conclusion on the grounds that surface-contact 
was costly to install, difficult to operate, and expensive to maintain compared with 
the more traditional overhead systems. As a result, councils either failed to adopt 
or quickly abandoned the system. 
This thesis .challenges that conclusion. Contrary to Klapper et a', I will show that 
despite high costs and technical difficulties, surface-contact systems survived in a 
number of towns for several years in the UK and elsewhere, fulfilling a hitherto 
unsatisfied demand for mass transportation, and supporting economic and social 
development in the process. To this limited extent, surface-contact traction can be 
judged a success. 
The thesis explains why a number of councils opted for the surface-contact 
alternative to overhead traction; and why they decided sooner or later to replace 
their systems. I demonstrate how the controversies surrounding both the choice of 
this transport mode and its subsequent operation were not simply about the 
technology or even economics, but encompassed socio-cultural, political and other 
issues, as well as environmental and aesthetic considerations. I augment the 
theme frequently alluded to in the secondary literature of the impact on the 
1 Charles Klapper, The Golden Age of Tramways, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962, p.78. 
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environment with detailed analysis of other influences. My research shows that 
there were in fact many other relevant contextual factors. I show how these factors 
influenced design and implementation practice.2 
Recent historians of technology, notably Schatzberg3 and Schmucki4, have 
referred to the opposition to overhead traction in the USA, Germany, and the UK. 
Similar opposition was evident in the historic cities of other European countries, 
especially France and Austro-Hungary.5 Schatzberg suggested that townspeople 
waged a brief but vigorous campaign against the environmental consequences 
and aesthetics of overhead wires in America's largest cities.6 McKay had earlier 
asserted that overhead wires provoked general public concern and strong 
criticism? Schmucki acknowledged the opposition, but proposed that the very 
negative European reaction was weaker than hitherto assumed. 8 She developed 
the argument further and suggested that much of the opposition may have been a 
surrogate for other political and financial arguments.9 This thesis also examines 
Schmucki's proposition. 
Opposition to overhead wires was strong enough in the UK for surface-contact 
traction to be adopted in five locations. This thesis explores the reasons for its 
adoption in each of the towns. I have chosen Wolverhampton and Hastings for 
2 Wiebe E Bijker and John Law, (eds), 'General introduction', in Shaping Technology/Building 
Society, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992, p.2. 
3 Eric Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology in the City: Opposition to Mechanized Street 
Transportation in Late-Nineteenth-Century America', in Michael Thad Allen and Gabrielle Hecht 
(eds), Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley 
Hughes, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001, pp.57-94. 
4 Barbara Schmucki, 'The Machine in the City: Public Appropriation of the Tramway in Britain and 
Germany, 1870-1915', Journal of Urban History, 38/6, (April 2012), pp.1 060-1 093. 
5 Richard J Buckley, History of Tramways from Horse to Rapid Transit, Newton Abbot: David & 
Charles, 1975, p.63. 
6 Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology', p.57. 
7 John P McKay, Tramways and Trolleys: The Rise of Urban Mass Transport in Europe, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, p.106. 
8 Schmucki, 'The Machine in the City', p.1071 
9 Ibid, p.1 076. 
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special attention because they were at opposite ends of the spectrum socially and 
economically. The other three areas in the UK where surface-contact was installed 
were Torquay, Lincoln, and the adjacent south Yorkshire districts of Mexborough 
and Swinton. As Mexborough and Swinton were small neighbouring urban districts 
covered by one operating company, my thesis refers to them as a single entity. 
I have included these three places for comparison, though in rather less detail. To 
avoid repetition and for easy reading, I refer to all of them as 'target towns'. There 
was experimentation with similar systems for a short time in west London and in 
Stepney in east London, but in those particular council areas the political issues 
surrounding traction choice served to force the swift abandonment of the trials. 
This research is not a technical study per se, although some technical details are 
included to describe the development process. I have adopted a town-by-town 
approach in order to capture the complexity of the issues, and the main social, 
political, economic and cultural contextual factors. Of course, the case-by-case 
approach has its potential disadvantages. There are some overlapping factors -
notably considerations of class, culture and politics - and this could have resulted 
in the dominance of narrative as well as analytical repetition. However, while there 
are similarities between the towns, the differences between them are sufficient to 
make my approach appropriate as they clearly did not follow the same path in 
reaching their conclusions. My thesis serves to bring out these variations in the 
decision-making process in each setting, and is generally more conducive to a 
social shaping approach to urban traction technology. 10 My analysis also takes into 
account the economics of surface-contact traction compared with overhead. 
10 Gijs Mom, The Electric Vehicle: Technology and Expectations in the Automobile Age, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University, 2004, p.xi. 
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(" In How Users Matter, Oudshoorn and Pinch outline how users consume, modify, 
domesticate, design, reconfigure, and resist technologies. 11 While this thesis does 
not cover such a wide spectrum, my analysis of both resistance to and support for 
surface-contact readily lends itself to an approach in which key actors, whether 
they were institutions such as local authorities or manufacturers, or individual 
members of society, 'could construct radically different meanings of a 
technology,.12 A paper by Divali and Revill indicated the complex relationships 
between the various parties, and suggested that 'organizations, modes of 
governance, infrastructures, vehicles and other artefacts shaped expectations and 
practices,.13 Furthermore, transport systems were 'both shaped by the play of 
social power and in turn acted back upon it'.14 This two-way process is highlighted 
in the following chapters of my thesis. 
Different actors were prominent in different locations. In Wolverhampton, 
councillors and politicians dominated the decision-making process and fought 
against the introduction of aesthetically unacceptable forms of traction (see 
chapter 3). In Hastings, the powerful lobbyists were the wealthy and influential 
residents. The Anti-Trammites fought hard but unsuccessfully to keep trams out of 
the town entirely (see chapter 4). In other towns, the promoters and system 
manufacturers, anxious to sell their particular technology, held sway. In Torquay, 
Lincoln, and Mexborough and Swinton, it was the powerful company interests of 
the National Electric Construction Company and Griffiths-Bedell which prevailed in 
the introduction of surface-contact traction (see chapter 5). 
11 Nelly Oudshoorn and Trevor Pinch, 'Introduction: How Users and Non-Users Matter' in 
Oudshoorn and Pinch (eds), How Users Matter: the Co-construction of Users and Technology, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003), p.1. 
12 Ibid, p.3. The social construction of technology tends to emphasise producer social groups. Co-
construction is a later variant which posits a mutually shaping relationship between users and 
technologies. 
13 Colin Divali and George Revill, 'Cultures of Transport: Representation, Practice and 
Technology', Journal of Transport History, Third Series, Volume 26/1 (March 2005), pp.99-111. 
14 Ibid, p.100. 
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I have taken Mom's field concept analogy as a starting point for my analysis. 15 
Following Mom, I define the 'application field' as the finished article, the surface-
contact powered tram. The 'field of expectation' includes the social and technical 
requirements for future applications by the various actors. I describe how between 
the two lie socio-cultural, political, economic, aesthetic and environmental 
considerations, all of which had to be resolved before stability could be achieved. 
Some of these factors enabled development, while others constrained it, thereby 
creating controversy. 
An analysis of technological controversies demonstrates that almost everything is 
negotiable. Historical controversy illustrates very well how technologies are 
socially constructed. 16 Historical controversies over technologies that are regarded 
as failures are especially instructive, as social constructionists insist that a proper 
understanding requires a truly symmetrical account, one that considers both failed 
and successful technologies. 17 These issues are discussed in detail in later 
chapters. 
Among the contextual factors highlighted in the thesis is the hugely significant 
issue of class in the late nineteenth century. In his authoritative work The City, the 
social philosopher Weber characterised towns as places for the organisation of 
power, and argued that democracy was heavily influenced by privilege and 
religion. 18 My thesis describes the many class-based responses to the introduction 
15 Mom, The Electric Vehicle, p.3. 
18 Trevor J Pinch and Wiebe E Bijker, 'The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts', in Wiebe E 
Bijker, Thomas P Hughes and Trevor J Pinch (eds), The Social Construction of Technological 
S1.stems, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989, p.26. 
1 Ibid, p.26. Noble's study of the introduction of numerically controlled machine tools is an 
example of successful and failed technology. 
18 Max Weber, The City, Glencoe, "Iinois: Free Press, 1986. 
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of trams and their form of propulsion in the target towns through the interplay of 
class interests. In Wolverhampton, decision-making was driven by rich councillor-
industrialists, despite opposition from middle-class shop-owners who feared 
isolation from adjacent towns. By contrast, in Hastings it was the wealthiest 
residents who used their influence to keep any form of modern transportation from 
their streets, but particularly trams. Their close-knit group offered formidable 
resistance to the council's transport deliberations, echoing Foucault's theory that 
wherever power is exercised, opposition will be generated. 19 
Such battles lasted for many years. The ebb and flow of debate echoed the class 
struggles identified by Marx, albeit on a much smaller scale.2o There is evidence of 
Marx's claim that users must define the uses, meanings and significance of the 
technology in order for the process towards stability to be complete,21 and that 
production and consumption overlap and contain common elements.22 Such cross-
fertilisation became the norm in debates about surface-contact traction, and it was 
only when a consensus between consumers and producers was reached that any 
kind of stability was achieved. Given the short-lived nature of some surface-
contact systems, it is debateable whether this state was achieved in those cases 
(see the variety of forms explained in section 2.13). 
The blurring of the boundaries between design and use does not imply that 
production and consumption should be considered as identical processes, or that 
designers and users have the same roles in technical innovation. Indeed, both the 
19 Paul Hoggett, 'Social Policy and the Emotions', in Gail Lewis, Sharon Gewirtz and John Clarke 
~eds), Rethinking Social Policy, London: Sage Publications, 2006, p.142. 
o RJ Morris and Richard Rodger, 'An Introduction to British Urban History' in Morris and Rodger 
(eds), The Victorian City: a Reader in British Urban History 1820-1914, London: Longman Group, 
1993, pp.23-28. 
21 Karl Marx, Marx's Grundrissa (Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy), translated by 
David McLellan (ed), London: Macmillan, 1980, pp.24-26. 
22 Ibid, pp.S3-S8. 
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market, and technologies' response to it, may be constantly changing.23 
Consumption and production, and their socio-economic impact, must therefore be 
closely examined in order to identify their particular characteristics.24 
In stark contrast with the social constructionists, and in keeping with the 
assumptions of the 'internalist' historians of technology that were the main quarry 
of them, the German existentialist philosopher Martin Heidegger argued that 
technology was an entity separate from the socio-economic influences that 
determine its application. Heidegger saw technology as 'an ordering of the world to 
make it available as a 'standing reserve' poised for problem solving and therefore 
as a means to an end'.2s Such a view reflects his apparent distaste for technology, 
which he saw as an instrument for domination. Contrary to Heidegger and the 
internalists, I argue that political and aesthetic constraints were highly influential in 
traction development. In dynamic societies such as existed in Wolverhampton and 
Hastings at the turn of the nineteenth century, decision-making was not simply 
founded on cause and effect. It was 'an intertwining of many factors,.26 
The nineteenth century was an exciting time of innovation, especially in the field of 
tram traction. The history of tramways is 'not merely a story of heroic achievement, 
nor of developing hardware,.27 Towns had particular political organisations and 
geography. Entrepreneurs and innovators introduced new equipment, and brought 
23 Michel Calion, 'Society in the Making: the Study of Technology as a Tool for SOCiological 
Analysis', in Bijker, Hughes and Pinch (eds), The Social Construction, p.101. 
24 Merete Lie and Knut H Sorensen, Making Technology Our Own? Domesticating Technology 
into Everyday Life, Michigan: Scandinavian University Press North America, 1996, pp 9-10. 
25 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, New York: Harper 
& Row, 1977, p.19. 
26 Andrew Murphie and John Potts, Culture and Technology, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003, pp.18-22. 
27 Michael Massouh, 'Innovations in Street Railways Before Electric Traction: Tom L Johnson's 
Contributions', Technology and Culture, Volume 18, No 2 (April 1977), pp 202-217. 
21 
( 
(" 
new business techniques to manage the developing industry.28 In turn, the process 
changed the social, political and geographical character of the towns.29 But 
balanced against enterprise was a feeling that Victorians were entering an anxious 
and uncertain modern world, particularly with regard to tramway development (see 
chapter 2 for a description of the options). At each stage, it was impossible to 
predict how the narrative would unfold, and which interest would eventually 
prevail. 
The over-arching questions for this thesis are: Why did certain towns decide to 
adopt one of a range of innovative surface-contact systems? Why did they 
subsequently decide to replace their chosen system with another urban transport 
technology? In addressing these questions, others arise: Why did surface-contact 
traction fail to achieve market penetration on a wider scale? Was it technologically 
inferior, or were socio-economic factors more important? Were deliberations 
clouded by financial and political arguments rather than aesthetic and 
environmental aspects? I have used quantitative evidence in the search for 
answers to these questions. 
In Chapter 2, I have traced the development of urban transport systems from 
horse-drawn omnibuses and tramways, through the early mechanisation era to the 
confirmation of electricity as the dominant motive power source. The reasons why 
some experimental schemes quickly disappeared, while others continued for 
several years, are examined. A chronology of events is included as Appendix 1 at 
the end of this thesis. 
28 James Foreman-Peck and Robert Millward, Public and Private Ownership of British Industry 
1820-1990, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p.123. 
29 Massouh, 'Innovations in Street Railways', pp.202-217. 
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Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are case studies of the five target towns. The patterns of 
urban development are discussed, and the emergence of their particular identities 
is explained. Their geographical and demographic characteristics are compared, 
and social inequalities, the complex dynamics between certain social strata from 
the powerful non-users to the poorer classes, and their respective impact on 
decision-making are examined. Networks of power are identified and the influence 
of religion and health and safety on the decision-making process is considered. 
The ways in which different groups did or did not gain an advantage in certain 
circumstances are analysed. The aesthetic, environmental and economic issues, 
set against the wider context of urban mobility and civic development, are 
examined to test for any commonality between the target towns. Energy networks 
insofar as they impacted on the environment are included. Finally, the political 
context is considered, including the role of local government and the decision-
making powers of councillors. The effect of commercial pressures exerted by 
tramway promoters and manufacturers is examined. The impact of central 
government's regulatory processes is described. 
Chapter 6 embodies the conclusions to the research and answers to the questions 
posed. The choices available are discussed, and the reasons for making them, 
together with the forces opposing change, and objecting to technological 
innovation. The processes leading to the eventual decisions to adopt surface-
contact traction in particular are explained. Finally, a section is devoted to present-
day trends in second generation surface-contact systems. 
23 
1.2 Sources for the study 
I have consulted a variety of primary sources, including newspaper accounts, 
letters, journals, and council minutes, in order to analyse the development of urban 
tram systems. In particular, I have concentrated on the choice of traction; the 
interplay between these systems and societal values; and the benefits, or 
otherwise, for the general population. Each source has been studied with an eye 
to context and subjectivity. The effect of this has been twofold; while accounts 
themselves have had to be moderated on the grounds of obvious partisanship or 
special interest, they have at the same time provided valuable evidence of the 
specific interests, power and strength of influence of key players in the debates. 
For instance, the proprietor of the Hastings & St Leonards Observer was also 
chairman of the local omnibus company and as a result, his newspaper was 
fiercely anti-tram. In fact he was subsequently accused of secretly financing the 
opposition to them (see section 4.6). The Wolverhampton Express & Star, 
promoting the interests of ratepayers, objected to the Lorain surface-contact 
system on economic grounds and was consequently accused by those councillors, 
who saw aesthetic benefits, of distorting the facts (see section 3.14). Some 
newspapers viewed themselves as beacons of modernity and strongly supported 
the introduction of trams,30 while others still counselled caution, reflecting their 
readers' concerns about overhead wires. 31 Opposition to tramways could be 
shown in terms of class conflicts and presented as dramas between employers, 
employees, users and residents. 32 Letters to editors formed an important part of 
my research, particularly in Hastings, and 'shed new light on issues that attracted 
30 Wolverhampton Chronicle, 14 October 1903. Hastings & St Leonards News, 15 January 
1897. 
31 Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology', p.80. 
32 David E Nye, Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992, P .110. 
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a broader public's attention and emotions'. 33 Also included in this thesis are 
satirical cartoons and poems, which 'take us closer to the street' than do local 
government archives.34 
Where published, eye-witness accounts have proved useful, less obviously biased 
sources of information, although they too will inevitably be subjective and 
potentially prone to exaggeration, sensationalism and dramatisation of events (see 
the 'Jovian thunderbolt' propaganda against the Dolter surface-contact system in 
Hastings in section 4.8). Minutes of local authority council and committee meetings 
frequently only record resolutions made, rarely including the debates which 
generated them. A notable exception was the verbatim account of the. 
extraordinary discussions surrounding the Lorain system in Wolverhampton (see 
section 3.14).35 Other sources consulted include the journals of various 
professional institutions, although these must often be treated with caution as they 
frequently reflected the views of transport and electrical industries. My main focus 
in this research has been on local actors and the local contexts of their decision-
making on tramway traction modes. The primary sources for these decisions have, 
where relevant, provided enough information on the impact of the wider ambitions 
of the British Electric Traction Company (BET). Further research on the 
relationship of the company with local authorities would take on the extensive BET 
archive at the National Tramway Museum at Crich in Derbyshire. The Museum's 
library catalogue reveals five pages of items either by or involving the company.36 
33 Schmucki, 'The Machine in the City', p.1 061. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Wo/verhampton Chronicle, 14 October 1903. 
36 The National Tramway Museum at 
http://ntm.adlibhosting.com/(accessed on 31 March 2014). 
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As well as primary sources, I have consulted a wide range of secondary sources 
to investigate the various contextual factors that bore on the decisions to adopt 
surface-contact systems and on their subsequent history. This will be clear from 
the footnote references in the substantive chapters that follow. In the past, many 
authors have adopted what may be called an 'internalist' or 'Whiggish' account of 
tram development, focusing exclusively on the development of the technology, and 
picking out those aspects which could be celebrated as progress, almost to the 
pOint of propaganda. Tramway enthusiasts tended to focus on technical matters, 
including such issues as manufacture, propulsion, track configuration, and the 
layout of overhead wires, while making comparisons with other systems.37 Other 
writers concentrated on contemporary street scenes showing the prominence of 
tramcars and the effects of track installations. Examples of this approach were the 
literature produced by Dover38, Jackson-Stevens39, Barham4o, and the 
monographs of the Tramway and Light Railway Society, all of which are referred to 
in later chapters. Klapper's 'Whiggish' account included a chapter entitled 
'Deviationists'. In this, he briefly focused on the failures of the surface-contact 
system, concluding rather revealingly that they were 'brought to book in the end'.41 
The anti-Whig position, which reveals the merits of relatively unsuccessful forms of 
tram traction, has received much less attention from historians. Other more 
academic studies of the history of transport privileged economic considerations 
above all others. Such selective views tend to distort the history of a subject. My 
approach, in keeping with the recent 'cultural turn' in transport history and mobility 
37 D Kinnear Clark, Tramways: Their Construction and Working, Buckingham: Adam Gordon, 
1992, facsimile of 1894 edition. Cassler's Magazine; Electric Railway Number 1899, Tramways 
and Electric Rai/ways in the Nineteenth Century, Buckingham: Adam Gordon, 1992, facsimile of 
1899 edition. Both editions contain a great deal of information about technical issues. 
38 Alfred T Dover, Electric Traction: A Treatise on the Application of Electric Power to Tramways 
and Rai/ways, London: Pitman & Sons, 1929. 
39 E Jackson-Stevens, British Electric Tramways, Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1971. 
40 Fisher Barham, Torbay Transport, Falmouth: Glasney Press, 1979. 
41 Klapper, The Golden Age, pp.68-82. 
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studies, captures the social and cultural categories, their power relations and 
attitudes, particularly towards tram-traction choices.42 
Of course there were exceptions to linear explanations of transport development. 
McKay's pioneering work on the transformation of urban passenger transport in 
Europe included sections on the electric tramcar revolution.43 McKay's useful 
monograph included a description of the various traction choices, and went some 
way in highlighting the opposition to overhead wires in Europe as well as the 
aesthetics of the available options.44 However, he failed to explain why some 
towns went ahead with non-standard alternatives. Instead, he concluded that 
alternatives were of only passing significance in Europe, and in the end, opposition 
was overpowered by the same economic interests that prevailed much sooner in 
the United States.45 In some towns in the UK, however, particularly in Lincoln and 
Wolverhampton, it took many years for that to happen. 
Ochojna46 and Bucklel7 broadened the debate by including the influence of 
politics and economics on the development of urban passenger transport in 
Britain. However, the treatment by historians on such important issues as the 
types of traction available is generally shallow, with little attempt to investigate, 
contextualise, or analyse the decision-making process. The past thirty years has 
seen a change. Historians of technology such as Thomas P Hughes, David E Nye, 
and Eric Schatzberg, have emphasised the numerous political, social and cultural 
42 Julia Twigg, 'Social Policy and the Body' in Lewis, Gewirtz and Clarke (eds), Rethinking Social 
Policy, p.131. 
43 McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, pp.35-83. 
«Ibid, pp.99 et seq. 
45 Ibid. 
46 AD Ochojna, 'The Influence of Local and National Politics on the Development of Urban 
Passenger Transport in Britain 1850-1900', Journal of Transport History, New Series Volume 4, 
No.3 (February 1978), pp.125-146. 
47 Richard J Buckley, 'Capital Cost as the Reason for the Abandonment of First-Generation 
Tramways in Britain', Journal of Transport History, New Series Volume 10, No.2 (1989), pp.99-
112. 
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, 
conflicts surrounding technological choices.48 More recently, Barbara Schmucki 
used a similar approach to describe how tramways were appropriated by city 
dwellers 'to fit them into existing lifeworlds'.49 
Much of the literature about the debates generated by opposition to conventional 
overhead electric traction was not focused on individual towns and was of a very 
general nature. Although several authors have mentioned the five target towns as 
examples where non-standard traction systems were introduced, there was no in-
depth analysis of the reasons for their adoption. The causal factors were not 
explored. My research finds that the decision-making processes which led to the 
adoption of surface-contact traction did not follow the same standard path. 
More recently, Buckley's academic study about the decline of the British tramway 
industry introduces three case studies in South Yorkshire. One, the Dearne District 
light railway, neighbours upon Mexborough and Swinton, the towns among the 
subjects of my research. 50 There was a physical interconnection between the two 
systems. However, the time span of Buckley's research is much longer than mine, 
and he focuses on the socio-economic and political reasons for the decline, with 
little discussion about the earlier technology. 
In the context of tram traction choices, towns provide ideal locations for the 
examination of the interaction between technology, culture and politics. 51 As 
tramways used the public space of the street, they faced public debates and 
48 Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology', p.S8. 
49 Schmuckl, 'The Machine in the City', p.1061. 
50 Richard J Buckley, 'The decline of the British street tramway industry in the twentieth century, 
with special reference to South Yorkshire', University of Hull, PhD thesis, 1987. 
51 Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology', p.61. 
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scrutiny. 52 As Callan suggests, 'towns consist of more than public transport, 
conservation, and councils composed of spokespeople. They conceal a hidden life 
and differ from each other with respect to population, history, and geographical 
location'. 53 They were socially dynamic with town councils governing, and pressure 
groups seeking to influence policies, enabling valuable comparisons. 54 
Drawing on wider literature, my specific analysis of the five target towns (see 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5) does indeed reveal that 'each town was different, with its own 
idiosyncratic nature,.55 In support of this view, Kellett quoted the manager of 
Manchester's tramways, writing in 1914: 'it may be very misleading to draw 
general inferences unless the local circumstances in each case are fully 
recognized and kept fully in mind'. 56 Because of the highly individual character of 
towns, Kellett stressed the difficulties of making comparisons, pointing out that 
'forms of enterprise, the response of their business communities, and the policies 
of their civic administrations varied widely'. 57 However, he acknowledged that they 
were all subjected to certain common economic events, citing the impact of 
railways on the urban fabric and economy as his own prime example. There is no 
doubt that the advent of tramway systems had similar impacts on 'various social 
groups at different times and in different cities'. 58 However, while urban growth and 
the development of suburbs relied on new forms of public transport, the process 
was complex and the outcome shaped by several social and economic factors as 
52 Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology', p.61. 
53 Calion, 'Society in the Making', p.93. 
54 Ibid. 
55 McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, p.20B. 
56 Manchester Tramways Department, The Passenger Transportation Problem: Report of the 
Special Sub-committee (Manchester, 1914), p.87 (quoted in McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, 
R20B). 
7 John R Kellett, The Impact of Rai/ways on Victorian Cities, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1969, p.1. 
58 Colin Divali and Barbara Schmucki, 'Introduction: Technology, (Sub)urban Development and 
the Social Construction of Urban Transport', in Colin Divali and Winstan Bond (eds), Suburbanizing 
the Masses: Public Transport and Urban Development in Historical Perspective, Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2003, p.17. 
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explained in later chapters.59 Capuzzo argued that fares, labour markets and place 
of residence, availability of suitable housing land, were all important factors in 
constraining outward expansion in varying degrees and in different places.6o In the 
UK tramways were 'more likely to be designed to cater for an established need 
than create an entirely new one61 , although once operational, they 'had great 
potential for stimulating large increases' in traffic.62 
The process of industrialisation transformed the relationship between social 
groups and produced significant changes in their activities. Change also affected 
urban residential patterns. Pre-industrial towns had high-status central areas. Over 
time, these were superseded in many towns by high-status zones on the 
periphery.63 The five towns covered in this thesis were already well established 
before the tramway traction controversy began, although they were of very 
different character. Wolverhampton and Mexborough and Swinton were heavily 
industrialised. My interpretation suggests that Wolverhampton's development 
conformed better to Hoyt's sector theory of neighbourhood change, wherein 
growth tended to be linear along established lines of communication, rather than 
the Burgess model of urban form.64 The Burgess model posits concentric rings of 
residential and industrial development around a central business district, with the 
wealthiest residents living furthest away.65 A better fit with the Burgess model was 
Torquay, which was largely a seaside health and leisure resort catering for the 
59 Divali and Schmucki, 'Introduction', p.10. 
60 Paolo Capuzzo, 'Between Politics and Technology: Transport as a Factor of Mass 
Suburbanization in Europe, 1890-1939' in Divali and Bond (eds), Suburbanizing the Masses', 
Fp·23-48. 
FML Thompson, The Rise of Suburbia, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1982, p.10. 
62 Ibid, p.11. 
63 Mark Shaw, 'The Ecology of Social Change; Wolverhampton 1851-71', Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Volume 2, No.3, (1977), p.332. 
64 Homer Hoyt, The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighbourhoods in American Cities, 
Washington: Federal Housing Administration, 1939, p.114. 
65 Ernest W Burgess, 'The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project' in Robert E 
Park, Ernest W Burgess and Roderick D MacKenzie (eds.), The City, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1967, pp. 47-62. 
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wealthy. Lincoln's urban morphology approximates to the Sjoberg model. In this, 
the wealthiest live in the centre and the poor and industry are consigned to the 
periphery.66 Hastings was a poor fit with any model, while Mexborough and 
Swinton developed in a linear pattern along an established transport axis. The 
latter were settlements situated on the South Yorkshire coalfield in industrial and 
mining areas, surrounded by the much larger towns of Sheffield, Rotherham, 
Doncaster and Barnsley. Each target town had its own distinctive urban 
morphology that departed from these general models in significant ways. The 
peculiarities of these towns, the traction options available, and the reasons why 
they chose unconventional and largely untried solutions are therefore worthy of 
explanation. 
1.3 Aesthetic concerns and opposition to tramway development 
When it came to transport policy, technology and innovation on the one hand 
enhanced the quality of life in urban areas and in so doing, altered the cityscape. 
On the other hand, this shaping process was a force for the deterioration and 
destruction of urban areas. Both railways and tramlines necessitated the widening 
of streets, with the consequential demolition of housing stock.67 Overhead wires 
had a visual impact. Whereas many residents welcomed the advent of tramways, 
others considered them to be intrusive and aesthetically unacceptable. Surface-
contact and underground conduit systems accommodated these sensitivities. 
66 Gideon Sjoberg, The Pre-industrial City: Past and Present, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 
1960. 
67 Colin G Pooley, 'Patterns on the Ground: Urban Form, Residential Structure and the Social 
Construction of Space' in Martin Daunton (ed), The Cambridge Urban History of Britain, Volume /1/ 
1840-1950, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.437. 
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Before considering the reasons behind opposition to tramways in general and 
overhead wires in particular, it is necessary to set objections in context. In the 
growing conurbations of Victorian England, many expressed their distress over the 
'onward march of industrial materialism,.68 Aesthetic concerns heavily influenced 
development of the urban fabric. Naturally, such concerns spilled over into the 
consideration of tram traction choice, especially during the initial stages. 
Uppermost in the minds of many decision-makers was the aesthetic movement, 
and the need to balance public transport provision with the quality of life. The 
movement had its roots early in the nineteenth century when there was a growing 
awareness and general dissatisfaction with the art that governed the taste of 
Britain at the time, and a backlash against drab utilitarianism. For some, the early 
Victorian era was a synonym for all that was dull and unimaginative.69 The 
aesthetic movement challenged values and helped to redeem industry from the 
prevailing drabness and disrepute. 
The Great Exhibition at the Crystal Palace in 1851 played an important part in the 
aesthetic awakening. Aesthetes reacted to the Exhibition, urging new ways of 
living in defiance of what was perceived as the horrendous design standards of the 
age. Their views were in stark contrast to the materialism of mid century. They 
argued that there was an urgent need to establish contact between art and nature 
on the one hand and manufacturing on the other.7o Much of technology, and many 
of the industrial exhibits, were viewed by critics as ugly and depressing. In the 
aesthetes' opinion, many artefacts were certainly not progressive. In a lecture by 
Ruskin, one of the founders of the movement, in Bradford in 1859, he urged 
manufacturers to apply art to industry, and to divert art from the vanities of wealth 
68 Lionel Lambourne, The Aesthetic Movement, London: Phaidon Press, 1996, p.13. 
69 AG Gardiner, John Benn and the Progressive Movement, London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1925, 
0.55. 
~o Ibid. 
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to the refinement of the common life. Ruskin stressed that the power of the 
furnace could bring 'civilisation to the rude'. 71 
As the movement gathered pace, aesthetic criteria began to playa more important 
role in urban development and innovative artefacts. The Art Nouveau movement 
during the last two decades of the nineteenth century highlighted comparisons 
between the rural idyll and industry.72 Although initially concerned with the 
decorative arts, the movement developed as a reaction to grim industrial 
townscapes. Aesthetic themes attempted to reconcile art and the modern face of 
technology and to find nature through its visual impact on the urban fabric. 73 The 
adoption of sinuous curves and whiplash lines into the design of street furniture 
and support systems for tram traction were examples. For the aesthete, cities 
could be redesigned and enhanced by the Art Nouveau movement. 
The movement had its origin in France, reflecting a rejection of American 
economic pragmatism. Since surface-contact systems were also developed in 
France, it is at least arguable that it was their aesthetic properties above all that 
recommended them to certain decision-makers. They were worthy of investigation 
and eventual adoption by some authorities. There were also political 
undercurrents. In their quest to improve the quality of life, aesthetes believed that 
the triumph of beauty in nature would destroy capitalism. They argued that 
economic and social conditions affect every aspect of an individual's life, from 
religious beliefs to legal systems and cultural frameworks. The role of art and 
design was to represent such conditions, and to seek to improve them, a theme 
71 Gardiner, John Benn, p.56. 
72 Klaus-Jurgen Sembach, Art Nouveau, Koln: Taschen Gmbh, 2002, p.9. 
73 Ibid, p.9. 
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adopted by Wolverhampton's ruling elite to justify their decision to install the Lorain 
system.74 
Compared with cities on the mainland continent, most British cities were not 
particularly beautiful, but there were exceptions. Edinburgh, parts of London, and 
some cathedral towns had fine buildings and monuments. But an American 
academic described British cities as the ugliest in Europe.75 Wolverhampton was 
no exception. Most of the elegant Georgian squares and houses had long since 
been demolished to make way for the tenements of the Industrial Revolution. The 
coal-mining districts of Mexborough and Swinton in south Yorkshire were typical 
examples of grimy northern towns. Yet Wolverhampton, Mexborough and Swinton 
installed surface-contact systems to obviate what were perceived as ugly 
overhead wires and their hideous support poles. Hastings, Torquay and Lincoln on 
the other hand had elegant areas considered to be worthy of protection. One can 
understand why an alternative was sought there. 
By contrast, any opposition to overhead traction was quickly overcome in the USA, 
where solid American pragmatism and individualism, compared with the more 
collective approach of Europe, held sway. Cities in the USA were in any case 
criss-crossed by multiple overhead cables supplying telegraphs and domestic 
power supplies. A typical view from a visiting British engineer was: 
our American cousins have no problem with forming a network of wires over 
their streets, as long as it facilitates locomotion. In Europe, we proceed 
more cautiously, and there is little doubt that these objectionable overhead 
74 Wo/verhampton Chronicle, 14 October 1903. 
75 Frederic C Howe, The British City: the Beginnings of Democracy, New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1907,p. 243. 
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wires have considerably interfered with the progress of electric traction on 
this side of the Atlantic. 76 
Recognising the cultural difference, the chief engineer of New York's street railway 
company when commenting on the slow growth of electric traction in Europe 
ventured: 
the European does not possess that intense activity. He appears to be 
more imbued with the spirit of art and beauty, and acts as if he thought that 
an improvement to be of the greatest benefit to himself, his country or city, 
should be developed slowly to assure perfection. If an improvement is 
effected in time for the use of the incoming generation, it is all that one can 
expect.77 
He cited the European pursuit of the aesthetic ideal and the need for perfection 
rather than practicality. Interesting though they may be as an indication of the way 
that others saw us, these are generalisations and not universally applicable. Within 
Europe there were also many influential actors committed to the maximisation of 
economic benefit: it was just that they encountered contrary cultural forces more 
often than their American counterparts, where initial opposition was quickly 
forgotten in most cities.78 
The debates about tram traction were not simply based on a New World versus an 
Old World dichotomy. There was even a distinction between North American 
78 JH Cox, 'Street Tramways and Electric Traction' in The Electrical Engineer, Volume 10, (1892), 
R86. 
7 FS Pearson, 'The Latest Developments in Electric Conduit Railways' in Cassier's Magazine, 
Electric Railway Number 1899, Adam Gordon, 1992 (facsimile of 1899 edition), p.264. 
78 Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology', p.82. 
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neighbours. Colonial Canada was clearly influenced by the aesthetic controversy 
that raged in Europe. In Toronto, a group of men armed with axes chopped down 
tramway support poles. The tramway company had not obtained the city 
engineer's approval to erect 'rough awkward poles that would have disgraced the 
streets of a backwoods village, more particularly when they were painted a variety 
of colours, the favourite being a glaring red'. 79 
Opposition to new transport systems had begun well before debates about 
aesthetic values.8o As early as 1859, Alexander Easton, an American champion of 
horse tramways, highlighted popular prejudices against advocates of innovation on 
the part of existing operators.81 Each transformation in transport engendered 
opponents to change, and very often at the forefront of such opposition were 
champions of established transport modes. Muleteers opposed the building of 
turnpike roads, and objected to the construction of canals, although improved 
transport systems eased movement and reduced costs. The most vociferous 
opponents of tramways were the vested interests of the omnibus companies and 
'antiquated communities,.82 Such opponents were dismissed by Easton as having 
the 'grossest ignorance of science and its benefits', and were categorised as 
Luddites by tramway entrepreneurs. Earlier tests by operators had found 
tramways to be the 'improvement of the age,83 in New York, Boston and 
Philadelphia. They offered greater comfort, were more economic to operate, and 
were much quieter than omnibuses 'rattling over stones'.84 
79 The Electrical Engineer, Volume 11, (1893), p.3. 
80 Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology' p.62. 
81 A Easton, 'A Practical Treaty on Street or Horse Power Railways', Philadelphia: (paper 
r:resented at the Institution of Civil Engineers, London, 1859), p.4. 
2 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid, p.6. 
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George Bruce, a contemporary of Easton in the UK, visited the USA in 1860 and 
was surprised to discover that tramways were the ordinary means of transport 
between different parts of large cities, just as omnibuses were in the UK.85 
However, he ominously predicted that prejudices against their introduction in 
England would be even stronger, as rail tracks were only tolerated in mining areas 
and colliery villages for coal conveyance.86 His economic analysis, although far 
from robust, estimated that the operating cost of trams was at least half that of 
omnibuses.87 Based on his observations in the USA, he recognised that a more 
rapid means of transport would enable greater freedom of travel and would assist 
the process of urban expansion.88 
In many towns, the prospect of tramways generated heated debates because they 
involved the public right of way, namely the street. 89 Both Schatzberg and more 
recently Schmucki noted that 'rails in the street symbolised the tramway's intrusion 
into an essential public space and threatened existing patterns of circulation'. 90 
'Mechanised street transportation threatened to destroy the traditional function of 
the streets as spaces for social interaction'. 91 This theme is discussed further in 
chapter 2. 
In some towns, the disputes and ensuing delays were not simply about the new 
technology, but about how to employ it in a manner that was satisfactory to the 
general population. These debates began with the introduction of horse-drawn 
85 George B Bruce, 'Memorandum on Street Railways', Westminster: (paper presented at the 
Institution of Civil Engineers, London, June 1860), p.1. 
86 Ibid, p.2. 
87 Ibid, p.6. 
88 0 Kinnear Clark, Tramways: their Construction and Working, p.328. Bruce was a renowned civil 
engineer and a strong supporter of tramways. He subsequently became the chief engineer of 
Buenos Aires tramways and was honoured with a knighthood in 1888. 
89 Raphael Schapiro, 'Public ownership in the British city: perspectives on urban utilities, 1870-
1914', Oxford University, OPhii thesis, 2005, p.143. 
90 Schmucki, 'The Machine in the City', p.1063. 
91 Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology', p.84. 
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vehicles, increased in intensity with battery-driven and steam trams in the 1880s, 
and continued with even more fervency when mains electricity as a power source 
became popular in the 1890s. The factors involved in the decision-making process 
were therefore complex, ranging from the aesthetics of design to socio-economic 
issues. There was also a feeling that tramways 'threatened citizens' established 
routines and eventually even the city's well being'. 92 Within this tangled web were 
also the often petty attitudes of powerful officials, wealthy residents of certain 
areas, shopkeepers, ratepayers, landowners, pedestrians, and the determination 
of entrepreneurs to impose their particular systems. 93 
Consequently, disputes about the type of electrification lasted for many years. A 
stricter regulatory framework and economic issues also delayed progress and led 
to indecision in the UK, allowing other countries to move ahead. Schapiro cites the 
UK's cautious approach as being 'British entrepreneurial failure compared to 
American private enterprise and German dynamism', which he considered were 
respectively the main drivers in those countries. 94 Evidence suggests that this view 
is questionable, as the more dynamic British promoters temporarily diverted their 
attention to other countries in South America and Asia. Others viewed the UK's 
caution as a positive benefit because it enabled all options to be considered. 
Objections on aesthetic grounds were not the only reasons for opposition. There 
were cultural issues too. An engineering contractor named Blackwell noted that 
early attempts to introduce any form of electrical motive power in the UK met with 
little encouragement. Referring to the systems in Blackpool, Brighton, the Giant's 
Causeway and the Bessbrook-Newry lines in 1883-84, he commented that 'the 
92 Schmucki, 'The Machine in the City', p.1063. 
93 Ibid. 
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public at large did not then even approximately appreciate the value of tramways 
of any kind and turned a cold shoulder to the proposers of any scheme looking 
toward their extension or improvement,.95 As late as 1899, 'the public was only just 
beginning to estimate them at their true value,.96 As he was in the business of 
supplying equipment and building tramways, these comments were not surprising. 
Even in the United States, it had required six years of 'earnest effort and great 
expenditure by inventors and promoters before any appreciable effect was 
produced,.97 Notwithstanding this, there were of course, several champions of 
electrically operated tramways who assisted development with vigour. In 1888, 
George Westinghouse junior, the president of Washington tram lines, expected to 
see horses withdrawn from the streets within two years, and electric traction 
introduced.98 
Disillusioned by slow progress in the UK with electric traction, manufacturers 
predicted that it would take years before trams would 'reach their proper estate 
and be recognised as an indispensable convenience by all c1asses,.99 Viewing the 
industry with dismay, Blackwell ventured that there was not the slightest evidence 
that any boom was likely to occur in the UK, and suggested that progress would 
be quiet and steady compared with either America or continental Europe. Certainly 
in Hastings, several attempts to introduce tramways were thwarted by fierce 
resistance from sections of the community. According to Blackwell in 1899, 'the 
British public is by no means educated to believe that a tramway of any kind 
whatever is necessary to its happiness and well being, and it would acquire that 
95 Robert W Blackwell, 'Electric Tramways in Great Britain' in Cassier's Magazine, Electric 
Railway Number 1899, Buckingham: Adam Gordon, 1992 (facsimile of 1899 edition), p.283. 
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education only by degrees,.10o Blackwell's assertion was too sweeping a 
generalisation: many towns in the UK were already beginning to welcome 
tramways by then. 
As the growth in electric traction accelerated, the differing attitudes of European 
and American societies towards trams and their power systems became more 
apparent. Many in Europe rejected the narrow techno-economic view of the 
American overhead solution on the grounds that it contained some serious 
consequences and harmful side effects. Additionally, the social expectations of the 
adoption of some form of electric traction were incredibly high. Many viewed the 
electric tramway as 'little less than the deus ex machina, descending miraculously 
on the urban stage to resolve the entire social drama,.101 People were clearly 
ready to accept the advent of the electrical tramway in a spirit of technological 
utopianism,102 provided the search for a solution that satisfied both environmental 
and aesthetic criteria continued. 
The economic historian Sutcliffe took issue with this view. For him, innovation and 
invention were 'the direct product of supply and demand relationships,.103 The 
opposing argument would be that social requirements must be present to stimulate 
the demand. Economics and social necessity worked hand-in-hand for the 
development of surface-contact traction to occur. In any case, the economic case 
was based on some heroic assumptions about the value to be ascribed to the 
environment. 
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In Europe, inventors and entrepreneurs continued to investigate technological 
alternatives 'to the simple and very effective overhead method that satisfied 
Americans completely' .104 The professional magazine of the Institution of Electrical 
Engineers, The Electrical Engineer concluded: 
while the overhead power system was technically feasible, it was 
unacceptable for aesthetic reasons. Overhead wires are unsightly, 
dangerous, and troublesome, and several schemes are still being tried out 
which will result in economic, safe, and simple solutions. Open slots are not 
allowed as they are dangerous to cart wheels, are an open receptacle for 
dirt, and are too costly to put down. The race seems to be between the 
accumulator and closed conduit system. The race to find a solution is 
becoming exciting. 105 
After initial hostility, however, in 1894 the Institution of Electrical Engineers 
declared that 'there was an almost unanimous feeling among members in favour 
of the overhead trolley system as being by far the best and cheapest solution in 
every way'. 106 Within four years, the Institution had undergone a complete volte 
face. It must be said though that as a body representing professional engineers 
within the industry, the Institution might have had a vested interest which no longer 
included the concept of aesthetic acceptability. 
Despite professional acceptance, general opposition continued. In the technical 
press and during municipal debates, 'large numbers of influential Europeans 
104 McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, p.83. 
105 The Electrical Engineer, Volume 6 (1890), p.88. [et seq] 
106 The Electrical Engineer, Volume 14 (1894), p.713. 
41 
thought that overhead wires and their support poles were extremely ugly and 
aesthetically unacceptable' .107 In Paris, a politician threatened to cut down the 
overhead wires if they were ever installed in his district. 108 Taking up the theme, 
Wolverhampton's former mayor and serving alderman, WH Jones declared that 
the Lorain system was seen as a way to 'preserve the beauty of the streets and 
roads of the town from the unsightly poles and wires of the overhead system of 
electric traction' .109 
Elsewhere, surface-contact systems were viewed as exotic foreign imports, and 
the debate continued about the acceptance of the continental ideas of Bohemian 
Paris.11o An alarmed reaction began to emerge between conservative British 
ideals and avant-garde innovations from the European mainland.111 The prevailing 
sentiment was to send inventors and engineers back to the drawing board rather 
than accept visual pollution and unpatriotic imports.112 Unlike earlier objections to 
electric traction based on safety to the public and horses and disturbance to the 
telegraph network, the aesthetic critique 'rested on subjective values that could not 
be refuted by technical experts'. 113 
Once overhead traction had been installed, some colourful descriptions arose. As 
early as 1894, opponents in the city of Danzig complained that 'overhead wires 
conveyed the ideas of a hop-field, the contact rollers made the noise of a swarm of 
bees, and the movement of the cars was like the rolling of a ship at sea' .114 Initial 
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negative reaction to the use of overhead traction was therefore generally 
widespread among authorities. Even in Glasgow, which was considered to be at 
the forefront of the development of new technology, debates continued for several 
years about the form electric traction might take. As early as 1892, a council 
delegation had visited the Leeds Roundhay overhead system, and had been 
impressed by what they saw. However, by June 1895, Glasgow's town councillors 
concluded that 'overhead electricity would not suit us in the heart of the city on 
account of its unsightliness, though it might do in the outskirts,.115 
John Young, the influential General Manager of Glasgow Corporation Tramways, 
concurred by suggesting that 'all things being equal, a system which provides the 
power without any overhead wire is preferable' .116 The wait-and-see approach 
prevailed, and in August 1896, a Glasgow councillor considered that 'we are on 
the eve of great developments in electric haulage, and within 'six months the 
conduit system might be demonstrated to be the best' ,117 
However, when the issue was finally settled in January 1899, the decision was to 
electrify all lines on the overhead system. With the benefit of hindsight, one 
transport historian regretted the decision. 'Seldom did public authority have a 
better chance to weigh technological alternatives in the light of the societal values 
it reflected and formed'.118 Although Glasgow councillors had taken an informed 
view, McKay believed they could have given deeper consideration to the options 
available. Young had suggested that it would cost only an extra penny per car-mile 
to satisfy aesthetic requirements, but his advice was ignored. 
115 The Electrical Engineer, Volume 15 (1895) p.747. 
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Elsewhere, continuous investigation was widespread, and several authorities 
considered alternatives to overhead traction. Even delegates from smaller towns 
such as Wigan visited other experimental systems. After a visit to the Canning 
Town accumulator line in London, a Wigan councillor concluded that 'the system 
should be avoided on account of its low mechanical efficiency, deterioration of 
batteries through jolting and variable loads, and the bad smell of unhealthy 
gases,.119 
Eventually, some cities adopted a hybrid solution in order to overcome aesthetic 
concerns. Thus in Paris, central government had considered permitting overhead 
electrification in peripheral areas in 1897, but it was not until 1902 that overhead 
wires were permitted more generally, except within the city walls and those 
quarters where aesthetic considerations should predominate.12o There, surface-
contact systems were installed. Even where overhead traction was permitted, it 
was established with elegant poles and without 'a spider's web of cross wires'.121 
Other European cities also had a brief flirtation with such systems, including 
Monaco, Dresden, Prague and Tours. In the USA, Washington installed an 
experimental length for a short time, but none of these lasted for long, with the 
exception of Paris, which retained a surface-contact system in the central area as 
a complement to overhead traction in the suburbs before serious flooding in 1911 
caused a reassessment. 
The values of the aesthetic movement eventually became established in British 
culture. Elsewhere, the acceptance of the need for visual environmental 
improvement inspired the 'City Beautiful' movement in the USA at the end of the 
119 The Electrical Engineer, Volume 6 (1890), p.185. 
120 Archives Nationales, Folio 14, 15024. (Paris). quoted by McKay in Tramways and Trolleys. 
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nineteenth century.122 The concept was 'in part inspired by Baron Hausmann's 
transformation of Paris,123 and dominated urban planning in the USA, particularly 
in city centres, during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Consequently, 
public transport systems were transformed to harmonise with their surroundings. 
1.4 The effect of the regulatory process on private enterprise 
Prior to 1870, the process for seeking approval for the construction of tramways in 
the UK was complicated. As a result, George F Shaw-Lefevre, a Liberal MP, who 
was the Parliamentary Secretary for the Board of Trade from 1868 to 1871, 
introduced the Tramways Act in 1870 to enable promoters to apply for Provisional 
., 
Orders without having the expense and time-consuming procedure of a private 
bill.124 A major disadvantage of the private bill process was that it allowed 
neighbouring factions to oppose each other.125 Acts of parliament avoided local 
. 
conflicts in such circumstances. 
Drawing on experience with earlier parliamentary bills for water and gas utilities, 
the 1870 Tramways Act recognised the right of the local council, the road 
authority, and more importantly the frontagers to be consulted and their interests 
taken into account in the process of approval. While not necessarily wishing to use 
the trams themselves, frontagers had their own usages of the street to protect. 
Such stakeholders were at the forefront of objectors to the implementation of many 
tramway systems. The Act recognised the need to safeguard the rights of those 
who objected to tramways as well as easing the process for those in favour. If a 
122 Clay McShane, 'Urban Pathways: the Street and Highway, 1900-1940' in Tarr and Dupuy (eds), 
Technology and the Rise, p.75. 
123 Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology', p.69. 
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125 Richard H Trainor, Black Country Elites: The Exercise of Authority in an Industrialized Area 
1830·1900, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p.265. 
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proposed line ran for more than ten yards at a distance of less than nine feet six 
inches from the kerb, and if one third of the frontagers objected, then approval 
could not be given to that section of line. 126 
Local authorities were allowed to pass by-laws on such issues as speed and 
frequency of services, and other restrictions were introduced, including both 
maximum and workmen's fares, and no compulsory lowering of fares. So as not to 
discourage private enterprise, Parliament removed ceilings on dividends to 
shareholders, although this led to charges that tramways were 'a financial caprice 
aimed more at private profit than public benefit'.127 
The building and operating of tramways was generally the business of a private 
company, not the local authority. The Tramways Act of 1870 gave the Board of 
Trade the power to grant tramway orders. The main distinction between tramway 
and railway operators was that the former did not have to own the right of way that 
they traversed. The right of way for tramways, namely along the street, involved a 
property right in use rather than a property right in ownership.128 But there were 
other differences too. The Act gave blanket approval to local authorities to own the 
lines, but not to own or operate trams. 129 
The approval of acts for the laying of tramways increased dramatically after the 
passing of the Tramways Act as the following table indicates: 
126 AD Ochojna, 'lines of class distinction: an economic and social history of the British tramcar', 
University of Edinburgh, PhD thesis, p.41. 
127 Schmuck!, 'The Machine in the City', p.1064. 
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Year Number of Acts Year Number of Acts 
passed passed 
1868 1 1880 39 
1869 3 1881 32 
1870 11 1882 43 
1871 11 1883 25 
1872 13 1884 30 
1873 22 1885 21 
1874 8 1886 19 
1875 14 1887 19 
1876 9 1888 20 
1877 22 1889 18 
1878 26 1890 2 
1879 31 
Total 23 Total 439 
years ". Acts 
Table 1.1 - Number of approved Acts for the laying of tramways. 130 
The most controversial clause within the Act was the twenty-one year clause, 
during which time municipalities could not take over tramway operations. 
Development was therefore dominated by the private sector. At the end of that 
term, the clause gave local authorities the option to purchase tramways in their 
area for the net value of the equipment at the time of sale. The 'then' value 
included the track, buildings and land, but there was no allowance for past or 
future profits of the enterprise, nor any compensation for forced sales or other 
considerations. 
In defence of the Act, Shaw-Lefevre denied that capitalists would be discouraged 
from investing in tramways by the purchase clause since there was no limitation 
on profit.131 To begin with, he was quite correct as Table 1.1 indicates. However, 
130 Clark, Tramways: Their Construction, p.23. 
131 Vesey Knox, 'The Economic Effect of the Tramways Act of 1870', The Economic Journal, 
Volume 11, No.44 (December 1901), p.S03. 
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many promoters 'floated their company, took their profits, and cleared out' rather 
than take a steady dividend yield. 132 Many contemporary operators and later 
transport historians have blamed the purchase clause for causing stagnation in the 
industry at the end of the century. For Blackwell, the widely v'arying conditions that 
the British promoter, owner and manager had to deal with forced them to 'make 
haste slowly'. He concluded that it would be absurd to expect a rapid adoption of 
electric traction in the UK such as that experienced in the USA. 133 In his opinion, 
the stringent twenty-one year rule was the principal reason that only approximately 
thirty route-miles were electrically operated prior to 1895.134 Ochojna took issue 
with this general view, pointing out that the accusation of stagnation caused by the 
twenty-one year clause was 'more of a public relations exercise than a sound 
business grievance,.135 He considered that the valuation exercise was a 'red 
herring', and concealed the fact that there had been under-investment and poor 
accounting practice for many years. The combined impact of such policies was to 
conceal actual capital depreciation. 136 
In support of the general view, the French laissez-faire economist Yves Guyot, 
who was also the French Minister of Public Works, pointed out that as a result, 
tramways already constructed suffered a heavy depreciation. He argued that UK 
capital which might have been devoted to enterprises of this character was 
invested in foreign countries instead. 137 There is evidence in support of Guyot's 
argument. WJ Clark, the former manager of the American General Electric 
Company, suggested that British capitalists had invested $35 million in American 
132 Knox, 'The Economic Effect', p.504. 
133 Blackwell, 'Electric Tramways', p.283. 
1304 Ibid, p.28S. 
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street railways, whereas the total investment in British street railway companies by 
1899 was only $52 million.138 Both Vesey Knox and Emile Garcke also believed 
that the tramways legislation inhibited development, especially that of the private 
companies. 139 
The 1870 Tramways Act was in some ways unfair to the tramway companies, who 
had to maintain the paving between the rails and on either side of the track to a 
distance of eighteen inches. They also had to maintain the roadway between the 
double track if the intervening space was less than four feet in width. Such a 
commitment was considered to be compensation to the local authorities for a loss 
of jurisdiction of the right of way. 140 The disadvantage for the companies was that 
competing vehicles could take advantage of the paved roads. While benefiting 
from the improved surface, they frequently obstructed the operation of tramcars. 141 
The Light Railways Act 1896 was originally intended to stimulate production after 
the economic downturn of the 1880s, which had seriously weakened agricultural 
production with consequential effect on rural communities. The Act would enable 
British farmers to compete with foreign competition, which had grown fiercer as 
trade restrictions had been relaxed. It was a widely held belief that without a light-
railway system in rural areas to give access quickly and easily to the home market, 
the agricultural industry would continue to be severely depressed.142 The Light 
Railway Commissioners were set up to consider applications, and to issue a 
provisional order if they were approved. The provisional order was scrutinised by 
the Board of Trade, but required no confirmation by parliament. A further 
138 William J Clark, The Street Railway Journal, Volume 15, No 10 (October, 1899). 
139 Knox, The Economic Effect', pp. 492-510. 
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--
advantage was that five years were allowed for completion compared with only 
two years under the Tramways Act. 143 
In general, the Act was not intended to authorise urban tramways, but as there 
was no clear definition of light railways, entrepreneurs could not be prevented from 
promoting systems by this method.144 Tramway promoters seized on the 
opportunity to build new systems under this procedure since the process was 
cheaper, faster and easier than under the 1870 Tramways ACt. 145 As a result, 
between 1896 and 1914 there were 279 applications for urban systems under the 
Act, of which 158 were approved.146 However, many were never constructed. 
The Light Railways Act gave more opportunities for public consultation in view of 
the opposition to any tramway scheme. It was usual for the Act to be used when 
two local authority areas were joined. 147 Under such criteria, the procedure fitted 
the purpose well as the system was planned eventually to join Hastings with 
Bexhill across an intervening wetland area known as the Pebsham marshes. 
1.5 Public versus private enterprise 
There is no doubt that the shortage of finance facing local authorities was a 
determinant in the pattern of tramway ownership. In Wolverhampton, Hastings and 
Torquay, views at the time on the most efficient form of ownership rested on 
political viewpoints. With the benefit of hindsight, Millward believed that 'the pace 
143 Klapper, The Golden Age, p.34. 
144 Cyril Dodd and Charles E Allan, The Law Relating to Light Railways, London: Shaw and 
Sons, 1896, pp.3-4. 
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of expansion was not affected decisively by whether undertakings remained within 
the private sector or were taken over by municipalities,.148 This was not entirely 
true, however. Opposition to companies threatened to block tramway development 
because the private sector was granted the use of municipally-owned streets while 
providing town authorities with little in return. 149 An objection was that tramways 
were associated 'primarily with economic speculation and investment'.150 For that 
very reason, supporters of municipalisation were extremely critical of the 
companies, for whom in their view profitability took precedence over the general 
goOd. 151 
Yves Guyot, on the other hand, concluded that almost all municipally-owned 
tramways in the UK operated at a loss. As he was opposed to socialism in all its 
forms, his views were hardly surprising. He blamed the losses on the advantages 
conferred on their employees, citing reduced working hours, holiday entitlements, 
increase in salaries, one day's rest in seven, and the provision of free uniforms. 152 
He also opposed the introduction of special fares for workmen, and claimed that 
municipalisation involved an arbitrary policy combined with a regime of privilege. In 
his case, the privileges were enjoyed by employees and workers to the 
disadvantage of tramway operators. 
Ochojna's paper about the influence of local and national politics on urban 
transport contains some challenging hypotheses regarding the impact of tramways 
on society, particularly about the conflict between the wealthier sections of the 
148 Robert Millward, Private and Public Enterprise in Europe: Energy, Telecommunications and 
Transport 1830-1990, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.33. 
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152 Guyot, Where and Why, p.143. 
51 
community and those not so well off.153 He also highlights the struggles between 
on the one side monopolies and the private sector, and on the other local 
authorities, who at the time were flexing their muscles after local government 
reorganisation. Ochojna summarises the 1870 Act as a 'nicely calculated response 
to potential misuse of economic power and disregard for urban amenity'. 154 
Clearly, Parliament had learned the lessons of past mistakes, when the lack of 
regulation of public utilities had caused problems. 
In the USA, there was an effective absence of public control until at least the early 
1900s. The result was twofold: on the one hand development of tramway networks 
was not constrained, but on the other a general free-for-all developed. In the UK, 
political interference was widespread at both national and local levels. As a result, 
private investors were more cautious, although economic historians have 
suggested that problems of asset-specific investment did not help. Under the UK's 
twenty-one year clause, franchises granted to would-be operators were too 
short. 155 
The friction and petty jealousies between tramway promoters mirrored the earlier 
tribulations of railway development. 156 As early tramway promoters were 
'frequently controlled by railway interests', with a 'strong influence of railway 
financing built into them' it was not so surprising. 157 Similar questions were raised, 
including inter-company rivalry and monopoly by certain companies, the impact on 
the old central core of a town and its urban fabric, the indirect social costs, and 
153 Ochojna, 'The Influence of Local and National Politics', pp.12S-146. 
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whether urban extension was stimulated. 158 These themes occur continually 
during tramway development debates, reflecting the uncertainty surrounding the 
choices available for electric-tramway systems. 
Following Guyot, a more recent interpretation by a tramway enthusiast, Jackson-
Stevens, was highly critical of the role of local authorities in UK. Progress was 
'bedevilled by the ineptitude and incompetence of local authorities' .159 In particular, 
he referred to the frustration encountered by the British Electric Traction Company 
(BET) to their extensive private enterprise plans, caused by municipal obstruction 
and lack of vision. Jackson-Stevens also attacked parochial narrow-mindedness, 
petty jealousies and rivalry between neighbouring towns, which resulted in 
incompatible systems. Furthermore, he referred to the acrimony surrounding 
BET's attempts to unify systems in the Black Country, where 'no uniform 
agreement could be negotiated' .160 
1.6 The British Electric Traction Company and the National Electric Construction 
Company (NECC) 
Both companies were key players in the debates about surface-contact traction. 
The BET had been registered on 26 October 1896 with Emile Garcke as the 
managing director, with the objective of developing electric tramways throughout 
the UK. 161 By 1901 he controlled 40 undertakings and 124 route-miles of electrified 
track, including the Wolverhampton & District Electric Tramways Company. 162 His 
network eventually expanded to more than 80 companies and subsidiaries. He 
158 Kellett, The Impact of Rai/ways, p.4. 
159 Jackson-Stevens, British Electric Tramways, p.12. 
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was an expert on electrical systems and founded the Tramways and Light 
Railways Association. Because of his huge controlling network, he was known to 
his detractors as 'oligarcke', and BET as the octopUS.163 Wherever he was 
involved, he had a decisive effect from his position of power. Garcke was born in 
Germany in 1856 and became a naturalised British citizen in 1880.164 Although 
BET became one of the most important operators in the tramway industry, the 
pressure to reduce fares at a time of increasing municipal ownership led to 
disputes with local councils. The company's attempts to increase fares had 
resulted in boycotts and a permanent loss of custom. As a result, the company 
began to withdraw from tramway operations after 1906.165 
The NECC was registered on 16 July 1897. The company's aims were similar to 
those of BET but its operations were on a much smaller scale. They promoted 
tramway systems in South Wales and Yorkshire, and unsuccessfully attempted to 
promote other systems in Scotland, Oxford and Folkestone. 166 NECC entered into 
an agreement with the Dolter Company in March 1905, and consequently 
championed that company's surface-contact system in Torquay and Mexborough 
through their subsidiary business ventures. 167 Financial problems soon beset 
NECC, and the company struggled to survive after the First World War, blaming 
the attitude of local authorities to expand their networks. Any remaining tramway 
interests were eventually acquired by BET in 1930.168 
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1.7 The duties of the Board of Trade 
In Torquay, Lincoln and Mexborough, the Board of Trade played an important role 
in regulating their surface-contact systems, and indeed ordering their closure when 
deemed necessary. But these were relatively new powers. In the early part of the 
nineteenth century, the Board of Trade's main job was to advise the Crown on 
matters of economic activity. By the 1860s, it had become responsible for new 
legislation on patents, design and trademarks, company regulation, labour, 
transport, and power. In this expanded role it had enormous influence on the 
development of tramway systems and both regulated and approved them. The 
Board of Trade ruled that while local authorities were best placed to construct and 
develop tram systems, 'given their disruptive nature in winding narrow streets, the 
lines should be leased out to company operators'. 169 
Learning the lessons from earlier regulatory problems with gas, water and 
railways, the Board of Trade imposed conditions on tramway undertakings that 
were in some cases tougher. 17o Investment had already been inhibited by the 
twenty-one year rule introduced by the 1870 Tramways Act (see section 1.4). 
Combined with the coincidental upsurge in electrical power, the stricter regimes 
imposed by the Board of Trade only exacerbated these effects. 171 Fears were also 
expressed by telegraph and telephone engineers, who were very much alarmed at 
the possibility that electric traction would interfere with their systems. Surface-
contact traction was particularly targeted. Reports from the United States 
suggested that great damage to gas and water pipes might be produced by 
169 Robert Millward, 'The Political Economy of Urban Utilities', in Martin Daunton (ed), The 
Cambridge Urban History of Britain, Volume 1111840-1950, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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electrolytic action. In consequence the Board of Trade stipulated that the drop in 
voltage on the return circuit should not exceed seven voltS.172 
In dealing with applications, the Board of Trade scrutinised the soundness of the 
companies, which had to be legally incorporated with limited liability status. Profits 
were controlled through the regulation of fares, rates and tariffs. The Board of 
Trade also had an interest in the configuration of routes to ensure that potential 
passengers' needs were satisfied. The more unscrupulous entrepreneurs, such as 
Henry O'Hagan, did manage to circumvent these requirements, especially those 
relating to competitive bidding.173 The Board of Trade also had supervisory powers 
to prevent monopoly abuse. If it was considered that the public were not receiving 
the benefits to which they were entitled after three years of a scheme's 
implementation, the Board was empowered to license the use of the line to other 
parties.174 
During the electrification era, the Board had an impressive list of senior managers. 
Charles Ritchie (Lord Ritchie of Dundee) was President from June 1895 until 
November 1900; Gerald Balfour (Earl Balfour) was President from November 1900 
until March 1905. He was the brother of AJ Balfour, the Prime Minister, who was 
an ardent supporter of the need for innovation in transport to overcome the 
problem of urban overcrowding (see section 2.2). Sir Courtenay Boyle was 
Permanent Secretary from 1893 until 1900. Together, these men spanned the 
most important years of tramway innovation and development. 
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1.8 Prominent actors in the surface-contact debates 
In Wolverhampton particularly, significant actors were influential in deciding the 
future of tramways. There, policy-making was effectively left to Council 
committees, and to the chairmen of those committees, since the Conservative and 
Liberal parties had few municipal programmes to implement.17s Committee 
chairmen frequently took decisions independently. These were subsequently 
confirmed by full council as a matter of course. The workload of council members 
was demanding, the calibre of some chairmen was frequently inadequate, and 
their judgement questionable. Meetings were described as 'tediously lengthy and 
ineffectual,.176 Not surprisingly, many of the most capable and successful among 
.. 
the borough's self-made men would avoid council service. 177 
Furthermore, committee chairmen were keen to promote their-own schemes and 
were reluctant to support other committees' plans. More projects resulted in higher 
rates, and as many councillors were industrialists, their business operations were 
being affected. There was therefore a need for a careful balancing act between 
committee policies and Council expenditure .. As a result, the Council chamber 
became 'a battleground where each chairman sought to promote the proposals of 
his particular committee, to obtain for his schemes the necessary amount of 
scarce resources, and to prevent other chairmen from pursuing any plans which 
might eat up those resources, leaving none for him' .178 
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Several key figures played leading roles in the decisions taken on forms of traction 
in Wolverhampton. Sir Charles Mander was a very influential industrialist who was 
also chairman of the Tramways Committee, and it is no wonder therefore that he 
eventually won the day with his support for surface-contact. Mander had been 
born to a well established local family in 1852. His grandfather, great-grandfather, 
uncle and great-uncle had all been members of the Board of Township 
Commissioners. He was educated at Rugby School and Corpus Christi College, 
Cambridge, graduating with an MA in the 1870s.179 He was a leading supporter of 
both electric lighting and trams. He was elected as a Conservative member to the 
Council in 1886, mayor for four consecutive years from 1892 to 1896, and an 
Alderman for thirty-four years. He was Chairman of the Lighting Committee from 
1893 to 1902 and the Tramways Committee from 1896 to 1920, as electricity was 
judged to be a common factor of both. 180 His Company were a leading 
manufacturer of paints and varnishes with several factories in Wolverhampton. 
The concentration of decision-making in his hands afforded him a key role in the 
development of surface-contact traction. Something of a philanthropist, one of his 
many gestures was to donate seasonal gifts, including warm underwear, for 
cabmen, tram conductors and drivers. As well as being an enthusiastic sportsman, 
he was a practising Anglican, and became secretary of the Church Congress of 
Wolverhampton in 1887.181 He held many eminent positions during his life, 
including that of High Sheriff of Staffordshire, and vice president of the Royal 
Orphanage. 
Stephen Craddock was vice chairman of the Tramways Committee and was a 
close friend and supporter of Sir Charles Mander. He was mayor in 1896/97. Like 
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Mander, he was said to have 'tramways on the brain' and followed him as 
chairman of the Tramways Committee in 1920.182 
Price Lewis was elected to Council in 1888 until 1914, and became mayor in 
1898/99. He was a member of the Methodist New Connexion church, and had 
'profound sympathy with labouring people and the struggles of the poor,.183 His 
asceticism was such that during his year of mayoralty, he judged himself 'unequal 
to the pecuniary obligations which custom rather than necessity has attached to 
the office' .184 He immediately cut the expected lavish entertainment and accepted 
no money payment or salary. His aim was to improve the conditions of the working 
classes as much as circumstances would allow. In many ways he was an 
extremist, and in due course became a leading opponent of the surface-contact 
system on the grounds of extravagance. 
GR Thorne, a firm opponent of the surface-contact system, was a Radical Liberal, 
belonging to a group of temperance reformers, 'opposing the Boer War and 
idolising Lloyd George. Their religious persuasions were extreme Nonconformity, 
Primitive Methodism and Baptism in particular,.185 Along with Price Lewis, Thorne 
led the opposition to the more influential Chairmen of other Committees on the 
Council and never became a member of Wolverhampton's establishment, despite 
being an elected member for twenty-six years between 1888 and 1920.186 
Alderman Sir John Morris was a vehement opponent of steam trams on the 
experimental route to Tettenhall. In 1881 when an extension was sought to the six-
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month trial period, he strongly opposed it on the grounds that the district was an 
attractive leafy suburb which was being damaged by the steam trams' noise and 
smoke.187 
1.9 Health and safety Issues 
The general public had little experience of electricity. They were frightened by 
something unseen yet so powerful, and concerns about health and safety of users 
naturally resulted. Overhead wires were considered to be dangerous because high 
winds could blow them down. Equipment failure could leave live wires exposed on 
the ground where all townspeople, especially children, were at high risk of 
electrocution. They might even start fires. 188 The more fanciful worried that 
inquisitive people might touch overhead wires with their umbrellas with similar 
results.189 Electrical engineers branded such fears as irrational and 
superstitious.19o In fact, the risk of any danger to humans from electrical systems 
was low because tramways operated at 500 volts, although even this low voltage 
could deliver an unpleasant shock. 
The higher speed of electric trams compared with horse traction resulted in an 
increase in accidents in most towns. At the turn of the nineteenth century, 
pedestrians, horses, cyclists, trams and motor cars were all competing for road 
space, and a 'modus vivendI had not yet been reached. 191 Horse-drawn carriages 
caused many of the accidents, as animals were unused to the new noises, but 
187 Ned Williams, By Road and Rail to Tettenhall, Wolverhampton: Uralia Press, 1980, p.13. 
188 Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology', p.70. 
189 John Burke, The Blackpool Tram Story 1885·1930 at 
http://www.allanburke.freeserve.co.ukltrams/trams.htm (accessed on 26 June 2003). 
,90 Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology', p.70. 
191 Mom, The Electric Vehicle, p.109. 
60 
three quarters of the victims were believed to be pedestrians, 'children playing in 
the streets inattentive to the new vehicles'.192 
Surface-contact traction introduced new dangers and posed risks to animals, 
particularly horses, when studs were left live after the passage of a tramcar. The 
risk to humans was, however, exaggerated. There was a wider dimension to the 
problem of health and the tramways. The politician Vesey Knox suggested that the 
UK's lack of progress with electrification of its tramways had a negative effect on 
the nation's health by denying the general public access to better dwelling 
places. 193 'Working class children will have to remain in crowded courts while they 
might have been in healthier suburbs'.194 In Munich, public-health experts urged 
.. 
companies to keep fares low so that poorer people could enjoy some fresh air 
'beyond the dust of the city for an hour or two on Sundays and holidays,.195 
However, opponents of tramcars believed that they simply added to the problem. 
Tramcars were dirty and unheated, filled with disease and germs, and were even 
accused of spreading pneumonia epidemics.196 
1 .10 Conclusions 
Most of the earlier literature about tramways and the adoption of surface-contact 
systems was general in nature. Very often it was written from a partial viewpoint, 
with little by way of analysis of the causal factors behind the conclusions reached. 
There was a tendency for tramway studies to be nostalgic and even romantic at 
times, written by enthusiasts for enthusiasts. The influence of politics, social 
192 Mom, The Electric Vehicle, p.109. 
193 Knox, 'The Economic Effect', p.S06. 
194 Ibid, p.510. 
195 Barbara Schmucki, 'On the Trams: Women, Men and Urban Public Transport in Germany', 
The Journal of Transport History, Volume 23/1, (March 2002), p.62. 
196 Howe, The British City, pp.12S-129. 
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composition, economics, and geographic location on the development of transport 
systems was neglected. All of these factors are undoubtedly to the fore in the 
debates about traction choices as later chapters containing case studies show. 
The contribution of individual personalities, such as the entrepreneurs and 
inventors, as well as powerful government administrators and council elites, could 
also be decisive. 
More recent authors have focused on the opposition to the development of new 
transport systems, and the interaction between various social groups. In particular, 
the hostility generated by the introduction of overhead electric traction for 
tramways was recognised. The question of whether aesthetic objections were 
really a surrogate for other reasons was suggested. In many towns, the proposed 
installation of overhead traction created controversy. This literature review 
highlights the key objections, and considers the alternative forms of traction. 
Although there was a degree of commonality among the various decision-making 
processes, it was by no means universal. The towns in the UK adopting surface-
contact systems were very disparate, varying from the wealthy health centres and 
seaside resorts of Hastings and Torquay, the ancient county town and cathedral 
city of Lincoln, the fiercely independent and proud city of Wolverhampton, to the 
urban districts of Mexborough and Swinton. 
The issue of health and safety has received little attention in the way of written 
documentation. Overhead traction created alarm due to the possibility of falling 
wires, and surface-contact systems posed hazards to both horses and 
pedestrians. There is evidence to support such fears, but all of this points to the 
fact that electricity was a relatively unknown and mysterious substance. 
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Most authors have tended to overlook the important role played by surface-contact 
traction in the development of the target towns. Among the few that did, McKay's 
conclusion that economic interests prevailed in the end may have some validity. 
None of the target towns was 'new', having all been established well before the 
modern transport era began. In considering the dynamics at play in the selection 
process, the question remains whether aesthetics and environmental factors were 
the main reasons for rejecting the overhead system, and how powerful each of 
them was. If they were not, what were the other contributing factors? 
There is a major difference between aesthetic and environmental factors in the 
context of tramway design. Aesthetics relates to a perception, an appreciation of 
the appearance of the actants, namely the trams and their power supply networks. 
To meet the standards desired in some towns, tram systems h(\d to harmonise 
with their surroundings. The environment was the urban fabric in which people 
lived and operated, and where social activities were carried out. At the turn of the 
nineteenth century, recognition of the environmental impact in towns was in its 
infancy, but for some decision-makers, the intrusion of tram systems on their 
surroundings raised important questions and had to be minimised. Possible 
answers have been suggested in this introduction and are developed in case the 
studies in subsequent chapters. 
63 
64 
CHAPTER 2 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPORT SYSTEMS 
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
'We cannot be satisfied methodologically 
with the designer's or user's point of view alone'1 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the development of transport systems from the 
introduction of horse-drawn omnibuses to the widespread acceptance of tram 
electrification. Cities developed economically and physically between the 1820s 
and the end of the nineteenth century, and innovators and entrepreneurs inevitably 
turned their attention to solving the problem of transporting people from home to 
workplace in a quick and efficient manner. The introduction of the numerous 
inventions that resulted, however, was not a linear process. There was a continual 
ebb and flow 'between the designer and the user, between the designer's 
projected users and the real users, between the world inscribed in the object [in 
this case the tram], and the world described in its displacement,.2 This free flow of 
ideas also spread geographically, and was cross-fertilised between North America 
and Europe.3 
The path from horse-power to electrification was difficult, with many inventions 
failing the crucial socio-economic viability test. Within the mix, surface-contact 
traction played an important part. Even so, there was experimentation with several 
surface-contact systems in an attempt to satisfy the environmental and aesthetic 
criticisms of overhead traction. Paris in particular, appeared to be a 'gigantic 
1 Madeleine Akrich, 'The De-scription of Technical Objects' in Wiebe E Bijker and John Law (eds), 
Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992, p.209. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Charles Klapper, The Golden Age of Tramways, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962, p.13. 
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testing station' at the end of the nineteenth century.4 The Dolter surface-contact 
system originated there, along with several others discussed later. The choices 
available caused confusion and uncertainty to many local authorities. 
Consequently, experimentation lasted almost as long as the heyday of electric 
traction systems, and was one of the reasons why some towns seemed so 
cautious about tramway development. 
Cultural values and symbolic meanings were also prevalent. In the nineteenth 
century, streets provided access to dwellings, but they had become congested and 
noisy, especially in the inner cities. Streets were not seen simply as transit routes, 
but were used for social purposes in densely populated areas.5 Scenes of 
everyday life were chaotic, alive and exciting.6 For the lower classes in large 
towns, residents gathered in streets to socialize, dance and promenade. They 
were informal playgrounds where children enjoyed games.7 Streets also provided 
a socio-economic function in that trade was conducted on them. Movement on foot 
encouraged social interaction and cohesion.s Attempts to designate streets as 
'transportation arteries' were therefore resisted because a valuable social amenity 
could be threatened.9 
Streets had different meanings for other strata of society. In parts of Hastings, the 
value attached to street usage was entirely different, particularly in the St 
.. Jean Robert, Les Tramways Parisiens :Troisieme Edition, Paris: Omnes et Cie, 1992, p.127. 
5 Clay McShane, Down the Asphalt Path: The Automobile and the American City, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994, p.62. 
6 Martin Daunton, 'Introduction', in Martin Daunton (ed), The Cambridge Urban History of Britain, 
Volume 1111840-1950, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.49. . 
7 John Armstrong, 'From Shillibeer to Buchanan: Transport and the Urban Environment' in M. 
Daunton, p.256. 
6 Ibid, p.231. 
9 Eric Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology in the City: Opposition to Mechanized Street 
Transportation in late-Nineteenth-Century America', in Michael Thad Allen and Gabrielle Hecht 
(eds), Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley 
Hughes, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001, p.B4. 
66 
Leonards area of the town. There, the wealthy believed that streets were mainly 
for parading in their carriages and enjoying the seaside air.1o 
In an engineering sense, trams were especially favoured in towns with very wide 
streets, like Paris boulevards, or where the road surface was so dreadful as in 
New York that digging it up could only improve matters. In the UK, streets and 
roads in general were narrow and winding and tramways were therefore liable to 
be very disruptive to existing activities and buildings. 11 Whatever method of 
traction was chosen, there would be disruption from the laying of tracks, power 
lines, studs, feeder cables, and their subsequent maintenance. 12 
The perceptions of the function of streets gradually changed as the century 
progressed. Instead of being sites of the traditional functiofls of social and 
economic exchange, in the eyes of the suburbanites streets became 
thoroughfares whose primary value was for transport. In the USA, 'dangerously 
high speeds or blighting overhead wires were not a sufficient reason to delay the 
suburbanite's homeward commute,.13 Such views were less prevalent in the UK, 
but the introduction of trams dramatically altered the function of streets. Main 
routes became transit thoroughfares, enabling people to move freely and more 
purposefully. Thus these new transport systems impacted adversely on social 
behaviour, and town dwellers had to adjust their customs to live harmoniously with 
the new technology. Such adjustments were not straightforward, and frequently 
produced conflict and fierce resistance. Neither did they follow a similar pattern in 
10 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 29 November 1879. 
11 James Foreman-Peck and Robert Millward. Public and Private Ownership of British Industry 
1820-1990, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p.164. 
12 Ibid, p.168. 
13 McShane, Down the Asphalt Path, p.30. 
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all towns. Tramway networks began to contend with the original street functions, 
particularly in the older, crowded districts. 
As far as the influence of women on traction design was concerned, nineteenth-
century society was male-dominated, to the extent that women's views were 
seldom heard or even invited. In general, women's social activities were separate 
from those of men's. Few ventured onto the stage of local government. There was 
one unusual social effect of tramways put forward which reinforced the dominant 
male stereotype. By one account, more rapid transport enabled men to go home 
for lunch where they could keep an eye on their wives, who if left alone all day 
'very often fell into bad and drunken habits' .14 Walsh contended that transport 
history has been predominately gender-blind. The greater part of analysis has 
been 'primarily by men for a male audience, focusing on machinery, technology, 
and the operation of transport companies,.15 A strong bond existed between 
technology and masculinity, closely identified with the mastery of machines. 16 Few 
analyses have acknowledged that although tram systems were designed by men, 
both men and women were users. Trams had a significant effect on the lives of 
women as consumers.17 
Unsurprisingly, tram operations were also male-dominated. There were few, if any, 
female drivers or conductors until the First World War when a shortage of men 
necessitated their employment. Women operators of tram systems were frowned 
upon. It was considered unglamorous and unbecoming for women conductors to 
14 House of Commons Select Committee, Municipal Trading, Q.2125. 
15 Margaret Walsh, 'Gendering Transport History: Retrospect and Prospect', The Journal of 
Transport History, Volume 23/1 (March 2002), pp1-8. 
18 Merete Lie and Knut H Sorensen, Making Technology Our Own? Domesticating Technology 
into Everyday Life, Michigan: Scandinavian University Press North America, 1996, p.202. 
17 Barbara Schmucki, 'On the Trams: Women, Men and Urban Public Transport in Germany', The 
Joumal of Transport History, Volume 23/1 (March 2002), pp.60-72. 
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use such familiar tramcar terms as 'any more fares please, pass right down inside, 
and no more room on top', even though the terminology was quite acceptable for 
male conductors. Such terms engendered doubt and disquiet, and were 
considered inappropriate for women who aspired to be ladies. By the standards of 
the time, they were behaving in an unseemly way. Conducting was not seen as 
suitable work for women. 18 
2.2 Technological development 
It is possible to define three loose periods of tramway development in the 
nineteenth century. The first began in the 1830s during the era of the horse-drawn 
omnibus. It continued with the introduction of horse tramways until the 1870s, by 
which time the limitations of horse-drawn vehicles were becoming increasingly 
apparent. Although there was some overlap, for the next twenty years the potential 
for steam, cable traction, accumulator batteries, compressed air, and a variety of 
non-animal power systems were tested, discussed and valued, as well as traction 
through current electricity. 19 New products such as heavy duty rails, special track-
work, improved tramcar bodies, lamps and heaters were also introduced.2o This 
second period was particularly creative, when inventors and entrepreneurs 
experimented with combinations of power sources and profitable management 
techniques. By the 1890s, overhead electric traction had begun to dominate in a 
third period following Sprague's demonstration of its viability in the USA. 
18 Schmucki, 'On the Trams', p.6S. 
19 Barbara Schmucki, 'The Machine in the City: Public Appropriation of the Tramway in Britain and 
Germany, 1870-1915', Journal of Urban History, 38/6 (April 2012), p.1070. 
20 Michael Massouh, 'Innovations in Street Railways before Electric Traction: Tom L Johnson's 
Contributions', Technology and Culture, Volume 18, No 2 (April 1977), pp.202-217. 
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Towards the end of the nineteenth century, an indication that a new age had 
dawned was a lecture given in Wolverhampton in 1898 by Professor Thompson of 
the Finsbury City and Guilds Technical College. Choosing the title 'The Coming of 
the Electric Horse', Thompson acknowledged that developments in the UK were 
several years behind the USA, but considered that the delay was advantageous. 
In his opinion, the USA was too anxious, and had 'spent money like water' on 
inventions. The UK began later, but had the full benefit of research and 
experiment. On the positive side, Thompson acknowledged that in USA, workers 
were 'now able to reside in suburbs, the slums have declined, and the health, 
comfort and morals of people have improved'. 21 
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the pace of expansion of tramway 
systems accelerated. Although a latent demand existed for the improvement of 
urban transport before electrification, there is little doubt that the improved 
services and fare reductions enabled by electrification assisted the process.22 The 
evidence suggests that the notions of 'technological push' and 'demand pull' were 
both present to explain the phenomenon.23 Undertakings were mainly run by local 
monopolies except in the larger towns, but even there, the nature of the service 
restricted competition to separate operational districts. Problems of ownership 
made it difficult to run trams of different operators on the same lines. 
However, by 1898 there were still only 6 kilometres of track per one million of the 
population in Britain, compared with 13 kilometres in France, 26 in Germany, and 
21 The Electrical Review, Volume 42 (4 March 1898), p.315. 
22 Anthony Sutcliffe, 'Street Transport in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century: 
Mechanization Delayed?' in Joel A Tarr and Gabriel Dupuy (eds), Technology and the Rise of the 
Networked City in Europe and America, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988, p.24. 
23 Chris Freeman, The Economics of Industrial Innovation, London: Frances Pinter, second 
edition, 1982, p.111. 
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more than 500 in the USA.24 By 1897, 90% of tramways in the USA were 
electrically operated. There is a possibility that the UK's slow take-up may have 
been partly a product of the 1870 Tramways Act, which included a twenty-one 
year purchase clause. In consequence, the investment in electrification might have 
appeared a very risky proposition to a private company.25 There is an element of 
truth in this suggestion, but it does not explain why some towns, which previously 
did not invest in horse-drawn tramways, were slow to adopt electrification. It is 
likely that the extra investment required for new tracks and equipment also 
delayed progress. Public opposition was also a delaying factor. 
Recognising the problems being caused by rapid urban development, Arthur J 
Balfour told the House of Commons in May 1900 that 'to remedy the great disease 
of overcrowding, you must trust to modern inventions and modern improvements 
in locomotion for abolishing time'.26 He had raised an interesting concept, the 
juxtaposition of time with transport, and consequently the possibility of suburban 
expansion with working class housing. Balfour was referring particularly to the 
situation of workmen travelling in London, but most of the great cities in UK were 
experiencing similar problems. The concept of 'the industrialisation of space and 
time'27 would have varied from town to town. Although trams were a spur to 
overcome this urban deficit and assisted a move towards modernity, there were 
24 Robert Millward, Private and Public Enterprise in Europe: Energy, Telecommunications and 
Transport 1830-1990, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.82. 
25 Foreman-Peck and Millward, Public and Private Ownership, p.166. 
26 Harold J Dyos, 'Workmen's fares in South London 1860-1914', Journal of Transport History, 
Volume 1, 1953-54, p.3. Arthur J Balfour was the leader of the Conservative party and became 
Prime Minister from July 1902 until December 1905. He became famous when, as Foreign 
Secretary, he made the Balfour Declaration in 1917, promising the Jewish people a national 
homeland in Palestine. 
27 Gijs Mom, The Electric Vehicle: Technology and Expectations in the Automobile Age, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004, p.7. 
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other factors which constrained outward expansion before 1914.28 Capuzzo 
concluded that the level of fares in relation to income, the degree of development 
and location of factory systems, patrimonial political structures, and policy towards 
the provision of public transport were all important issues?9 . 
Balfour, and many others, failed to realise the huge amount of opposition there 
would be to the suggestion of the humbler classes moving out of the densely 
populated inner city areas to the leafy suburbs These had previously been the 
province of the wealthier sections of society, who could afford private or public 
transport and had left the expanding cities in greater numbers. The movement had 
created segregated suburban areas quite unlike any urban phenomena occurring 
in America at that time. In the UK, much of the land was owned by the gentry, 
aristocrats, or corporate bodies.3o The majority of wealthy people had moved to 
the periphery by mid-century, while in America the alterations in residential 
patterns had yet to happen.31 
By the end of the century, however, there had been a massive explosion in 
population growth and movement in the USA, triggered to some extent by the 
boom in tramway construction. Tramcars 'enlarged cities, reached far out into the 
countryside, and integrated smaller hamlets into the urban market,.32 
28 Colin Divali and Barbara Schmucki, 'Introduction: Technology, (Sub)urban Development and 
the Social Construction of Urban Transport', in Colin Divali and Winstan Bond (eds), Suburbanizing 
the Masses: Public Transport and Urban Development in Historical Perspective, Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2003, p.10. 
29 Paolo Capuzzo, 'Between Politics and Technology: Transport as a Factor of Mass 
Suburbanization in Europe, 1890-1939' in Divali and Bond (eds), Suburbanizing the Masses', 
fP·29-32. 
David Cannadine, 'Victorian Cities: How Different?' in RJ Morris and Richard Rodger (eds), The 
Victorian City: A Reader in British Urban History 1820-1914, London: Longman, 1993, p.121. 
31 Ibid, p.12S. 
32 David E Nye, Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology 1880-1940, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), p.ix. 
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Table 2.1 indicates the comparative growth in tramway provision in the two 
countries, and emphasises the divergence between them: 
United Kingdom United States 
Cities with a 
population of 
Number Proportion supplied with Number Proportion supplied with 
street railways in 1903 street railways in 1902 
% % 
5,000 - 5,999 95 11 147 41 
6,000 - 6,999 75 13 98 52 
7,000 - 7,999 60 13 75 61 
8,000 - 8,999 43 9 45 71 
9,000 - 9,999 44 16 50 76 
10,000 -11,999 84 17 62 84 
12,000 -14,999 91 31 75 95 
15,000 -19,999 75 30 72 100 
20,000 - 29,999 82 50 78 100 
30,000 - 39,999 47 64 43 100 
40,000 - 49,999 30 80 13 100 
50,000 - 59,999 13 100 17 100 
60,000 - 69,999 13 92 7 100 
Table 2.1 - Comparison of tramway provision between the UK and tf1e USA in 1902-03.33 
Within the UK's provincial towns, tramway networks became more influential than 
rail. Travel distances were short and a cheap readily accessible service was 
essential to compete with the no-cost walking alternative. Trams were 'the 
gondolas of the people,34, encouraging the migration of the working classes into 
the suburbs; in this way they were 'enormously important, particularly in the 
provincial cities,.35 Their introduction was a local landmark, and 'battles between 
the protagonists of different systems of operation and of different structures of 
ownership enlivened late Victorian local government,.36 
33 Hugo R Meyer, 'Municipal Ownership in Great Britain', Journal of Political Economy, Volume 13, 
No.4 (September 1905), p.481. 
34 Richard Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy: Aspects of Working Class Life, London: Chatte & 
Windus, 1957, p.120. 
35 Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities, London: Pelican Books, 1968, p.1S. 
36 Ibid, p.16. 
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By 1902, Wolverhampton had provided one track-mile for each 6,300 of its 
inhabitants, while Lincoln's contribution was only one track-mile for each 27,000 
townspeople. These statistics reflect the massive difference between tramway 
provision in the UK and the USA, illustrated in Table 2.2: 
USA in 1902 United Kingdom in 1903 
One mile of tramway track for: 530 cities, groups of cities and 158 cities, groups of cities and 
towns, and groups of towns towns, and groups of towns 
% % 
less than 1,000 people 24.7 0 
each 1,000 to 1,499 people 33.0 0 
each 1,500 to 1,999 people 21.9 1.9 
each 2,000 to 2,599 people 10.7 5.7 
each 2,600 to 2,999 people 3.8 3.2 
each 3,000 to 3,999 people 2.8 7.6 
each 4,000 to 4,999 people 2.3 10.1 
each 5,000 to 5,999 people ) 12.7 
each 6,000 to 6,999 people ) 8.7 
each 7,000 to 7,999 people ) 1.5 12.7 
each 8,000 to 8,999 people ) 3.2 
each 9,000 to 9,999 people 0 5.1 
each 10,000 to 10,999 people 0 2.5 
each 11,000 to 11,999 people 0 6.3 
each 12,000 to 12,999 people 0 4.4 
each 13,000 to 19,999 people 0 10.1 
each 20,000 to 21,999 people 0 2.5 
each 22,000 to 29,000 people 0 3.2 
Table 2.2 - The ratio between tramway track and population.37 
Tramways continued to develop in the UK. By 1900 there were 213 tramway 
undertakings, and five years later, there were 311 of which one half were 
municipally owned.38 Despite the growth, statistics for March 1904 give an 
indication of how far the UK still lagged behind the USA in the development of 
electric traction, as Table 2.3 shows: 
37 Meyer, 'Municipal Ownership', p.483. 
38 Robert Millward, 'The Political Economy of Urban Utilities', in Martin Daunton (ed), The 
Cambridge Urban History of Britain, Volume 1111840-1950, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, p.324. 
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United Kingdom United States 
Method of Traction 
Route mileage Track mileage 
Electric 1,462 21,920 
Steam 109 259 
Cable 30 241 
Horse 235 170 
Gas 4 0 
1,840 22,590 
Table 2.3· Comparison between the UK and USA of tramway systems in March 1904.39 
To set these figures in context, the population of the UK in 1904 was little more 
than 38 million.40 In the USA, the population by then had reached 82 milli~n.41 The 
peak mileage for tramway systems in the UK occurred in 1923-24, when there 
were 2,624 route-miles.42 
Although the subject is dealt with specifically in later case studies, the evidence 
suggests that in the UK prevailing political convictions and social conventions at 
the local level helped shape the development of tramway systems. Municipal 
authorities were at the forefront of the process. At the national level, contemporary 
economic, political and aesthetic values of the Victorian era held sway. The 
challenging operational network was further complicated by regulatory and 
ownership requirements.43 In some towns, there were almost insurmountable 
barriers to tramway development from various sectors of society. 
39 Meyer, 'Municipal Ownership', p.484. 
40 http://www.populstat.info/Europe/unkingdc.htm (accessed on 12 March 2012). 
41 http://www.census.gov/population/estimateslnationlpopclockest.txt (accessed on 12 March 
2012). 
42 Richard J Buckley, 'Capital Cost as the Reason for the Abandonment of First-Generation 
Tramways in Britain', Journal of Transport History, New Series Volume 10, No.2 (1989), p.99. 
43 Millward, Private and Public Enterprise, p.4. 
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2.3 Horse-drawn omnibuses 
As the UK's economy expanded, the growth of horse-drawn vehicles from the 
early nineteenth century onwards was phenomenal. In 1814; there were 23,000 
four-wheeled vehicles in London. By 1834, there were 49,000; a period of rapid 
expansion followed so that by 1864 there were 102,000 four-wheelers with a 
further 170,000 two-wheelers.44 Such an enormous number caused massive 
congestion, quite apart from the pollution left behind by the horses. The increase 
in traffic was mirrored elsewhere in the rapidly expanding towns. Many of the four-
wheelers were delivery carts, transporting goods to a variety of destinations. 
Private travel was the realm of 'carriage folk', people who belonged to an 
immensely privileged and comfortable social class with an increasing amount of 
leisure time enhanced by their wealth.45 As urban growth intensified, demand for 
carrying capacity increased. Without improvements to road surfaces, however, the 
need would not have been met. In the great cities, paving kept pace with the 
increase in the number of carriages.46 In smaller towns, it did not. 
Based on a modification of existing intercity stage-coaches, the first horse-drawn 
omnibuses were introduced in Nantes by the French entrepreneur Baudry in 
1826.47 He quickly discovered that he was generating more revenue from short-
haul passengers than from his operations over a longer distance.48 Before long, 
these services were replicated in most large European and American cities. They 
were introduced to London and New York in 1829 and to Philadelphia in 1831. In 
44 Andrew N Wilson, The Victorians, London: Hutchinson, 2002, p.262. 
45 Mom, The Electric Vehicle, p.7. 
46 Ibid, p.B. 
47 John P McKay, Tramways and Trolleys: The Rise of Urban Mass Transport in Europe, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, p.1 O. 
46 McShane, Down the Asphalt Path, p. 7. 
76 
the UK, other cities quickly followed suit. The first recorded horse-drawn omnibus 
service in Wolverhampton appeared in 1833, albeit on a small scale.49 
The advent of these horse-drawn vehicles had a profound effect on rural as well 
as urban areas. Thompson estimated that it took five acres of land to provide feed 
for one horse.50 Based on this assumption, in the USA alone, more than a third of 
available agricultural land was given over 'to raising crops to fuel the nation's 
horses'. 51 The majority of these 'urban herds' were employed to move freight 
rather than people. Even so, the impact on agricultural production was significant. 
While clearly not on the same scale in the UK, such consumption of a scarce 
resource was a significant factor in the search for alternative forms of po.~er. 
In many towns, omnibuses had severe limitations. The rough nature of the roads 
reduced travel speeds to five or six miles per hour, which was not much faster 
than walking. The vehicles were uncomfortable and their propensity to overturn, 
combined with the difficulty in controlling the horses, posed safety hazards to both 
passengers and pedestrians. The hilly topography of some towns such as 
Hastings placed further limitations on the routes on which they could operate. 
Referring to the discomfort of travelling by omnibus in a debate in Hastings 
Council, one councillor likened omnibuses to 'ramshackle old liver pills from the 
way they shook people up', adding 'when passengers were outside (that is to say 
on top deck) it was like being up in a balloon, and when they were inside they 
were nearly stifled'. 52 Another correspondent wrote 'if you are fond of asphyxia, 
you should ride inside an omnibus on a sultry summer day: a bouquet of fusty 
49 Stanley Webb and Paul Addenbrooke, A History of Wolverhampton Transport, Volume 1: 
1833-1930, Wolverhampton: Uralia Press, 1978, p.6. 
50 FML Thompson, 'Victorian England: The horse-drawn society', Inaugural Lecture presented at 
Bedford College, London University, 1971. 
51 McShane, Down the Asphalt Path, p.4S. 
52 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 4 July 1891. 
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straw will contribute much to your gratification, and you may faint away amidst 
appropriate sights and sounds'.53 Clearly, there was a demand to find better 
solutions to the urban transport problem. 
There was a further problem. The high fares charged on omnibuses excluded the 
general population from using them. As a result, the bulk of the population 
continued to Jive in urban centres close to their workplaces. However, in the great 
cities, the main catalyst for suburban development was the train service, which 
enabled much faster connections between inner cities and their suburbs. In 
London, the suburb came first and the short-stage coach or omnibus followed 
once the potential passengers had been established.54 Nevertheless, omnibuses 
remained the primary form of transport, especially in the smaller towns and cities 
where distances were short.55 Omnibuses flourished, and In Paris for example, 
there were six horse-drawn omnibus companies covering various arrondissements 
in the early 1850s, and in 1855, the Compagnie Generale d'Omnibus was 
awarded a fifty-year concession to operate. 56 
An added problem to suburban development in the UK was that transport 
entrepreneurs were prevented by government regulations from investing in land on 
the outskirts of towns.57 The situation was different in the USA. Entrepreneurs 
there were prepared to see transport as an initial loss leader, paving the way for 
lucrative real estate development. Even so, omnibuses in the USA hardly changed 
urban residential patterns as they barely expanded the commuting radius. 58 
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2.4 The origin of tramways - horse-drawn trams 
The origins of a tramway on which vehicles could run lay in antiquity, but the first 
horse-powered street system is generally acknowledged to have begun in 1832.59 
This was introduced by the New York and Harlem Railroad Company, but it was 
unpopular and was suppressed for a time.6o The reason was that the iron rails 
were very wide with deep grooves and a ridge projecting above the road surface. 61 
They not only caused damage to other road users, but also the grooves frequently 
became clogged by mud and pebbles. Apart from an isolated four-mile section in 
New Orleans in 1835, there was little further expansion for almost twenty. years62 , 
despite the fact that costs per passenger were reduced below that of omnibuses.63 
The major advantage of rails was the reduction of friction between wheels and the 
track and consequently more efficient use of horse-power. A pulling power of thirty 
kilograms was needed to move a tonne on cobblestones and of twenty kilograms 
on a well-paved road. A pulling power of only eight kilograms was necessary to 
move the same load on rails.64 Overcoming the rolling resistance of wheels on 
road surfaces therefore enabled two horses to pull vehicles weighing six tonnes 
when fully loaded with up to fifty passengers.55 Passengers also experienced a 
more comfortable ride compared with omnibus travel. 
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Once the problems associated with rails protruding above the surface of the road 
had been overcome, horse-drawn tramways developed strongly from the 1850s 
onwards. In 1852, a French engineer named Alphonse Loubat introduced a rail 
flush with the road surface in Paris, and a regular service opened in the following 
year.66 Nevertheless, the wealthier sections of the public, particularly in the UK, 
continued to be slow in accepting what was perceived as an American 
innovation.67 Tramways generated an 'aura of public enmity,68, with much of the 
opposition coming from the carriage-owning community. They objected strongly to 
any innovation which affected their way of life. Many even preferred an improved 
omnibus service to a new technology.69 This manifestation of enmity varied from 
town to town and within society's stratifications. It was quelled for a time in the 
1860s by 'the endorsements of engineers, parliamentary commissions, and the 
transit industry,70 but was to reappear with renewed vigour once the battle to 
introduce electric tramways began. 
A 'brash and grandiloquent' American named George Francis Train succeeded in 
introducing the first real horse tramways in England on the macadamised roads of 
Birkenhead, the line opening on 30 August 1860.71 Subsequently he also obtained 
permission to lay down lines in London along Bayswater Road, Kennington Road, 
and in Westminster during 1861. These lines were, however, short-lived due to 
strong opposition from carriage owners, who objected to the damage caused to 
their wheels by the system's step rails, and obstructions to travel caused by 'these 
huge machines'.72 Inevitably, omnibuses were damaged and someone was killed. 
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Train was prosecuted on charges of creating a public nuisance and all charges 
were proven.73 
Omnibus companies also opposed the new form of competition. Train's venture in 
the Potteries in north Staffordshire fared a little better in 1864 when he substituted 
grooved rails for the step rails used elsewhere. That company lasted until 1880 
when it was wound Up.74 Overall, his ventures were unsuccessful, and he had left 
England in frustration well before, referring disparagingly to 'that effete country,.75 
In fact, it seems likely that Train selected the wrong areas for his innovations, 
particularly in London, where local wealthy residents owned their own carriages, 
and had no need of public transport. 76 Moreover, these higher-class res~~ents 
resented the unwelcome intrusion into their way of life. Although the interiors of 
Train's tramcars were luxurious, the refined carriage owners took exception to the 
'people's carriage' which they viewed as a vehicle for the lower classes. Train's 
'misjudgement of sensibilities' generated a 'collective memory of nuisance and 
obstruction' which was to last for many years. 77 
Partly as a result of this strong opposition, and partly because of the relatively 
good condition of roads in the UK compared with America and elsewhere, the 
second half of the decade saw a lull in development. The need for tramways was 
considered less urgent as 'cabs and omnibuses were available for general 
circulation at reasonable fares,.78 Another elitist view was pronounced by 
Alexander Beresford-Hope, a member of parliament, privy councillor, and one of 
the wealthiest men in the UK, who said 'society in London looks upon the 
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extension of tramways with dislike and apprehension,.79 Such opinions ignored the 
requirements of the poorer members of society who continued to have unmet 
transport needs. 
In 1865, Portsmouth introduced trams, followed shortly afterwards by liverpool, 
but by the end of the decade, only a handful of the larger cities had a service. 
During this period, the legislative procedure to start up a tramway service was 
complicated and expensive. As a result, legislation in the form of the tramways Act 
of 1870 was introduced to simplify the process (see section 1.4). Nevertheless, a 
plethora of potential bases for objection remained, and the anti-Trammites of 
Hastings and the wealthy inhabitants of Torquay were able to delay the 
implementation of any scheme in their towns. By contrast, the more dynamic 
decision-makers of Wolverhampton were ready to embrace the positive effects 
and had a horse-tramway network in operation by 1877. 
However, after the passing of the 1870 Tramways Act, development was more 
pronounced, and aided by the fall of the world price of fodder, a 'mild tramway 
mania' ensued.so But operational problems soon appeared. The disadvantages of 
horse power applied to trams every bit as much as to omnibuses. Horse feed 
represented one third of total operating expenses for horse-drawn trams. There 
were additional expenses such as horseshoes and harnesses, grooms and vets.S1 
A horse could be worked only four or five hours per day, but services had to be 
offered for twelve or sixteen hours.s2 Many cars required a double team, with extra 
teams for even modest grades. With spares required for emergencies, as many 
79 Clark, Tramways: Their Construction, p.14. 
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as eleven horses had to be kept on hand for each horse car.83 Horses were 
neither swift nor powerful. A lighter car weighed up to two tons and seated twenty 
passengers, which a single horse could only move at an average speed of five to 
six mph, or a maximum of eight to ten mph.84 For larger tramcars, two horses were 
needed to pull a vehicle weighing around 2 % tonnes. In hilly areas, extra trace 
horses were necessary. Due to the constant stopping and starting and the energy 
needed to overcome the inertia of a tramcar, the average working life of a horse 
was around four years, after which they were often unfit for any other work.85 
There were widespread complaints from passengers about the levels of comfort 
within tramcars. One correspondent, writing in the New York Herald, de~~ribed the 
adventure as 'modern martyrdom, with passengers packed in like sardines in a 
box with perspiration for oil. The seats being more than filled, passengers are 
placed in rows down the middle, hanging from straps like smoked hams in a 
corner grocery. Pickpockets ply their vocation and the foul, close, heated air is 
poisonous,.86 This conjures up a most unappealing image of transport, particularly 
in the crowded hours. Improved ventilation awaited further developments in 
tramcar design.87 
The eventual expansion of horse-drawn transport was helped to some extent by 
the rise in real earnings of the working classes. 88 Extra disposable income 
produced greater potential for freedom and mobility for leisure purposes. After the 
introduction of horse tramways, competition between that mode of transport and 
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omnibuses developed. Ochojna asserted that for a tramway to be successful, it 
would have to serve all major routes in a town or service area.89 This argument 
was based on the assumption that if a passenger had to change somewhere along 
the route, the advantages of speed and comfort would be undermined significantly. 
2.5 The limitations of horse power 
By the mid-nineteenth century, cities were almost entirely dependent on horse-
drawn transport for the movement of passengers and freight. Steam railways 
provided a service for inter-urban transport, but where deliveries had to be made 
to centres not adjacent to depots, horses remained the prime movers. Horse 
dependency increased as economic exchanges accompanied industrialisation9o, 
and the horse-drawn tram became the first urban mass-transport system.91 Many 
other public services also depended on animal power. At mid-nineteenth century, 
there were a quarter of a million working horses in the UK. By the peak in 1901, 
the number had grown to more than one mi"ion.92 
Horses were expensive and costly to maintain. When they were not working, they 
were 'eating their heads off'. 93 They were temperamental and many were nervous, 
and had difficulty in learning to cope with city traffic. 94 They were prone to illness 
and an epidemic could result in huge losses in both animal welfare and financial 
terms. Consequently, tramway companies kept an additional ten per cent of 
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horses above normal operational requirements in order to cover such 
eventualities. 
The 1872 Great Epizootic outbreak, an influenza epidemic which resulted in the 
death of thousands of horses in the USA, underlined the significance of horse 
dependency to a country's economy.95 Although not as serious in the UK, similar 
outbreaks did occur. Disaster struck in Hastings in the severe winter of 1876fl7 
when an epidemic killed several horses belonging to a private omnibus operator. 
In Keighley, the horses of the Tramways Company developed pinkeye soon after 
the Company was founded in 1888, and all services were discontinued for two 
months while they recovered. 96 Although such events did not lead to an immediate 
push towards mechanisation in Hastings as they did elsewhere - for one thing it 
was not so serious - a consequence was the flotation of an omnibus company to 
spread the risk. 
Horse-drawn transport was unhygienic. Each horse deposited between ten and 
twenty pounds of manure and two gallons of urine every day on the roadways, 
creating significant public health hazards.97 'The heaps attracted flies until they 
were pulverised, dried up and blown about by the wind,.98 The problem was 
exacerbated by the tramway operators' practice of storing manure in enormous 
heaps near their stables over many months, in order to sell it to farmers for 
fertiliser, even though the revenue raised from the activity was minimal.99 The 
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practice was widespread, and even a medium-sized stable in New York 
accumulated a 30,000 cubic feet pile of manure. 100 
Many of the problems associated with horse-drawn omnibuses persisted 
throughout the tram era, and objections to horse-drawn vehicles gathered 
momentum. A Victorian social conscience was awakening, and appalled by the 
scenes of brutality to overworked horses, social reformers began to raise concerns 
about animal welfare in many towns. 101 Unless road surfaces were well-
maintained, horses were frequently injured through straining and slipping. When 
teams of horses were operated, movement became more complex as all of them 
had to begin pulling at the same time to overcome the inertia of the load. 102 Horses 
occasionally dropped dead through exhaustion, causing severe delays to other 
traffic as it took hours to remove the carcasses. 103 The pro-tram lobby in 
Wolverhampton became energised by such matters when debates about 
electrification began at the end of the nineteenth century. Replacement by 
mechanised transport was recognised as a strong justification. As Buckley pointed 
out, horses were inherently unsuited to tramway operations. 104 
2.6 The move towards mechanisation 
Although the limitations of horse-drawn transport were well recognised, it is difficult 
to pinpoint exactly when the first attempts at mechanisation of horse tramways 
occurred.105 Rather, there was an effort to find a suitable alternative across a 
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broad front from the early 1870s onwards. 106 What is certain is that the cost of 
animal traction, combined with the propensity of horses to illness, the unhygienic 
consequences, and slow speed of travel, led to experimentation in several 
countries simultaneously. To the tramway operators, the economic case against 
equine power was indisputable.107 Additional tramcars required additional horses, 
and the cost per car mile remained practically the same. Increased services 
resulted in no proportional decrease in operating costs as there was no economy 
of scale. 
The tramway businessman WJ Clark noted that in the USA, the average 
percentage of operating expenses to gross receipts never fell below 80~o.' which 
left little for reserves and payment of dividends. 108 Similar statistics applied to the 
UK. Consequently, operators were incurring very high operC:3ting costs and making 
small profits, although the New York lines paid fairly well in the ii1itial stages with 
average annual dividends of 8% between 1855 and 1864.109 General 
unprofitability was not the only problem. Low levels of passenger comfort and 
humanitarian concerns also contributed to growing demands for an alternative 
method of propulsion. 
There was no sequential time line of traction development, but rather a series of 
parallel experimental investigations of possibilities. In the light of its success on 
railways, steam power was the most obvious choice for tramway mechanisation. 
Steam was proven and established in many fields of transport. It seemed that it 
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only needed scaling down and adapting to the needs of urban transit. 11o 
Speculators applied their experiences with railways and other forms of steam 
transport and sought to adapt them to suit urban street requirements. More recent 
authors have described this process as a form of social shaping between those 
involved with technological development on the one hand, and users and urban 
mobility on the other, a concept discussed in chapter 1 of this thesis.111 There 
followed a series of attempts by inventors to find a suitable solution, but there was 
no immediate panacea. 
2.7 Steam traction - a source of inanimate power 
The first steam-powered light locomotives to run on tracks laid in the streets 
appeared in New York in the 1830s. They were unsuccessful due to public fears 
that their introduction was a ploy for main-line railways to penetrate inner-city 
streets, and objections to their polluting effects. They were 'noisy, emitted large 
volumes of steam and smoke, and posed dangers of fire and explosion' .112 It was 
not until 1859 that the first steam-powered vehicles designed solely for tramway 
operations were introduced on an experimental basis in several cities in the 
USA.113 The steam trams, manufactured in New Jersey by Grice and Long, were 
of the combined tram design, incorporating the steam motive power into the 
passenger compartment. 114 They did not last long, but several manufacturers, 
including Grice and Long, continued development throughout the 1860s. 
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In the UK, trials with a separate locomotive and passenger-car trailer began on the 
Ryde pier tramway in March 1864. The trial was unsuccessful, but stimulated 
further experimental work throughout the next two decades. The first permanent 
steam tramway service in the UK began at Wantage on 1 August 1876.115 This 
was a roadside line, running for two-and-a-half miles on a verge alongside the 
Wantage Road. Again, it was unpopular, but this time objections came from the 
authorities in the shape of the Board of Trade inspector, who was said to be 
horrified by the achieved high speed of fifteen mph.116 
As with the later introduction of electrically powered trams, the UK lagged behind 
in the introduction of steam power despite the many indigenous manufacturers. As 
a consequence, several companies sought export outlets across the world, so that 
by 1875, UK-manufactured steam trams were operating in Brazil, Belgium and 
France. One example of the export of locomotives and expertise was the first 
regular steam passenger service in Paris, operated by Les Tramways Sud (the 
Southern Tramways). This company had been formed on 9 August 1873 by 
presidential decree, and was originally horse-powered.117 In March 1876, the 
system was extended to include steam traction. GP Harding, an English promoter, 
obtained a concession to order Merryweather dummy locomotives employed over 
the four-and-a-half mile route from the Bastille to Montparnasse railway station. 
Shortly afterwards, a total of forty-six locomotives were delivered to various 
operators in Paris.118 Steam dummy locomotives were developed to address the 
distress caused to the horses still operating omnibuses and private carriages. This 
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involved enclosing the engine in a box-like body in order to make them resemble 
horse tramcars as far as possible. 
The primary benefits of steam were economic. A steam tram could do the work of 
five horses at less than half the cost. However, although they provided an 
improved mass-transit service, steam trams were not universally welcomed. Even 
dummy locomotives did not entirely overcome the dangers caused by scared 
runaway horses. Also, damage to the light rails previously designed for horse 
trams was considerable. The loads imposed were often in excess of seven tons, 
resulting in high track-maintenance costs. More importantly, the number of 
accidents caused by steam trams persuaded the public that animal power was 
better suited to the crowded streets.119 A contemporary brochure described the 
machines as being 'far from graceful', and complained that 'a cloud of steam 
condensed everywhere, on the passengers, on passers-by, and on people in 
carriages,.12o Consequently, the Paris steam locomotives were taken out of service 
and by 1878 had been replaced once again by horse traction, with most engines 
being transferred to Harding's undertaking in Rouen. By 1881 Tramways Sud was 
making heavy losses and in 1884 the Company applied for bankruptcy. 
Combined steam cars, wherein the steam engine was incorporated within the 
passenger compartment, were unsuccessful on UK tramways with very few lasting 
beyond the experimental stage. The main objections were noise, vibration, heat 
and dust in the passenger compartment. Also, unequal weight distribution made 
the vehicle unstable, and any defect would put both the traction and passenger 
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unit out of action. 121 They had a little more success in continental Europe, although 
separate vehicles soon became the norm. 
The tight regulatory framework in the UK acted as a deterrent to innovation. In 
particular, McShane blamed the Red Flag Act of 1865 for hindering the more 
advanced developments in road-based mechanical traction in the UK. He saw the 
law as symbolising opposition to high-speed road travel and restricting the spread 
of steam-powered vehicles. In comparing the respective countries' entrepreneurial 
spirit, he concluded that American venture capitalists would hardly be willing to 
invest in road-based steam vehicles in the UK after such a daunting precedent. 122 
Improving and regulating boilers to prevent the possibility of accidents also 
became a major political issue, and in the UK a rigid inspection regime for steam 
tramways was introduced by the Board of Trade in 1875.123 Apart from steam and 
smoke emission, regulations on noise, brake systems, and speed of travel were 
introduced. The matter became so important that there were three House of Lords 
Committees between 1877 and 1879 to consider tramway policy, deliberations that 
culminated in a recommendation to the Board of Trade to issue only seven-year 
licences for steam operation.124 Ochojna attributed the languishing of the steam-
tram industry to the ensuing regulations. When the time came to renew the original 
seven-year licences for the use of steam with the Board of Trade, complaints from 
individuals and local authorities became more insistent. 125 To become acceptable, 
the new technology had to be 'transformed from unfamiliar, exciting and possibly 
frightening things into familiar objects embedded in the culture of society and the 
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practices and routines of everyday Iife.126 In reality, this did not happen, and to the 
opponents of steam trams, they remained a 'nightmare come truet127, as the 
illustration at Appendix 2 from the satirical magazine The Dart indicates. 
The final House of Lords Committee strongly recommended that local authorities 
should construct and maintain the tramway tracks in order to protect the public 
highway, but should be debarred from operating the tramways, mainly to protect 
the integrity of the public highway in the event of any conflict of interest.128 Despite 
the recommendation, on 11 January 1883 Huddersfield Corporation Tramways 
began operations with steam traction. This was the first municipally-owned 
tramway in the UK.129 The reasons for the departure from standard practice were 
twofold. The gradients within the town were such that horse tramways were 
deemed impossible, and in addition, the enterprise was too risky to attract a 
private operator. 
The relative success of steam trams between 1880 and 1900 was not without its 
problems. The locomotives were difficult to maintain, and a further disadvantage 
was that they were difficult to start up initially, and the constant stopping and 
starting reduced their efficiency. They were therefore unable to exploit the benefits 
of increased speed, and average journey times suffered as a result. 
Other objectors pointed to their proneness to accidents. Among the evidence cited 
was an incident in Huddersfield in 1883, when seven people were killed and 
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twenty-eight injured by a runaway engine. 13o In 1891 an engine exploded 'with 
disastrous consequences,.131 Such incidents, however tragic, are associated with 
many transport modes, and assume greater significance when a system has 
become unpopular for other reasons. 
Nevertheless, because of the widely accepted shortcomings of horse power, there 
was some network expansion. To many, however, they remained 'belching trains, 
startling horses and mowing down pedestrians indiscriminately' .132 Even the 
satirical Punch magazine published a poem describing steam trams as 'bogeys to 
be avoided at all costs' .133 An amusing all-black postcard was produced in the 
Potteries, captioned 'when Stoke stokes'.134 The patience of passengers on the 
upper decks had become so drained that they complained vehemently about the 
soot and smoke from the exhaust chimneys, and a deputation was sent to the 
Board of Trade. 135 As a result, the steam trams were withdrawn in 1882, though 
they reappeared two years later after modifications had been carried out. 
At their zenith, the transport historian Klapper ventured that there must have been 
more than 2,500 steam trams in operation in continental Europe. 136 In the UK, the 
network increased from 9.65 route-km in 1878 to 82.06 route-km in 1883, and to 
410.3 route-km by 1891.137 According to Board of Trade returns, the peak in the 
UK arrived in 1898 when there were 589 engines in service. 138 The main 
concentrations were in the conurbations of the Black Country and the north of 
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England where steep gradients made the use of horse tramways impossible, 
although more than fifty undertakings countrywide ran steam trams at some time. 
By contrast, there were only 698 engines operating in the USA in 1892, falling to 
616 in the following year.139 
In her doctoral thesis, Pender claimed that the number of steam trams in operation 
in the UK was 'truly impressive' given its smaller relative size. 14o Comparative 
statistics do not show the real picture. By 1892, steam traction had peaked in the 
USA and was already declining. Electric traction had taken off, and the UK was 
lagging behind the USA in the introduction of the latest technology. In the early 
1890s, there was substantial opposition to steam trams in the USA from both town 
authorities and the horse-owning fraternity, partly due to the anti-pollution lobby.141 
Electric traction was in the ascendancy with 13,413 tramcars in 1892.142 This 
number had increased to 17,233 in the following year. Steam traction in the USA 
peaked in 1890, when there were 527 route-miles carrying 287 million 
passengers.143 
Some steam-tramway promoters were not entirely scrupulous. In particular, Henry 
O'Hagan, described by some authors as 'notorious', gave 'lurid details in his 
autobiography of bribery of local officials to secure concessions, very high 
promotion expenses, and of what is usually regarded as watered capital'. 144 A 
financial journal claimed that he built tramlines at prices not subject to competition, 
and 'of all the tramways ushered in by his City of London Contract Corporation Ltd, 
139 Clark, Tramways: Their Construction, p.731. 
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75% of the capital was lost' .145 He was involved with most of the major steam 
undertakings, including those in south Staffordshire and the Manchester 
conurbation, and was responsible for 'part of the odium incurred by the urban 
steam tram'.146 GP Harding, the entrepreneur of Paris Sud and Rouen, acquired a 
similar reputation. He received 3.5 million francs in shares for tracks and 
equipment costing only 2 million.147 McKay identified two different sources of 
profits for such entrepreneurs, the more obvious being operation of the system 
after the lines were built, and the other being the inflation of capital from 
construction and the provision of equipment.148 
By the early 1890s, steam tramways began to decline as electrification became 
popular, and were replaced by electric power when it was shown to be a cleaner 
and more efficient form of traction. In the complex world of tramway development, 
the steam tram enthusiast Dr Whitcombe called the advent of elactrical traction 'a 
great stunt initiated by the Press' and backed by 'American propaganda' .149 In an 
open debate with Whitcombe in 1937, locomotive designer H Holcroft argued that 
it was an awakening of municipal consciousness that sounded the death knell of 
steam trams. Municipally-owned power stations stood idle for most of the day, and 
the option of taking over tramways occurred just at the time when the authorities 
wanted to secure a large power load for the generating stations to bring the unit 
cost down and thereby attract new customers. 150 In Holcroft's view, councils 
therefore exercised their option to purchase in order to fill that gap. The last urban 
steam tram in the UK ran in 1909. 
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2.8 The fireless steam engine and the Mekarski compressed-air system 
A variation on the steam engine designed to overcome the strict regulations 
governing the polluting effects of smoke and ash was the fireless steam engine. 
Pressurised steam was generated in a stationary boiler, usually situated at a line 
terminus. The steam was fed into a locomotive, which ran on the stored energy as 
steam was released into the driving pistons. Not only was pollution centralised, but 
the weight of the locomotive was also reduced since it was unnecessary to carry a 
coal supply.151 The system was first used by Emile Lamm in New Orleans in 1873, 
and transferred to France by Leon Francq, who installed it in Lille, Lyon and parts 
of Paris from 1876. There were benefits from reduced pollution, but no economic 
or operating advantages compared with horse-drawn trams. A major disadvantage 
was that after around fifteen kilometres of normal running, recharging became 
necessary, and any extra exertion could leave the locomotive stranded as it ran 
out of power.152 
The Mekarski system used compressed air instead of steam to drive the pistons. It 
was installed in Nantes and was used on a number of lines in Paris from 1878 
onwards.153 The system solved the problem of pollution from the locomotives, but 
the stationary compressors required uneconomically large amounts of coal. It met 
the environmental and aesthetic requirements, but was unreliable and slow, 
achieving average speeds of only five-and-a-half mph.154 Compressed-air systems 
were considered as dangerous to the public as steam trams due to the risk of 
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explosion.155 However, a professional journal in support of the system, reported a 
boiler explosion incident in New York, and took delight in stressing that the only 
injury was to a man in a restaurant, who sustained burns when a small piece of 
flying metal knocked over a can of hot water on a stove. 156 Needless to say, the 
accident would have been less amusing if the man had been hit by the piece of 
metal. 
Wolverhampton Council did in fact consider a compressed-air engine in 
September 1881 at the behest of the Tramways Company, but finally rejected it 
because they mistakenly thought it was powered by steam. 157 It was subsequently 
discovered that the word 'steam' had been inserted into the company's application 
in error, but by then it was too late. 
2.9 Cable traction 
It is likely that cable traction evolved from the system adopted in mines and 
collieries, and was first applied to street tramways in San Francisco in 1873.158 
The system was designed in the previous year by Alexander Hallidie, and is an 
example of a technology appropriate to topography as San Francisco has hills far 
too steep for horse-drawn transport. 159 Cable cars were operated by an endless 
cable in a duct between the rails, where a 'gripper' on the car engaged with the 
cable for propulsion (see Appendix 3).160 Power to pull the cables was provided by 
a centrally-located steam engine. The problem of smoke pollution was therefore 
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concentrated, overcoming one of the causes of opposition to steam-tram 
traction.161 As there was no possibility of boiler explosion, cable traction also 
improved safety, and the speed of the cable limited the speed of the tramcars to 
an acceptable level. However, efficiency was low because up to 80 per cent of the 
power generated by the steam engine was needed to haul the heavy cable. 162 
Although he regarded cable cars as the only real competitor to conventional 
overhead-powered trams in the USA, Nye pointed out that they were more than 
twice as expensive to instal1.163 
At the zenith of cable traction in the USA in 1890, there were 283 route-miles over 
which 373 million passengers travelled each year.164 The advantages of cable 
traction compared with horse power were speed: cars were two or three times 
faster; and versatility: cars could ascend gradients much too steep for horses. 
Most cities in the USA were built on a grid pattern, which was better suited to the 
use of cable chains than the generally more complex shape of European cities. 
Indeed, the curves and junctions in most historic European cities caused such 
operational problems that cable cars were considered little more than 
curiosities.165 
Despite its limited potential, cable traction was introduced in some cities where it 
was possible to have long straight runs. The first system in the UK was at 
London's Highgate Hill in 1884, and lasted until it was replaced by the overhead 
system in 1909. It was also employed in Edinburgh, Birmingham and Streatham, 
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although the latter two systems were short-lived.166 In Edinburgh, however, cable 
cars ran for more than twenty years,167 where they were disparagingly referred to 
as a 'perpetuation of an anachronism' by supporters of standard overhead 
systems. 16B 
Edinburgh's system was the largest in Europe and indeed, the fourth largest in the 
world comprising 36 route-miles. 169 There was a serious attempt to replace it in 
1907, referred to in a contemporary journal article as the 'Edinburgh Tramway 
Fiasco'.17o The Tramways Company needed to renew worn-out cables and their 
adviser, Professor Kennedy, suggested experimentation with surface-contact 
systems. The city council visited selected towns where the Lorain, Dolter and 
Griffiths-Bedell systems were operating, but their final report recommended only a 
two-hundred yard section of surface-contact, with a mixture of cable and overhead 
traction in the suburbs. Intercommunication between the routes would have been 
difficult as the heavier electric cars would damage the light track of the cable cars. 
Also, a dual power system would have required different rolling stock and 
maintenance programmes, resulting in extra costS.171 
Not surprisingly, the report was rejected as a 'tangled recommendation'. At an 
estimated cost of £32,000, the recommended solution was not much less than 
total cable replacement. Meanwhile, the Kingsland Traction Company offered to 
install their mechanical surface-contact system, using the cable car's centre 
conduit slots, at a cost of £24,300. The city council decided to opt for cable 
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replacement, which the Electrical Review, as an organ of the electrical industry, 
labelled a 'stick in the mud pOlicy,.172 Electric traction had 'appeared to be a 
goldmine,173, but an acceptable solution still had to be found. 
While cable traction was initially welcomed, it became unpopular with the general 
public. The system was subject to frequent cable, pulley and power plant failure, 
as well as obstructing other road users. Drivers had to be particularly skilful when 
detaching from and re-attaching to cables at route line changes, otherwise the 
tram would stop violently, causing accidents to passengers. 174 Despite some 
advocates believing that it could become a popular form of traction 175, the 
disadvantages were too great and it was not long before innovators looked 
elsewhere. 
2.10 Accumulator cars 
As no entirely successful system had been discovered, there continued to be 
much experimentation, driven not only by economics, but by a need to find an 
environmentally and aesthetically acceptable solution to the urban transport 
problem. One of the early pioneers of electric traction was Thomas Davenport, 
who in 1835 in the USA used primary battery power as the source of electrical 
energy to drive his motors.176 His invention was, however, massively expensive 
compared with coal-powered steam traction, with the additional problems of 
handling chemicals and of fragile material within the battery cells. 177 Meanwhile, 
Robert Davidson in Scotland experimented with a battery-powered electric motor 
172 The Electrical Review, Volume 60 (15 March 1907), p.452. 
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on a railway car, reaching speeds of four miles per hour.178 In 1854, Professor 
Page developed a battery-powered electric locomotive which attained speeds of 
19 mph in the USA. Such attempts were short-lived due to the high cost of 
operation.179 
In London, Brussels, Berlin and Paris, experiments were carried out with 
accumulator-driven tramcars from 1884 onwards. At first, the results were 
encouraging as the average cost of such traction was five pence per car mile 
compared with six-and-a-half pence per car mile for horse traction. 18o 
However, in May 1890, the Brussels experiment was abandoned, a decision which 
left the Electrical Engineer puzzled, finding it 'curious that the initiators of the 
storage car system in Europe should abandon their attempt at the time when the 
great London tramway companies were convinced of the financial success of the 
system, and were actively taking steps for the extensive introdur.tion of it'.181 
Accumulator-driven tramcars soon proved impractical. Batteries were insufficiently 
strong to withstand the forces placed upon them by uneven tracks. They were only 
capable of containing a limited energy supply, which necessitated frequent 
recharging, and consequently reduced their range of operation. 182 Batteries 
themselves were heavy, accounting for around 30% of the total tramcar mass. 
This limited their passenger-carrying capacity. As a result, they proved costly and 
inefficient. 
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There were social issues also. Passengers complained of strong smells from the 
battery chemicals and expressed fears about damage to their clothes in the event 
of spillage.183 Indeed, there were several instances of passengers pursuing claims 
for damage caused by acid leakage. In Birmingham, a portion of the gross profit of 
the Central Tramways Company was set aside for the settlement of such claims. 
Because of the restricted range of the cars, accumulator traction was relatively 
unsuccessfuI184, and made little commercial impact in the UK.18s Interest 
diminished quickly after 1895186 with the exception of Birmingham, where 10 cars 
ran on the Bristol Road line between 1890 and 1901 despite causing much trouble 
with frequent breakdowns.187 As it happens, the Birmingham accumulator cars 
were manufactured by the Electric Construction Company of Wolverhampton, one 
of whose directors, responsible for the commercial side of the business, was the 
renowned Emile Garcke referred to in later chapters. 18S 
2.11 The advent of current electricity 
The early nineteenth century saw a series of scientific discoveries that 
underpinned notable developments in electrical engineering.189 One of the most 
important occurred in 1831, when Michael Faraday developed the dynamo, a 
device capable of converting electricity into motion, on which later electric motors 
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were based. But there were many years of further experimentation by innovators 
and pioneers before a proven traction system for transportation was available. 19o 
Another major development occurred in 1860s when the principle of self-exciting 
electromagnets was discovered independently by Wheatstone and Siemens. The 
discovery paved the way for the Belgian Gramme, who in 1870 built the first 
generator capable of providing bulk economic supplies of electricity.191 From there 
on, progress was halting as each inventor attempted to improve the designs of 
others, until in 1879, Siemens and Halske built a locomotive for the Berlin 
Industrial Exhibition. Powered by a two horse-power dynamo, the locomotive 
attained speeds of 7 kilometres per hour hauling three trailers. Each trailer carried 
eighteen passengers.192 Current was transmitted from a small central station to a 
motor on the car by means of a third rail. 193 
Progress was then more rapid, and the first commercial electric tramway was 
opened at Lichterfelde in Germany in May 1881.194 In this system, one of the 
running rails was connected directly to the positive pole of the dynamo, and the 
other to the negative. However, if both rails were touched simultaneously, shocks 
to pedestrians and animals occurred. The problem was to find a power supply that 
was both efficient and less dangerous to the general public. 
Initial experimentation with overhead trolley systems was carried out by Leo Daft 
and Charles van Oepoele in the USA, but it was the American Frank Sprague who 
achieved the breakthrough with his 'universal swivelling, under running trolley to 
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pick up current from a single copper wire conductor' .195 His invention 'launched the 
electric streetcar revolution' in 1887.196 In Sprague's opinion, overhead-line 
propulsion would prove to be the cheapest, but he conceded that the system 'may 
be unsightly in appearance, and perhaps be somewhat in the way,.197 He further 
predicted that overhead lines would be resisted in many large cities. His prediction 
proved to be correct, especially in Europe, although in the USA any opposition 
was short-lived.198 
Thus the first awareness had emerged of a set of issues that would be debated in 
the UK and elsewhere over the next twenty years. Despite his prediction of 
resistance, Sprague also believed that strong financial incentives for private 
decision makers 'could almost always be trusted to override non-economic 
considerations and impractical aesthetic principles,.199 Electrification had to 'serve 
both public need and private greed,.200 A careful balance was necessary, but there 
were many instances where apparent aesthetic considerations won the day, as 
later case studies show. After Sprague had demonstrated the practicability of 
electricity for tramcar propulsion, contemporary authors considered that the 
inventive and experimental stage had ended, and it was the turn of the engineer 
and designer to perfect details.201 
In the overhead traction system, current is collected by means of a trolley pole. 
The trolley presses against the underside of the wires and current is passed to 
motors on the tramcar. By 1893, there were no major technical or legal barriers to 
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prevent the installation of overhead traction. Indeed, systems were already being 
introduced in Leeds and in south Staffordshire, the latter adjacent to 
Wolverhampton's boundaries.202 
2.12 The open-conduit system 
Although overhead systems proved almost universally acceptable, alternatives to 
the unsightly poles and wires were still sought in certain locations. One of the 
options was the open-conduit system. This comprised an enclosed electrical 
supply buried in a channel between the rails of the track. Power was transferred to 
the tramcar by means of a collector known as a 'plough', a rod protruding .from 
beneath the tramcar running in an open s10t.203 The main advantage was that no 
overhead wires were required and maintenance costs were lower than those of 
overhead wires.204 A further benefit was that any anticipated dar,lage to existing 
gas and water mains from current leakage would be minimized as the conduit was 
completely insulated. In 1885, Blackpool became one of the earliest towns to 
adopt open conduits, but soon encountered a major problem. The system was 
installed along the sea-front, but sea water flooding caused frequent breakdown, 
and wind-blown beach sand, mud, pebbles and other debris blocked the conduit 
slots and interfered with traction. 205 Because of these difficulties, the system was 
converted to overhead traction in 1899.206 
In the very same year of 1899, Clifton Robinson, who was managing director of 
several tramway companies including London United Tramways, made a number 
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of visits to European cities to investigate alternative forms of electric traction.207 He 
saw the open-conduit systems in use in Berlin, Brussels and Budapest. He was 
particularly impressed by the combined overhead and open-conduit system in 
central Paris, which he thought could be adopted by the London County Council. 
Consequently, the open-conduit system was used extensively in central London 
despite the high cost of installation and disruption to street traffic while work was 
undertaken. The network eventually comprised 123 route-miles.208 To overcome 
aesthetic objections, the LCC installed a hybrid system, with open-conduit 
operation in the central area and overhead traction in the suburbs. Open-conduits 
were also installed in the centre of Bournemouth, and lasted from 1902 until 1911 
before replacement by overhead wires.209 A handful of towns in France were 
relatively enthusiastic about open-conduits, with the last line closing in Bordeaux in 
1958.210 It is likely that memories of this system persuaded the Bordeaux 
authorities to install a second-generation surface-contact network in 2003 (see 
chapter 6).211 
Estimates of the cost of installing open-conduits varied greatly. One author 
suggested they cost thirty-three per cent per mile more than overhead.212 
However, according to Dover's near-contemporary study, the cost of open-
conduits was twice as high per mile compared to overhead.213 In the USA, they 
were found to be four times as expensive.214 
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2.13 Surface-contact systems - the aesthetic answer? 
Surface-contact systems, sometimes called closed-conduits, involved a ground-
level power supply for electric trams. Studs were set in the road at intervals and 
connected to a buried electric cable by switches operated by magnets, usually 
located on the tramcars. Current was collected from the studs by a 'skate' or 'skid 
collector' under the tramcar. 
In his book tracing the development of tramways, Klapper described options to 
overhead systems under the pejorative term of 'deviationists', which coul~ be 
interpreted as a subconscious indication of his views. In order to explain this 
seemingly irrational departure from the logic of technologicai norms, he ascribes 
the experimentation taking place to a 'profound urge to be differ€;nt in human 
nature,.215 The evidence does not support his case and there was a rather more 
complex set of issues than his over-simplification suggests. There is no doubt that 
some towns diverged from an established course or a standard deemed 
acceptable elsewhere, but the reasons lay in strongly held beliefs and local 
considerations, a combination of factors that could not be resolved by simply 
copying others, as argued in the case studies in later chapters. 
The surface-contact method of tramway current collection for commercial 
operation originated in France. Some 50 route-miles of lines were laid in Tours, 
Lorient and Paris with moderate success.216 Their sponsors' intention was to 
overcome aesthetic objections by finding a viable method of operation not 
requiring overhead wiring. There was also an economic advantage as the surface-
215 KI apper, The Golden Age, p.68. 
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------ --~-~---~---------------
contact system was a cheaper alternative to open-conduits, as the latter required 
major excavation of the street to install the power supply in deep tubes.217 The 
towns in this country which installed surface-contact systems were as follows: 
,.---~~--------~~ ~ ---~-~---.. ------- ~--.-~ 
'Replaced Location iType Installed Replacement 
I I Method 
- -_. --~----. "------ ._-------_._--_._- ~ 
Wolverhampton Lorain 11902 ---
1
1921 Overhead 
i jWires 
'-" - -------- ---- ---.. ------- ,.---- ------ ._-----~~-- -
Hastings Dolter 1905 
1
1914 , Petrol-electric. 
(only along sea I 'Later, overhead , ! • front) I Wires. I 
- .. _-_ ... - ---_ .. _- ~------ r '-- -- ----... -~-- "--- I r9-f9~- r:: -----Lincoln Griffiths-Bedell 
1
1905 Overhead 
I 
,Wires 
,- _ .. _-,_._-- - _ ... -.---- ,- .. _- ._--_."._-- .. - _._._. __ . -- . __ ._- 11907----- 11908----~ r-------------------Mexborough Dolter pverhead 
I I ,Wires i 
- ._-_. __ ._--_ ... _------- ... _. __ .. 
'Oolt-er-------- 11907-~ 11911---- r::--------------,Torquay ,Overhead 
I I Wires , 
r- ---- .•. _ .• --- ------.--. ---- r---'----- ---- ._.- ----_._._--_._--_ ... 
1196a--
_ .. _- -------- ,-._-----------_ .. _-_._-
,Whitechapel- Griffiths-Bedell 1908 Conduit 
Bow '(only for 23 day 
,experimental 
period) 
Table 2.4 - Surface-contact installations in the UK. 
As early as 1888, the West Metropolitan Tramways Company had experimented 
with the Lineff surface-contact system, when 200 yards of track were laid with 
three-foot sections of central rail at the Chiswick depot.218 A length of flexible hoop 
iron was laid along the electrical conductor, underneath, but not in contact with the 
central rail. As a tramcar passed, a powerful magnet lifted the rail to energise the 
motors, after which it dropped back to its original position.219 Commenting on this 
demonstration, the Electrical Engineer stated: 
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Although a number of successful experimental sections have been shown 
in and around London, no progress regarding actual work has yet been 
chronicled. Electric traction ought to be cheaper than horseflesh, but 
problems are recognised with leakage of current and water ingress.22o 
The trials were discontinued as Lineff wanted a seven-year experimental period 
but the Hammersmith Vestry were only prepared to offer two years.221 Unlike other 
surface-contact systems, the Lineff system was never commercially operated in 
the UK. 
Other inventors continued to develop systems, mainly in France, Germany, the UK 
and to a lesser extent, the USA where aesthetic objections were rarer. In France, 
the oldest system was the Claret-Vuilleumier (C-V), which was used on the Place 
de la Republique to Romainville section in Paris from 1896 until 1900, when it was 
abandoned in favour of Diatto surface contacts.222 The C-V was unusual in that it 
had electro-magnets under the track rather than on board the tram. The 
unwelcome result was considerable current leakage. In addition, the magnets 
attracted other metals and so became ineffective, thus necessitating constant 
maintenance.223 
An important modification of the pioneering C-V was the placing of the electro-
magnets on board the cars. To this group belonged the Diatto, Dolter, Lorain, and 
Griffiths-Bedell systems. The Diatto stud system was the most common in France, 
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there being more than 20,000 studs in use. It was the invention of Italian Alfredo 
Diatto of Turin and was first installed in Tours in 1899, a lead followed by four of 
the Paris tramway companies in 1900.224 The studs in Tours and most in Paris had 
been removed by 1910 (many having been destroyed by the floods of 28 January 
that year, when waters of the River Seine reached almost nine metres above 
normal level) but one Paris route continued until 1913.225 
In common with all magnetic-stud systems, the power was supplied to the tram 
from studs laid between the rails. The studs only become live when activated by 
an electro-magnet carried on the car as it passed. In the Diatto system, the tram 
carried a three-part skate with five electro-magnetic coils.226 The outside two parts 
of the skate formed the south magnet pole and the centre part the north pole. The 
centre part had a double function: it also made the electrical contact with the stud 
head, being sufficiently long always to be in contact with at least one stud. 
The stud itself consisted of a six-inch diameter soft iron disk laid in an asphalt 
block and fitted on its underside with a carbon contact. Beneath this was a cylinder 
made of ebonite and lined with non-magnetic nickel-steel with a copper stud at its 
base through which the power was fed in from below. The cylinder contained a 
pool of mercury in which there floated a soft iron armature, topped with a carbon 
contact. When a tram was positioned over the stud, the armature was attracted 
upwards to make electrical connection via the mercury with the stud head and thus 
with the car. Once the tram had passed, the armature fell back by gravity to break 
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the circuit.227 
The one major problem encountered with the Diatto system was that mercury 
leaked out causing the stud to go dead. In addition, when the mercury level fell, 
there was arcing at its surface causing mercury vapour to form. The vapour not 
only allowed the current to leak, but also condensed onto the insides of the stud, 
destroying its insulation properties and causing the stud to stay Iive.228 Additional 
skates were fitted to the cars to short-circuit any live studs and blow a fuse in 
them. In a later design, there was even a magnetic-arc blow-out coil incorporated 
into the stud head. 
An important competitor to the Diatto system was developed by the Dolter Electric 
Traction Company (see Appendix 3). The company's publicity made the explicit 
point that it obviated the use of overhead wires in picturesque towns (see 
Appendix 4). Dolter also emphasised the compatibility of the two methods: 
it lends itself admirably to a combination with overhead systems. It is easy 
to use the Dolter system in the middle or busy parts of towns, employing the 
trolley for the outskirts or for parts where it is not considered necessary to 
use surface-contact. Dolter is prepared to put down surface-contact in the 
whole or parts of any system and guarantees the satisfactory working for 
any required time.229 
227 The Electrical Review, Volume 45 (1 December 1899). 
228 Ibid. . 
229 Keith Turner, The Directory of British Tramways, Sparkford: Patrick Stephens Ltd, 1996, Dolter 
contemporary newspaper advertisement reprinted, p.148. 
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In the cases of Hastings and Mexborough, the adjacent systems over which the 
cars had running powers employed overhead collection, and the trams had 
therefore to be fitted with both types of traction. 
Ttle Dolter installation at Torquay operated on a 550 volts supply split into sections 
of feeder cables which were laid under the road surface in the centre line of the 
tracks. The Dolter pots were fitted into the cables at regular intervals, their caps 
just flush with the road surface.230 The pots consisted mainly of a ceramic 
insulated material, though into their tops were set two metal pads which were 
normally dead electrically. 
Below the tram were suspended two skids, polarised north and south by coils 
energised either from the car's operating current or from a bank of batteries carried 
on the vehicle.231 This latter supply activated the first contact plate upon starting, 
and then cut out. As the skids passed over a Dolter pot surface, the two metal 
pads were magnetised, thereby attracting a pivoted arm inside the ceramic pot. On 
rising, the arm closed a set of contacts and the main current then flowed up 
through the plate and via the skids to the tram controller and motors.232 After the 
tram had passed, the magnetic field ceased and the pivoted arm fell by gravity, 
cutting off the supply and rendering the road surface plate inert. There was also a 
smaller skid, following the main pair. When this passed over a plate which had 
remained live, it rang a bell on the tram to warn the crew.233 
Corrosion from the sea air affected the action of the pivot arm with unfortunate 
results. Either it remained up, releasing up to 550 volts to anything with which it 
230 Fisher Barham, Torbay Transport, Falmouth: Glasney Press, 1979, p.31. 
231 Robert J Harley, Hastings Tramways, Midhurst: Middleton Press, 1993, pp.6-7. 
232 Ibid. 
233 Barham, Torbay Transport, p.31. 
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came into contact, or it stayed stubbornly down and the tram received no supply. 
Sometimes a follow-up gang, nick-named in Torquay as 'the Dolter murderers', 
had to work on the faulty plates and replace or service them.234 
The Lorain system adopted by Wolverhampton differed from the Dolter because it 
used a single contact skid 12 feet long. On either side were six pairs of electro-
magnets which formed magnetic poles over an area of 16 feet, extending beyond 
the skid at both ends of the tramcar.235 As a tram approached a contact stud, the 
magnetic field lifted a switch which fed an electrical current to the tram's skid. 
Apart from the method of current collection, the Lorain system was similar to the 
Dolter operation.236 
The Griffiths-Bedell system varied in the operation of the contact stud. In all the 
other surface-contact installations, the moving armature was attr&cted upwards 
towards the stud head by the magnetic field. When the field passed, the armature 
fell back by gravity (the Lorain was assisted by a spring), thereby breaking the 
electrical circuit.237 In the case of Griffiths-Bedell, the whole stud head and 
armature became magnetized and the armature was attracted downwards against 
the pull of a spring to make contact with the cable below and was broken by the 
spring pulling it back.238 The accurate positioning of the stud mechanism with 
respect to the collector magnets, both in height and laterally, were therefore 
critical, and precise installation was essential.239 
234 Barham, Torbay Transport, p.31. 
235 Webb and Addenbrooke, A History of Wolverhampton Transport,p.25 
236 Ibid, p.28. 
237 Ibid, p.25. 
238 l1ford Historical Society, Newsletter NO.110, December 2012. 
239 /lford Recorder, 16 March 1906. 
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The Thomson-Houston system in Monaco was another surface-contact variation. 
The system comprised two rows of studs staggered at 3 metre intervals. Each row 
was 30 centimetres from the running rails with one set for power and the other for 
control. Each tram had two skates beneath, but the same problems occurred, with 
power studs remaining live after the passage of the tramcar. The system operated 
from 1898 until replacement by overhead in 1903.240 In Prague, the Krizic system 
was installed to preserve the aesthetic qualities of the 650-year-old King Charles 
Bridge, a major tourist attraction across the Vltava River. The system was in 
operation from 1903 until 1908. In both, pickup studs were activated by remote 
electrical switchgear at trackside, unlike the more common group of systems using 
electro-magnets. 241 
During his European expedition in 1899 (see section 2.12 above), Clifton 
Robinson inspected the surface-contact systems in Paris and Monaco. He 
recognised that they were less efficient than open-conduit, but also less expensive 
to instal1.242 Prior to his trip abroad, he had seen an experimental surface-contact 
system in operation at Willesden. This was the Thompson-Walker system, which 
had been developed to eliminate the risk of studs remaining live after the passage 
of a tram. The costs were substantially less than the open-conduit system adopted 
by the London County Council in other areas: between £8,600 to £9,500 per mile 
compared with £ 11,400 per mile. 243 The LCC went so far as to recommend 
adoption of the Thompson-Walker system on some sections in west London. 
However, they rescinded their recommendation when it was pointed out that the 
roads in question had recently been reconstructed, and it would have been both 
240 Wolverhampton City Archives, Folio L6213p; JR Prentice, 'Studded with Success', Tramfare 
issue 220, July/August 2004, pp.7-10. 
241 Ibid, p.8. 
242 Buckley, History of Tramways, p.6S. 
243 Smeeton, The London United Tramways, pp.38-40. 
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costly and politically embarrassing to begin again. Those particular sections were 
eventually fitted with overhead traction. 
In 1905, the LCC were considering the expenditure of between £4 and £5 million 
on the electrification of their northern system of tramways. Consequently, several 
learned papers were produced urging the Council to consider the adoption of 
surface-contact systems as an alternative to overhead traction. One such paper 
set out a balanced assessment of the economic benefits and disadvantages of 
surface-contact, open-conduit, and overhead systems.244 W Noble Twelvetrees 
outlined the technical merits of various forms of surface-contact systems, and the 
problems associated with them, with the benefit of several years of operation. He 
*. 
concluded that although such systems were imperfect, they had passed beyond 
the experimental stage and deserved serious consideration as alternatives to both 
overhead and open-conduit traction. 
Several other towns considered installing surface-contact traction, but eventually 
rejected it, mainly on cost grounds. After Sheffield City Council exercised its right 
to take over the horse-tramway system in 1896, a committee was formed to 
inspect other tramway operations with a view to expanding and electrifying the 
network.245 The committee was particularly interested in surface-contact traction 
as an inter-connector across the city centre, where it was felt that overhead wires 
would be intrusive. Nevertheless, after visiting several operations, the committee 
recommended overhead traction as it was cheaper to install. 246 
244 Twelvetrees, 'A Report on Surface-contact Traction' I p.1. 
245 The Street Railway Journal, Volume 16 (10 February 1900). 
246 Ibid. 
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In 1906, the City of Oxford Electric Tramways Company, a subsidiary of the 
National Electric Construction Company (NECC), wanted to electrify its horse-
drawn lines without using overhead wires. The overhead system was unthinkable 
in the city of dreaming spires, and open-conduits were deemed too expensive. The 
NECC proposed the Dolter system, which they were installing in Torquay and 
Mexborough. By then, defects were becoming apparent with the Dolter system in 
Hastings. Cautiously, in 1908 the city council wrote to Torquay for a report on the 
operations there, to which Torquay replied that the system seemed fairly 
satisfactory.247 Oxford agonised for another five years before the city council finally 
decided to introduce motor buses instead of electric trams in 1913.248 
Folkestone was another town where the NECC attempted to introduce the Dolter 
system. In October 1907, a council deputation visited the Dolter installation in 
Mexborough and travelled on a short length which had not at that stage been 
officially opened. It was said to be 'a great success'.249 Nevertheless, Folkestone 
decided against any form of electrification. As it was a relatively small network, it 
was considered better to continue with horse-drawn trams as a tourist attraction in 
the seaside town until 1921, when motor buses were introd uced. 250 
2.14 Conclusions 
My starting point for this chapter was a quotation from Akrich, who claimed that a 
multi-layered network of actors exists in the development of any technological 
system. This was particularly true of urban transport, where an exchange of ideas 
247 Barham, Torbay Transport, p.31. 
248 Klapper, The Golden Age, p.209. 
249 Charles C Hall, 'The Mexborough and Swinton Traction Company', British Bus and Tram 
slostems, No. 33, p.365. 
2 0 Klapper, The Golden Age, p.20S. 
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produced innovation, sometimes through imitation and replication. At each stage, 
users and producers had an important part to play. 
The introduction of an appropriate transport system was not merely a battle 
between entrepreneurs and inventors on the one hand, and the middle and upper 
classes on the other. It is true that wealthy and influential people, insulated from 
everyday life by privilege, did exert a disproportionate amount of power in the 
decision-making process as later chapters will show. But there were many other 
actors including local authorities, central government, and users further down the 
social scale. 
Public transport gave greater freedom to many. Initially, however, the introduction 
of horse-drawn omnibuses made little impact. Horse-drawn trams had a much 
greater impact. Higher speeds meant that the effective range of travel doubled, 
and as a consequence, workers could live twice as far from their employment, 
giving them a wider range of residence. Urban mobility also enabled workers to 
seek employment at places previously too distant to contemplate. Employers too 
could relocate to more suitable areas in the knowledge that employees would be 
able to travel cheaply and more easily to work. For all its faults, and there were 
many, tram travel with improved frequency, convenience and accessibility 
revolutionized urban life.251 
Although tramways were presented as 'natural, technologically superior 
successors to uneconomical omnibuses' the fight to introduce them was not won 
easily.252 The carriage-owning community offered strong resistance, anxious to 
maintain the status quo. They were joined by wealthy merchants and landowners 
251 J oyce, Tramway Heyday, p.g. 
252 Schmucki, 'The Machine in the City', p.1 062. 
117 
in opposition to these 'unnecessary intruders'.253 But despite the objections, horse 
tramways continued to increase in numbers, reaching their peak around 1884.254 
They continued to operate alongside other forms of transport, but decline gathered 
pace and by 1914 there were few remaining. The decline coincided with a 
realisation of the limitations of horse-power, and of the range of mechanical 
options available. It was not solely due to the problem of urban pollution, important 
as that was. Technical, as well as social impulses, also played a part in the 
transition.255 Even so, as far as intra-urban transport was concerned, animal power 
proved to be far more flexible than the services provided by steam railways, 
except in the great cities. 
Despite opposition, steam traction offered a ready-made mechanical alternative to 
the limitations of horse power, but the technology remained socially unacceptable 
except in certain industrial areas. While recognising the obvious hygienic 
disadvantages, many people still preferred horse traction. There was, however, a 
body of people who considered animal traction to be morally wrong, especially 
when horses were forced to work in hilly areas. Steam trams fulfilled an important 
role in providing a suitable alternative to animal power, but there were two key 
reasons why they failed to meet the demands of urban transport. Steam traction 
did not fulfil 'the environmental, aesthetic, and cultural requirements on the one 
hand, and the technical and economic requirements on the other'.256 Thus neither 
the users among the general population nor the tramway operators were content, 
a 'consequence of an urban culture that did not blindly embrace the machine,.257 
Nevertheless, they co-existed uneasily with horse-drawn trams in many towns, 
253 Schmuckl, 'The Machine in the City', p.1 063. 
254 Ochojna, 'The Influence of Local', p.142. 
255 Mom, The Electric Vehicle, p.8. 
256 McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, p.34. 
257 Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology', p.63. 
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and for more than twenty years were developed and improved by designers in 
response to the many complaints from users, local authorities and regulators. The 
cable system was the only serious competition to steam trams in the pre-electric 
period, although its viability in the UK was confined to Edinburgh.258 In the USA, 
there was a distinct phase of investment in cable traction before electrification. In 
San Francisco with its hilly topography and grid-pattern street layout, cable traction 
is still in operation although mainly as a tourist attraction. 
The social implications of technological progress became more prominent as the 
century progressed. The Fabian Society considered all the electric traction options 
and concluded that conduits were dangerous to bicycles because of thei~ .deep 
slots. Furthermore, in line with the growing Victorian perception that a progressive 
society needed to embrace moral issues, they held that 'people who are sensitive 
to overhead traction have no objection to the sight of horses straining with their 
loads, or the intolerable uncleanness of streets, or the employment of boys in the 
disgusting labour of cleaning Up,.259 Although this apparently powerful case for 
overhead traction was not immediately accepted everywhere, an argument was 
clearly developing on both sides of the debate. If overhead wires were 
unacceptable on aesthetic grounds, what about the environmental impact of the 
tons of manure deposited on the roads and the visible suffering of horses? 
Inventors and entrepreneurs seized the opportunity to change from animal power 
to mechanical traction. They were not driven by altruistic motives but pursued 
personal fortune in the quest for new systems. Innovation and experimentation 
continued throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century. Although not 
particularly successful, even accumulator cars performed a 'valuable pioneering 
258 Buckley, History of Tramways, p.36. 
259 The Fabian Society, 'The Municipalization of Tramways', Tract No. 77, London: 1897, p.10. 
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----------------------....., 
function in awakening decision-makers to the possibilities of electric traction.26o In 
the central areas of London, an open-conduit system - deemed environmentally 
acceptable although technologically more difficult to install and more expensive 
than surface-contact - was adopted to complement overhead systems in the 
suburbs. Other forms of traction failed to attract the capital needed to improve the 
prototype. The reasons for this could be attributed to external causes, among them 
timid investors and inferior materials. 
Several cities did consider surface-contact traction but rejected it on the grounds 
of cost and unreliability. Local and geographical circumstances also played a 
part.261 The debates were characterised by indecision and fraught with opposition 
from many sides. Although Wolverhampton was not alone in its long deliberations 
before finally adopting surface-contact traction, it was the only town in the UK 
where the system lasted for the best part of two decades (see chapter 3). Since it 
was also the first adopter in the UK, it was expected by contemporary observers to 
go down in history as the pioneer of the surface-contact system.262 
A professional journal had concluded rather testily that overhead was the only 
viable solution despite the artificial obstacles of law, prejudice and vested 
interests. Championing overhead traction, the journal commented that 'it was 
bitterly opposed in some quarters, but has won by utility and unobtrusiveness, 
thanks to English neatness and pride'. The journal considered the excess of scroll 
work on support columns in an effort to placate environmentalists as 'a mistake 
and intrusive,.263 Clearly, these views were not universally supported. 
260 Buckley, History of Tramways, p.S3. 
261 Mom, The Electric Vehicle, p.g. 
262 The Tramway and Rai/way World, Volume 10 (12 September 1901), p.483. 
263 The Electrician, Volume 51 (24 April 1903), pp.28-29. 
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Generally, the coming of tramways with their colourful cars added to a feeling of 
well-being for townspeople.264 Great crowds were drawn to systems' opening 
ceremonies, usually performed by important public figures. Great excitement was 
generated by the press 'with the attractions of a novelty and the thrill of a new 
experience,.265 But the opposition still felt they were taking up physical space, and 
dominating roadways at the expense of carriages. The next chapters consist of 
case studies of the towns where the reasons behind the adoption of surface-
contact traction are explored. 
264 Chaceley T Humpidge, 'Foreword', in Charles Klapper, The Golden Age, p.xi. 
265 Schmucki, 'The Machine in the City', p.106S. 
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CHAPTER 3 - WOLVERHAMPTON: AN INDUSTRIAL CITY 
'Victorian Wolverhampton was proud, wealthy, perhaps slightly vulgar, but above all 
vigorous' .1 
3.1 Introduction 
I have chosen Wolverhampton as a key focus because a" of the elements which 
fuelled the debates about traction choices existed there before the final decision to 
adopt the controversial surface-contact system was made. In its relationship with 
Birmingham and the Black Country, Wolverhampton clearly considered itself to be 
different. The city fathers were unperturbed by the spectre of isolation, and were 
quite prepared to make independent decisions regarding transport. In this chapter, 
I trace the development of Wolverhampton and examine the societal issues that 
influenced its decision-makers. I also consider the city's economic development, 
urban form and political complexion of the key actors who guided the council 
through the procedure. 
Wolverhampton was a former market centre slowly accumulating factories and 
other forms of industrial activity to become a thriving hub. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, expansion continued rapidly. not only in size but also in the 
complexity of its industries. The process resulted in the reinvention of itself as a 
vibrant Victorian city. By 1905, local industry had evolved and diversified, and 
produced a wide variety of artefacts. Resourcefulness and continued success was 
1 Michael Allbut and Anne Amison, Victorian Wo/verhampton, unpublished book, 1991, at 
http://www.historywebsite.co.uk/articlesNictorianBuildings/19thCentBritain.htm (accessed on 30 
April 2011). 
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expressed in a justifiable sense of civic pride in the 'good old town',2 an expression 
of affection and familiarity frequently used by its townspeople.3 
A hierarchical structure developed within the towns of the West Midlands. 
Birmingham tended to dominate its immediate Black Country neighbours, while the 
smaller surrounding towns were overshadowed by Wolverhampton, even though 
each developed its own institutions. The situation was unlike that in the Lancashire 
conurbation, where Manchester had a much greater influence on Salford and its 
satellite towns.4 Wolverhampton be~ame an economic nucleus for the surrounding 
Black Country towns. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the British Electric Traction Company (BET) 
had purchased tramway operations in the adjacent towns. The company's grand 
plan was to combine all systems in the Black Country, including Wolverhampton, 
into one unified operation using overhead traction, but Wolverhampton strongly 
resisted any attempts by BET to interfere within its boundaries. 
Initially, Wolverhampton had considered the installation of the standard overhead 
system, but not all councillors were persuaded, pointing to the visual intrusion of 
the wires. After a brief experiment with Kingsland mechanical traction, a small 
committee visited Paris to view the surface-contact systems in operation there. 
Consequently, it was decided to adopt the Lorain system, but in two separate 
phases as the technology was relatively unproven. The first phase received 
2 William H Jones, The Story of the Municipal Life of Wolverhampton, london: Alexander & 
Shepheard, 1903, p.151. 
3 John Smith, 'Ingenious and Daring: the Wolverhampton Council Fraud 1905-1917', in James R 
Moore and John E Smith (eds), Corruption in Urban Politics and Society in Britain 1780-1950, 
Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2007, p.114. 
4 Richard H Trainor, Black Country Elites: The Exercise of Authority in an Industrialized Area 
1830-1900, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p.379. 
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cautious approval from an independent assessor, but before the second phase 
began, debates began in earnest within the council chambers about whether 
protection of the environment merited the extra costs involved. The controversy 
was fuelled by conflicts, tensions, and power struggles between the various actors. 
The consequent cautious approach to decision-making led to a network of 
technical, social and cultural interactions.5 Isolation from Wolverhampton's Black 
Country catchment area, due to incompatibility with the BET network, added to the 
protracted disputes. 
At the forefront of discussions was the aesthetic and environmental impact of an 
acceptable system. Schmucki suggests that much of the opposition to tramway 
electrification 'functioned as a surrogate for other political and financial arguments' 
rather than for aesthetic reasons.6 Primary source information about 
Wolverhampton indicates that there were indeed many forces at piety. These are 
explored in the following sections. 
3.2 The geological divide 
Wolverhampton's location played an important part in generating a sense of 
independence, which eventually became reflected in the traction debates. The city 
is situated at the edge of the Black Country, a collection of historic market towns 
and industrial villages to the north-west of Birmingham on the now largely defunct 
'ten yard coal seam'. Geologically and geographically, the city is not located 
entirely within the Black Country. The northern and western suburbs rest above 
rich fertile clay, while the southern and eastern suburbs overlie seams of coal, 
5 Gijs Mom, The Electric Vehicle: Technology and Expectations in the Automobile Age, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004, p.6. 
6 Barbara Schmucki, 'The Machine in the City: Public Appropriation of the Tramway in Britain and 
Germany, 1870-1915', Journal of Urban History, Volume 38/6 (2012), pp 1060-1093. 
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ironstone and limestone. The dividing ridge forms a watershed between the River 
Severn to the north-west and the River Trent to the south-east. 
Over time, Wolverhampton became recognised as the unofficial capital of the 
Black Country, a 'shock city of the Industrial Revolution,.7 The city developed its 
own traditions and local culture, and had a particular identity of its own. Although 
only some fifteen miles north-west of Birmingham, it could not be described as a 
dormitory, but was a city in its own right with an independent economic life.s As 
such, it became a regional magnet,. drawing in commerce and economic activity, 
and exerting influence over a large area. 
The explOitation of the coal seam and the resulting intensity of manufacturing led 
to the Black Country being described as 'black by day and red by night' by the 
visiting American consul in 1862.9 The appalling physical environment and the 
effect on its people are best described by a contemporary author: 
Blackness everywhere prevails; the ground is black, the atmosphere is black, and 
the underground is honey-combed by mining galleries. By night, the roaring 
furnaces are seen for miles around, pouring forth their fierce throbbing flames like 
volcanoes. The hundred chimneys of iron-works display their blazing crests.10 
The process of industrialisation led to a great expansion of Wolverhampton in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 11 In the first half of the nineteenth century, 
7 John Smith, 'Industrialisation and Social Change: Wolverhampton Transformed', in Jon Stobart 
and Neil Raven (eds), Towns, Regions and Industries, Urban and Industrial Change in the 
Midlands, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2005, p.135. 
8 John R Kellett, The Impact of Railways on Victorian Cities, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1969, p.365. 
9 Elihu Burritt, Walks in the Black Country and its Green Border Land, London: S Low, Son, and 
Marston, 1868, pp. 4-6. 
10 Walter White, All Round the Wrekin, London: Chapman and Hall, 1860, pp.6-7. 
11 Smith, 'Industrialisation and Social Change', p.134. 
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growth patterns tended to be dominated by resource-based industries.12 Small 
industries were established for the manufacture of iron, steel and brass goods. 
Skilled workmen were attracted from far afield. Merchants followed, some with 
agents in the colonies, in continental Europe, and India to market their goods.13 
Consequently, agricultural activities declined in importance. The population rapidly 
increased, and a new spirit of enterprise developed. 
Underlying geology played a major role in the demographically divided pattern of 
residential development of Wolverhampton. The pleasant western suburbs of 
Tettenhall and Penn, bordering the rich farming county of Shropshire, became the 
province of wealthy industrialists and professionals. In the south-eastern sub~rbs, 
mining areas suffered severe pollution from the associated heavy industries. Poor-
quality housing predominated, and social services were practically non-existent. 
The prevailing winds ensured that the living environment in the wesl remained 
agreeable, while pollution and smoke from factories continuously affected the 
eastern areas and the rest of the Black Country. 
The politics of the city reflected this division. The Anglican Conservatives 
representing wards in the west were anxious to do nothing which might detract 
from their environment, while the Liberals representing the eastern suburbs were 
more concerned with social injustice and the perceived need to improve the lives 
of the poorer members of the community. Even steam tramways were acceptable 
along the grimy southern route to Dudley, but an experimental trial was quickly 
dropped along the tree-lined route to Tettenhall, despite its popularity (see section 
3.7). 
12 RJ Morris, 'Urbanization', in RJ Morris and Richard Rodger (eds), The Victorian City: A Reader 
in British Urban History 1820-1914, London: Longman, 1993, p.47. 
13 Jones, The Story of the Municipal Life', p.S. 
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Between 1876 and 1890, Wolverhampton and the Black Country were beset by an 
economic depression, caused by declining natural resources, inefficient methods 
of production, and increased external competition. 14 Several ironworks in the city 
closed down, badly affecting the working-class east end where factories were 
located. As the century's end neared, however, many of the economic problems 
had been overcome by diversification into higher-skilled metal work, and the city 
began to grow in confidence once more. 15 
3.3 Modelling Wolverhampton's development 
As in other large towns in the UK, several slum areas developed during the 
industrialisation phase in Wolverhampton. Public transport was poor, and 
inevitably, heated exchanges occurred during council debates about priorities for 
solving the problems. Should resources be spent on alleviating poverty or 
providing a new transport system? 
The growing population was crammed at maximum density into slum courts and 
alleyways near their workplaces.16 This process of central infilling caused 
overcrowding and made central areas unattractive to wealthier residents. One 
such area was the notorious Caribee island slum, which bordered the centre. It 
was described disdainfully as 'an open gutter where disease thrived, inhabited by 
the lowest class of humanity,.17 Caribee island was the epitome of 'the other', 
resonating with contemporary writers' equating of working-Class areas with darkest 
Africa. Social segregation induced the fear of the 'unknown and irreligious masses 
14 Trainor, Black Country Elite, p.26. 
15 Smith, 'Industrialisation and Social Change', p.137 .. 
16 Ibid, p.139. 
17 The Wolverhampton Chronicle, 17 August 1849. 
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inhabiting these regions,.18 Contemporary writers pandered to the fear of the 
masses by the middle classes, who 'panted for stories about the exploration of the 
dark city, mysterious and filled with all kinds of enormity,.19 
In Wolverhampton, there was a constant stream of unskilled Irish, Welsh and 
Russian Jewish immigrants, with limited financial resources. The immigrants lived 
in high-density ghettoes with crowded tenements, narrow courts, and dark 
alleyways which constrained space. To satisfy the middle classes' craving for 
sensationalism, the press presented the inhabitants of these areas as a morally 
problematic and dangerous urban underworld. The trade magazine, The Builder, 
described the area as frightful, 'like the settlement of a tribe of Indians', an~. 
wondered how the civilized upper classes of Wolverhampton could allow such an 
area of abject poverty to exist. 20 This was socio-economic and migrant segregation 
at its worst, and was to become a key factor in later debates about tram traction. 
The growth of such areas may have reinforced the desire of the wealthier classes 
to maintain a distinct cultural identity. There was certainly fear and a feeling of 
menace to the established order generated by the explosion of population. In 
general, the higher echelons of society 'beheld a danger to security and to all 
pleasant things' in their presence.21 Of course, Wolverhampton was not the sole 
instance of the phenomenon. Other large towns were experiencing the same 
process. However, Wolverhampton's social segregation represents a prime 
18 David Cannadine, 'Victorian Cities: How Different?' Social History, Volume 2, No.4 (January 
1977), p.460. 
19 Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities, London: Pelican Books, 1968, p.62. 
20 The Builder, August 1872. 
21 Briggs, Victorian Cities, p.71. 
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example of Ward's two nations of rich and poor between whom there was scarcely 
any contact.22 
Housing patterns began to reflect social segregation. The wealthier townspeople 
migrated to large villas with gardens in the more rural suburbs.23 In fashionable 
Tettenhall, they could escape to enjoy the country air. The inhabitants looked to 
Wolverhampton as the source of their wealth, but westwards to rural Staffordshire 
for their identity as village residents. One author writing about Tettenhall called this 
phenomenon 'urban schizophrenia, with frontiers no one but local people could 
see, but which had a profound effect on public transport, housing, and the social 
life of communities'?4 
In fact, segregation became even more marked as middle-class townspeople 
moved to the new residential districts.25 They set up homes in more modest 
houses in regularly laid-out streets in Penn.26 The provision of surface-contact 
trams through these upper- and middle-class suburbs enabled development 
without detracting from the environment. Both areas contrasted sharply with the 
wretched Caribee Island slums. However, development was quite unlike that 
experienced in other cities. In Manchester, for instance, the working-class areas 
stretched like a girdle around the commercial district. Outside that girdle lived the 
upper classes and the bourgeoisie.27 
22 David Ward, 'Victorian Cities: How Modern?' Journal of Historical Geography, Volume 1, No.2 
~April1975), p.146. 
3 Mark Shaw, 'The Ecology of Social Change; Wolverhampton 1851-71', Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers, new series, Volume 2, NO.3 (1977), pp.332-348. 
24 Ned Williams, By Road and Rail to Tettenhall, Wolverhampton: Uralia Press, 1980, p.1. 
2S Trainor, Black Country Elites, p.S5. 
26 Shaw, 'The Ecology', p.339 
27 Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England, Leipzig: Panther edition, 
1845, p.79. 
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The development of the urban spatial structure of Wolverhampton was complex 
and cannot be described easily by sociological models. The city is not organised 
into clear zones, but developed in a series of sectors. Certain areas became 
attractive for different reasons. Like many other cities, there was a central 
business district at the core, but as development occurred, activities expanded in a 
wedge from the centre (see Appendix 6).28 High-class housing grew linearly along 
an axis to the north through Chapel Ash to Tettenhall, with middle-class housing to 
the west in Penn. Heavy industry, coal mining and working-class housing was 
located in the east and south east. Development therefore was more in line with 
Hoyt's sector theory of neighbourhood change. 29 In this model, 'different types of 
residential areas tend to grow outward along distinct radii, and new growth ~n the 
arc of a given sector tends to take on the character of the initial growth in that 
sector,.30 In Wolverhampton's case, surface-contact tramlines followed those radii 
and enabled a corridor of growth to the more attractive suburbs. • 
Neither does the city's pre-industrial imprint conform to either Sjoberg's model or 
Burgess's later modification. Development tended to be linear along well-
established lines of communication rather than within a pattern of concentric 
zones. 31 Topography and underlying geology were therefore significant factors in 
shaping the urban environment. 
28 Shaw, 'The Ecology', p.332. 
29 Homer Hoyt, The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighbourhoods in American Cities, 
Washington: Federal Housing Administration, 1939, p.114. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Shaw, 'The Ecology', p.332. 
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3.4 Demographic diversity - a profile 
The Industrial Revolution produced a mass migration of people seeking 
employment into Wolverhampton and its suburbs, resulting in a rich demographic 
mix. Rapid expansion led to a feeling of dominance over the adjacent Black 
Country towns. In consequence, little consideration was given to their views about 
traction choices. As a result, the smaller towns and particularly Bilston, did not 
hesitate to encourage the British Electric Transport Company to frustrate 
Wolverhampton as the arguments in section 3.8 show. 
Some of the population growth can be explained by inward migration from the 
surrounding countryside and other West Midlands towns, but new inhabitants also 
arrived from elsewhere. In 1851, 1 in 8.3 of the residents, approximately 6,000, 
was of Irish descent, and by 1871 this had grown to 1 in 5.7, approximately 12,000 
people.32 The majority of the Irish immigrants became permanent residents, but 
many lodging houses also appeared for transients.33 The graph in Appendix 7 
indicates the rapid population growth compared with other target towns. In 1899, 
Weber commented that of his seventeen great cities, only London, 
Wolverhampton and Portsmouth had attained consistently high growth rates in the 
mid-nineteenth century. 34 
32 http://www.genuki.org.uklbiq/eng/STSlWolverhampton/ (accessed on 10 July 2009). 
33 Jeremy Walters, 'Victorian Wolverhampton: a social perspective', (unpublished paper presented 
at the University of Wolverhampton, 2010). 
34 Adna F Weber, The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century: A Study in Statistics, New York: 
Macmillan, 1899, p.56. 
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1801 12,566 1861 60,860 
1811 14,836 1871 68,291 
1821 18,380 1881 75,766 
1831 24,732 1891 82,662 
1841 36,382 1901 94,187 
1851 49,985 1911 95,328 
Table 3.1 - Population statistics for Wolverhampton.35 
The suburbs also experienced population growth, but not to the same extent. At 
the end of the nineteenth century, Wolverhampton's neighbouring industrial areas 
were yet to be absorbed into the main city. To the south and east were the grim 
districts of Heath Town, Bilston, Sedgley, Willenhall and Wednesfield, while to the 
north-west lay the leafy suburb of Tettenhall, bordering on Shropshire. Heath 
Town was swallowed up in 1927 while the remainder remained separate municipal 
entities until 1966, with the following populations: 
35 http://www.qenuki.orq.uklbiq/enq/STSlWolverhampton/ (accessed on 10 July 2009). 
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1801 1811 1821 1831 1841 1851 1861 1871 1881 1891 1901 
Bilston BC 6,914 9,646 12,003 14,492 20,181 23,527 24,364 24,188 22,730 23,453 24,034 
(2,580 
acres) 
Wednesfield 1,088 1,248 1,468 1,879 3,168 4,858 8,553 8,998 10,801 14,538 17,855 
UDC 
(3,700 
acres) 
Tettenhall 
- - -
2,618 3,143 
- - - - -
5,337 
UDC 
(7,965 
acres) 
Heath Town 
- - - - - - - - - -
9,441 
UDC 
(780 acres) 
Combined 56,667 
Total 
Table 3.2 - Population statistics for Wolverhampton's suburbs.38 3738 
The influence of Wolverhampton on its surrounding townships can be inferred from 
the size of its parliamentary constituency. In 1851, the municipality had a 
population of 49,985 whereas the parliamentary constituency comprised 119,748 
people.39 
As the city grew, an academic source defined its Victorian identity as 'proud, 
wealthy, perhaps slightly vulgar, but above all vigorous,.40 The sense of 
importance which Wolverhampton attached to itself is implied in Trainor's 
reference to the resentments felt by the smaller towns in the Black Country 
36 http://www.genuki.org.uklbig/englSTS/Biiston/ (accessed on 10 July 2009). 
37 http://www.historvwebsite.co.uklarticlesIWednesfield.nineteenth.htm (accessed on 10 July 
2009). 
38 http://www.genuki.org.uklbig/englSTSlTettenhaIV (accessed on 10 July 2009). 
39 Briggs, Victorian Cities, p.30. 
40 Albutt and Amison, Victorian Wolverhampton. 
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towards 'pretentious larger towns' such as the dynamic and progressive 
Wolverhampton. For Bilston townspeople, the proximity of Wolverhampton was 
'more of an irritant and a drain on civic talent than a spur to initiative'.41 These 
feelings 'diminished as the smaller localities began to acquire their own 
institutions' and become more established.42 Through this process, the 
neighbouring towns acquired some of the urban characteristics and amenities that 
the larger and longer-established towns enjoyed. 
Shopkeepers played a particularly important role in the development of urban 
social relationships in smaller manufacturing centres. In Bilston, around 45% of the 
middle class were shopkeepers in the mid-nineteenth century.43 However, there 
.. 
were many small shops in the mining areas of Wolverhampton run by miners and 
their wives. They were 'far more working class than middle class enterprises', but 
nevertheless played a vital role in the economic development of thsir working 
class communities.44 
By 1900, 'even Bilston enjoyed a town hall, public baths, a free library, recreation 
grounds, and a school for art and technical subjects' .45 Yet Bilston still looked to 
Wolverhampton for its representation in Parliament, justices of the peace and 
school boards.46 Although the smaller towns therefore had some degree of 
autonomy, they still had to acknowledge their 'relatively humble place in the urban 
hierarchy,.47 Bilston in particular suffered most from its chief adversary 
Wolverhampton, until it was eventually absorbed by its larger neighbour. Bilston 
41 Trainor, Black Country Elites, p.374. 
42 Ibid, p.40. 
43 Morris and Rodger, 'An Introduction to British Urban History', in Morris and Rodger,p.32. 
44 Trainor, Black Country Elites, p.61. 
45 Ibid, p.276. 
46 Ibid, p.235. 
47 Ibid, p.264. 
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did, however, play an important independent role with its ally BET, in the surface-
contact controversy at the turn of the century, when it remained firmly committed 
to the overhead system of traction. 
3.5 The evolution of local government 
Local government played a crucial role in the determination of traction choices. 
Decisions were made in the council chambers, usually on the advice of expert 
officials, although strong-minded individuals sometimes shaped the argument as 
happened in Wolverhampton. The city's political development followed a fairly 
typical pattern, except for the intervention of powerful councillors on key decisions. 
Traditionally, the parish was the unit of administration and the focus of local affairs, 
with the body of parishioners meeting in the church vestry to raise any necessary 
money for highway maintenance and general improvements. The vestry therefore 
became an important centre of power in the decision-making process. 
However, the rapid growth of towns during the Industrial Revolution generated 
new needs, such as improved highways, street paving, lighting, and better public 
health and transport facilities. Separate local authorities were set up with powers 
to deal with these issues, but these ad hoc arrangements eventually resulted in a 
confusing pattern of authorities with little overall coherence or direction.48 
In recognition of this problem, new local authorities were established outside of 
London under the Municipal Corporations Act, 1835. They were usually created in 
the most active, expanding urban settlements. The municipal borough authorities 
48 W Eric Jackson, Local Government in England and Wales, London: Pelican Books, 1964, 
pp.36-37. 
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that were created were notably diverse. Indeed their functions were refashioned 
according to their political vitality and dynamism. In some towns, there was very 
little change. In others, there was an 'air of revolution'.49 
By 1841 there was a general feeling that Wolverhampton was sufficiently 
advanced to manage its own local affairs. 50 However, the movement for change 
was not universally accepted. There was opposition on the grounds that 
incorporation would lead inevitably to an increase in rates, the burden of which at 
that time was mainly borne by businessmen and shopkeepers. 51 Nevertheless, a 
series of meetings were held by prominent citizens, resulting in a petition to Queen 
Victoria in February 1847 to grant a Charter of Incorporation. The compelling 
.. 
reasons given were that Wolverhampton possessed the three necessary 
qualifications of wealth, intelligence and population. 52 By that time, the population 
had grown to more than 40,000. On 18 March 1848, the Charter cf Incorporation 
was granted.53 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the Black Country generally lacked an organised 
framework of local government. In fact, the want of financial resources, power and 
expertise greatly affected its ability to deal with worsening urban problems. 54 
Wolverhampton, however, began to emerge as an economically diverse and 
progressive town. The local politicians were by no means one-dimensional. As the 
town matured politically, a significant overlap began to develop between the 
leaders of local government and philanthropy.55 Some elites considered 
49 Briggs, Victorian Cities, p.369. 
50 Trainor, Black Country Elites, p.232 
51 Jones, The Story of Municipal Life, p.22. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid, p.29. 
54 Trainor, Black Country Elites, p.231. 
55 Ibid, p.123. 
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'generosity with assets as well as time was a fundamental duty in making the 
conditions of human life as favourable as circumstances would allow'. 56 The 
perceived duty to lead in pursuit of the common good was encased in firm 
confidence in the basic principles of the Victorian economy, society and polity. 
Some councillors held that the provision of basic infrastructure, such as water, 
sewers, road improvements, and lighting, was sufficient to fulfil their duties. Others 
believed that it was their duty to contribute to the social, moral and intellectual 
advancement of the townspeople. Although the process was less than smooth, 
Wolverhampton's municipal gospel was eventually considered to be a 'model of 
civic achievement', much admired by surrounding towns.57 During later debates, 
moral and economic issues were prominent once again. Such beliefs set 
councillors on a collision course when expenditure on tramway systems was being 
discussed and became even more pronounced when debates about surface-
contact traction were raging. 
Civic pride and idealism were to the fore in many other Victorian towns. 
Wolverhampton clearly had both in abundance. Policies engendered civic unity on 
the one hand, but a more sinister form of social control on the other. However, the 
overall effect was to promote among townspeople a community spirit towards their 
'good old town,.58 Wolverhampton's city fathers were considered to be 
'experimental, adventurous, and diverse'. 59 
56 Trainor, Black Country Elites, p.133. 
57 Ibid, p.279. 
58 Jones, The Story of Municipal Life, p.151: Trainor, Black Country Elites,p.279. 
59 Briggs, Victorian Cities, p.185. 
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One of the illustrious residents, the poet John Corfield, had advocated as early as 
1877 'snatching the lightning' for the benefit of mankind (see Appendix 15).50 Once 
the Wolverhampton Electric Lighting Order finally received royal assent in 1890, a 
Lighting Committee was formed immediately afterwards, under the Chairmanship 
of the energetic moderniser Sir Charles Mander. The first electric lights were 
erected in 1893 and two years later, the lights in Queen Square and the 
surrounding streets in the city centre were switched on by no lesser person than 
Lord Kelvin, then President of the Royal SOciety.61 The power station in 
Commercial Road finally completed in 1894 included two generating units 
dedicated to tramways in anticipation of their electrification.62 Subsequently, in 
another example of technological embrace, Wolverhampton was to install an 
.. 
auxiliary generator at its destructor plant in Crown Street to provide 750 kilowatts 
of electricity from waste products. 
As well as a time of notable technological development, the latter part of the 
nineteenth century continued to be a period of reform for local government. There 
was an awakening of public spiritedness, and a more active popular interest was 
encouraged in local government affairs. As towns increased in size, those with a 
population of at least 50,000 were designated County Boroughs under the Local 
Government Act, 1888.63 These were all-purpose local authorities, large enough to 
be able to run all local services including transport.54 In this category were not only 
Wolverhampton, but also Lincoln, Hastings, and Torquay. 
60 'The story of electrical supply in the Wolverhampton area', chapter 1, p.1 
http://www.historywebsite.co.uk/articles/electricity/Electricity.htm#menu (accessed on 10 July 2011) 
ei Jones, The Story of Municipal Life, p.245. 
62 The Tramway and Rai/way World, Volume 11, 13 Febr 
63 Jackson, Local Government, p.49. 
64 Barry M Doyle, 'The Changing Functions of Urban Government: Councillors, Officials and 
Pressure Groups', in Martin Daunton (ed), The Cambridge Urban History of Britain, Volume 11/ 
1840-1950, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.288. 
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By the end of the nineteenth century, Wolverhampton Council had developed into 
a pluralist, politically mature entity. The social composition was as follows: 
Occupation 1888-1900 1900-10 1910-1919 
Manufacturer 33 27 27 
Shopkeeper 23 20 23 
Drinks trade 11 8 7 
Professional 16 21 27 
Administrators 6 7 5 
Workmen 6 10 10 
Women 0 0 0 
Retired 5 7 1 
Table 3.3 • Occupational composition of Wolverhampton's councillors (Figures are In 
percentages).85 
Thus, in common with many other large cities, there was a steady rise in the 
number of professionals on the council at the expense of shopkeepers and 
industrialists. The newcomers were lawyers, medical men, estate agents and 
accountants. The councillors were by now fairly evenly divided between the 
65 George W Jones, Borough Politics: A Study of the Wolverhampton Borough Council 1888-1964, 
London: Macmillan, 1969, p.369. 
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Conservatives and the Liberal parties. By the turn of the century, the socialist 
influence was growing and there were five Labour members serving on 
Wolverhampton's council. 66 
For the councillors who were business men and shopkeepers, town politics 
involved a conflict of interest. They had to balance their business interests on the 
one hand against those of the ratepayers and townspeople on the other. Among 
the councillors, it was not unusual for families to become linked through marriage 
and business transactions.67 Social exchange and membership of the same 
church groups were frequent between councillors of similar political leanings. 
The important position of the mayor with its trappings of grandeur was usually 
~. 
filled by men of wealth and high social standing. It was advantageous if they could 
'give money to local charities and patronise the town's good causes,.68 Hospitals, 
schools, libraries and churches were amongst the beneficiaries. M9ny of 
Wolverhampton's mayors gave of their time and money, but Sir Charles Mander, 
the champion of surface-contact systems, was particularly renowned for his good 
deeds. 
In order to deal with the rising workload, the council employed more than eighty 
paid officials by 1905. By then there were twenty committees each with separate 
responsibilities.69 (see Appendix 8). Foremost among the officials was Sir Horatio 
Brevitt, the Town Clerk and Solicitor from 1882 to when he retired in 1917. He 
regarded himself as the town governor and the leading man in Wolverhampton. 
Powerful public officials often had a considerable say in policy as well as 
66 Trainor, Black Country Elites, p.2S6. . 
67 Robert J Morris, 'Structure, Culture and Society in British Towns' in Oaunton, p.416. 
68 David Cannadine, Lords and Landlords: The Aristocracy and the Towns 1774-1967, Leicester: 
Leicester University Press, 1980, p.S3. 
69 Smith, 'Ingenious and Daring', p.11S. 
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administration. Brevitt frequently over-stepped the mark, declaring himself a public 
official, not a council servant. He strongly believed that he had the independence 
to decide which orders to carry out, and to the dismay of many councillors acted 
accordingly.70 He promoted the Wolverhampton Tramways Act of 1899 and 
represented the Corporation in litigation over the acquisition of the tramways. He 
was knighted on 13 January 1915 for services to the borough. 
3.6 Early transport networks 
The first horse-drawn omnibus in Wolverhampton appeared in 1833, when George 
Bayley introduced a service from the suburb of Darlaston to the city centre. He 
used a nine-seat vehicle alternating with a service to Birmingham.71 In 1835, John 
Doughty began a service from Birmingham to Wolverhampton, and in September 
1836, the Midlands Omnibus Company commenced a similar operation, followed 
by the Birmingham Omnibus Conveyance Company in the same year. Others 
quickly followed, and by 1838, a service to Shifnal and Ironbridge in Shropshire 
was introduced by Rushton's Omnibus, operating twice a week, with other 
services to the neighbouring towns of Wednesbury and Willenhall.72 By the 1850s, 
regular local omnibus services and hackney cabs were radiating out from the 
centre of Wolverhampton. These services continued after the introduction of 
horse-drawn trams. To accommodate growth, the first cab stand was provided in 
1845, although omnibus services had no recognised stopping places en route. The 
drivers relied upon requests from the public. The first cabmen's rests and shelters 
were introduced in 1874 to protect them from the elements. 
70 Doyle, 'The Changing Functions', p.297. 
71 Stanley Webb and Paul Addenbrooke, A History of Wolverhampton Transport, Volume 1: 
1833-1930, Wolverhampton: Uralia Press, 1978, p.6. 
72 Ibid, p.8. 
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Shortly after horse tramways appeared in London and other major towns, 
Wolverhampton Council received a letter dated 22 September 1876 from W Webb 
of Queen Victoria Street, London, stating that 'a group of influential gentlemen' 
were interested in laying tramways in the city. The letter requested a meeting 
between the council, Webb, and the group's engineer, Joseph Kincaid.73 Identical 
terminology was used in correspondence from a tramway promoter to Hastings 
Council in 1896. 
A further letter dated 13 October 1876 proposed three routes, from 
Wolverhampton city centre to Tettenhall in the north west, city centre to Willenhall 
in the east, and from Five Ways to Bilston in the south east (see the map at 
Appendix 9). Subsequently, the Wolverhampton Tramways Company Limited, with 
registered offices at 3 King Street, London, was formed on 14 December 1876 
with the aim of developing a network in the city. A share issue of £100,000 was 
raised to finance the purchase of horses and tramcars, and to enable construction 
to commence. The Company promoted the Wolverhampton Tramways Order 
1877, which was confirmed on 23 July 1877, enabling the Company to construct 
three lines radiating out from the centre like the spokes of a wheel. 74 The Order 
contained mostly standard clauses, one being that the Council was given 
compulsory purchase powers at any time within ten years after opening, and again 
after 21 years. A more noteworthy clause prohibited passenger traffic on the track 
in the High Street, thus preventing through-running across the centre. At that 
stage, the introduction of a tramway system was not controversial and indeed was 
welcomed.75 The original intention was to operate by steam power, but due to 
many local objections, the Order was granted for the use of animal power only. In 
73 Note. Joseph Kincaid (1834-1907) was a successful promoter, responsible amongst other 
wojects for the Highgate Hill cable tramway. 
4 Williams, By Road and Rail, p.B. 
75 Ibid. 
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December 1877, the Company's head office moved to 23 Queen Victoria Street, in 
London?6 
The Wolverhampton Tramways (Extension) Order, 1878, enabled a further 
extension outside the boundaries from Bilston to Moxley.77 Construction on all 
lines commenced early in 1878 under the direction of the contractor, W T Mousley 
of Clifton.78 The offices and main depot were in Darlington Street, with another 
depot situated at Newbridge and a third at the Moxley terminus.79 
On 30 April 1878, the Board of Trade inspector, General Hutchinson, visited and 
approved the line to Tettenhal1.8o A trial run watched by many interested 
spectators took only 12 minutes for this one-mile five-furlong section. The public 
service began to great acclaim at 8 am on 1 May 1878 for a fare of 2d for the full 
distance. The tramcars were one-horse single-deck, manufactured by 
Stephensons and Hughes.81 A chain horse could be brought into service to assist 
on the climb up Darlington Street into the city centre. The cars were able to seat 
either 18 or 22 passengers.82 The route to Willen hall was completed in mid-May 
and opened to traffic on 6 June 1878, while the longest route to Bilston opened in 
mid-July. These routes were operated by Hughes two-horse double-deckers to 
accommodate passenger demand.83 By 1880, 8.55 route-miles of tramway were 
open to the public, comprising 1.825 miles of double-track and 6.725 miles of 
76 Webb and Addenbrooke, A History of Wolverhampton, p.10. 
n 1bid. 
78 Williams, By Road and Rail, p.S. 
79 JS Webb, Tramways of the Black Country, Walsall: WJ Ray & Co, 1954, p.7. 
80 Williams, By Road and Rail, p.S. 
81 Keith Turner, The Directory of British Tramways, Sparkford: Patrick Stephens Ltd, 1996, p.160. 
82 Webb and Addenbrooke, A History of Wolverhampton, p.10. 
83 Turner, The Directory of British, p.160. 
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single-track. 1,616,349 passengers were carried by 17 tramcars, and the 
Company owned 119 horses.84 
3.7 The steam tram experiment in Wolverhampton 
As other towns began to experiment with and introduce other forms of motive 
power, Wolverhampton Tramways Company also considered a more efficient and 
acceptable alternative to its horse tram system.85 Because it had been originally 
intended to use steam power, an experimental steam-traction system was 
introduced on the Tettenhall route between May and November 1881. The rolling 
stock comprised a Hughes locomotive hauling a pair of double-deck cars 
especially adapted for the purpose.86 
At the time, houses along the Tettenhall Road were substantial, belonging to 
society's professional classes, and the existing horse-tramway route acquired a 
prestige and status that made it the Company's premier line.87 The newest cars 
were directed there, under the charge of the most senior drivers, who wore white 
bowlers to distinguish themselves from the others.aa 
The route chosen as a testing ground for the steam tram was a section of Telford's 
original London to Holyhead trunk road, and as such was one of the widest 
thoroughfares in the city.89 The Wolverhampton Tramways (Mechanical Power) 
Order of 1880 authorised the Company to have a six-month trial period. The trials 
84 Board of Trade, Returns of Street and Road Tramways, Parliamentary Papers, (House of 
Commons Session 1880, Volume 64, No 264). 
85 Williams, By Road and Rail, p.1 O. 
88 Turner, The Directory of British, p.160. 
87 Webb and Addenbrooke, A History of Wolverhampton, p.14. 
88 Williams, By Road and Rail, p.10. 
89 Neil Raven and Jon Stobart, 'Networks and Hinterlands: Transport in the Midlands' in Stobart 
and Raven (eds), p.82. 
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began on 4 January 1881, and were officially inspected by General Hutchinson of 
the Board of Trade on 28 January.90 In the middle of May, the Board of Trade 
issued a certificate of approval, and the steam tram began its revenue-earning 
experimental period on 18 May.91 Over the next six months, it travelled nearly 
7,857 miles, and hauled over 70,360 passengers without incident. 92 
The steam tram operated alongside horse-drawn trams, also without incident, and 
appeared popular and successful. Nevertheless the Council refused a further six-
month extension of the trials. 93 Whether the elegant residents of Tettenhall Road 
objected to the noise and smoke, or whether its smooth efficiency compared to 
horse-drawn trams was opposed by the Company's general interests (they made 
no attempt to introduce steam trams elsewhere in the city) is hard to determine. It 
is more likely that the cessation of the experiment reflected the increasing 
dominance over the development of Wolverhampton's tramways wielded by the 
well-heeled residents of Tettenhall Road. The intrusion of steam trams was not 
welcome. 
Despite the decision against it, Council minutes show that general opinion in the 
city was in favour of the steam tram, and Councillor Burkitt organised a petition in 
favour of its retention, eventually signed by 2,338 people from various echelons of 
Victorian Wolverhampton's society.94 At a Council meeting on 21 November 1881, 
the motion to retain steam was defeated by 19 votes to 14, with fierce opposition 
led by Alderman Sir John Morris and Councillor Williams, who declared the steam 
90 Webb and Addenbrooke, A History of Wolverhampton, p.10. 
91 Williams, By Road and Rai', p.12. 
92 Webb and Addenbrooke, A History of Wolverhampton, p.14. 
93 Williams, By Road and Rail, p.12. 
94 Webb and Addenbrooke, A History of Wolverhampton, p.14. 
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tram 'a public nuisance,.95 Thus the first shots were fired in the battle against any 
form of public transport in Wolverhampton that aesthetically offended, particularly 
if it occurred in the wealthier districts. This contrasts with the ready adoption of 
steam traction in nearby Black Country towns, as well as five years later on 
another route in Wolverhampton itself through less salubrious areas, by the 
Dudley, Sedgley and Wolverhampton Tramways Company. The elite gentlemen in 
their own carriages disliked sharing the road with 'coke eating beasts,.96 The 
process demonstrates that the rich and powerful in Victorian society could still 
have a significant effect on the lives of their fellow citizens. And so the experiment 
was terminated. 
3.8 A separate enterprise in Wolverhampton 
Meanwhile, to the south of the city, the Dudley, Sedgley and Wolverhampton 
Tramways Company Limited was incorporated on 20 December 1879 to link the 
Black Country towns of Dudley, Upper Gornal and Sedgley with Wolverhampton.97 
The Dudley, Sedgley and Wolverhampton Tramways Order, 1880 was enacted 
and the standard-gauge line opened on 7 May 1883.98 Services began with seven 
Ashbury horse cars, but the Company decided very early on to use steam 
because of the gradients and undulating nature of the roads, which were 
particularly severe on the approaches to Sedgley from both directions.99 In places, 
the tramcars had needed three horses to pull them.1oo Steam traction at the time 
was a relatively familiar power source compared with electric traction, which was 
in its infancy. 
95 Williams, By Road and Rail, p.13. 
96 Ibid, p.14. 
97 Webb, Tramways of the Black Country, p.12. 
98 Webb and Addenbrooke, A History of Wolverhampton, p.1S. 
99 Webb, Tramways of the Black Country, p.12. 
100 Turner, The Directory of British, p.55. 
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Recognising the importance of Wolverhampton's system, the gauge was 
constructed to match the standard gauge of the city. The other lines within Dudley, 
Stourbridge and Kingswinford were built to 3' 6" gauge. 101 The adoption of 
standard gauge was surprising as there was no direct interconnection between the 
two systems. The Dudley, Sedgley and Wolverhampton network terminated on 
Snow Hill, just south of Queen Square which was the focal point of the 
Wolverhampton Tramways Company system (see map at Appendix 9).102 
An order giving the necessary powers to operate with steam was obtained in 1884. 
Horse traction ceased on 8 November 1885 so that track laying could commence, 
and steam traction began on 16 January 1886.103 When operated as a steam 
tramway, the system used an unusual type of rail section with a centre grooved 
rail. The only other examples of this design were Liverpool horse tramways, and 
Hull and Doncaster overhead-traction electrical systems in the early 1900S.104 
To begin with, five Kitson locomotives together with five top-covered bogie saloon 
cars operated the system, a further four locomotives being added later. 105 The 
Company was unsuccessful, however, and went into liquidation in March 1888.106 
It was purchased on 6 April 1889 by contractors Oppert and Fell, who sold it on 18 
October that year for £44,000 to the Midland Tramways Company.107 This 
enterprise was reconstituted in 1893 as the Dudley and Wolverhampton Tramways 
101 Webb and Addenbrooke, A History of Wolverhampton, p.15. 
102 Turner, The Directory of British p.S5. 
103 Webb, Tramways of the Black Country, p.12. 
lQ.4 Wingate H Bett and John C Gillham, The Tramways of South Yorkshire and Humberside, 
Walsall: The light Railway Transport League, 1962, p.g. 
105 Webb and Addenbrooke, A History of Wolverhampton, p.15. 
106 Turner, The Directory of British. p.S6. 
107 Ibid. 
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Company, but difficulties remained as the line was under-stocked and services 
were poor. Only a forty-minute service was possible between the two termini. 108 
The Company went into voluntary liquidation, and the British Electric Traction 
Company (BET) purchased the assets from the receiver on 22 April 1899 for 
£18,900.109 The ambitious BET had already been active in the Black Country, 
crossing swords with Wolverhampton's town clerk in March 1899. The town clerk 
asked 'is it not your object in surrounding Wolverhampton with tramway schemes 
to force the Corporation to grant a lease to your Company?' BET replied 'the 
object is to prevent the Wolverhampton tramways from being crippled by the 
Wolverhampton Corporation,110. BET had reckoned without the city's fierce 
independence. BET's plan was to combine all systems for the whole of the Black 
Country into one great system, if the local authorities would agree to postpone 
their right to purchase the tramways 'for the price of old iron' for a few years.111 
The intention was to install an electrically operated overhead system under one 
management, with one method of operation, and a common gauge. Extensions 
would be provided in all directions, with frequent services and convenient, 
comfortable and rapid communications. 112 Although ambitious, the plan was not 
unrealistic given the 'eighty square miles of a vast industrial centre of unsurpassed 
importance, between Wolverhampton and Birmingham, containing more than one 
million people,.113 Within the Black Country, there was no unified system. The 
network comprised fifty-four miles of tramway route with two different gauges, 
worked by three different methods, and owned by five separate companies. 
108 Webb, Tramways of the Black Country, p.12. 
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However, Wolverhampton's councillors viewed BET with suspicion as they stood 
in the path of the council's plans to take over all operations within the city to their 
own specification. Politically, they wanted to keep the industrial giant at arm's 
length. 
In an attempt to force the city's hand on the demise of the Dudley, Sedgley and 
Wolverhampton network, BET promoted the Dudley and Wolverhampton 
Tramways Order 1899114. The order gave Wolverhampton Council the power to 
purchase the mile or so of track within its boundaries. However, relations between 
BET and Wolverhampton deteriorated, and BET refused to sell. 115 Both BET and 
Wolverhampton Corporation attempted to obtain control of those sections outside 
the boundary on the Bilston and Willen hall routes, but after protracted negotiations 
and arbitration they were finally purchased by BET. Wolverhampton gave an 
undertaking not to acquire or work on any tramways outside their boundaries in 
the districts of Bilston, Coseley, Darlaston, Sedgley, or Willenhall without the 
consent of BET.116 
The dispute was considered by a Board of Trade appointed arbitrator, Sir 
Frederick Bramwell. Wolverhampton agreed to pay BET £22,500 plus the costs of 
arbitration. The settlement included all consumable stock on 1 May 1900, the date 
of transference. 117 The council also agreed to pay £4,250 to the Dudley & 
Wolverhampton Tramways Company.118 The intention was to work the section 
with horse cars from the Wolverhampton Tramways Company, but this proved 
impossible because the centre-grooved rails only supported stock with centre-
114 Webb, Tramways of the Black Country, p.7. 
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flanged wheels. 119 BET appealed against the settlement and continued to press for 
running powers within the city. They eventually renounced all claims after a 
judgement by Justice Joyce on 29 November 1900.120 The scene was set for 
disagreements with BET which would continue for several years, culminating in 
Wolverhampton's independent and detached view of network operations in the 
adjacent Black Country conurbation, and the thwarting of BET's grand plan. 
Not to be outdone, BET registered the Wolverhampton District Electric Tramways 
Company Limited (WDET) 17 December 1900, its express purpose being to 
acquire from its parent company the lines outside Wolverhampton's boundaries. 121 
In particular, WDET reconstructed the standard gauge section between Dudley 
and Wolverhampton to 3' 6" gauge and equipped it with overhead electric 
traction.122 
3.9 Municipalisation 
1 May 1900 was a momentous occasion for another reason. On that date, the 
Corporation-owned tramways began operations, and from that date the council 
was free to pursue its tramway policy. The previous private operator was put 
clearly in the shade, as the Express and Star reported: 
There was in some senses nothing short of a transformation. The 
passengers found on mounting the car that the driver and conductor were 
literally metamorphosed. They wore for the first time a uniform of blue 
119 Webb and Addenbrooke, A History of Wolverhampton, p.23. 
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serge, with orange braid, from head to foot. They were smartness 
personified. Inspectors wore a suit similarly cut, but with gold trimmings. 123 
These were by no means the only improvements in working conditions. Wages 
were increased and the long hours of work reduced, as happened in London.124 
Thus many of the so-called 'negative' estimates of the impact of municipalisation, 
as adduced by Guyot, certainly applied in Wolverhampton.125 He somewhat 
sarcastically concluded that 'municipal service must, above all, confer advantages 
on its employees. Such undertakings of right belong to them' .126 His right-wing 
views and militant attitude towards socialism had been developed earlier in his 
book The Tyranny of Socialism. 127 Operations were also improved. Three more 
horse cars were purchased, and services were increased to every ten minutes on 
the Tettenhall route and every fifteen minutes on the others. 128 The 
Wolverhampton Tramways Company was eventually wound up in March 1901 as 
by then all of its lines had been purchased either by Wolverhampton Corporation 
or BET.129 
Wolverhampton took over its tramways as soon as it was able. This meant that 
with its rapidly expanding population and low revenue from rates, it had a potential 
source of income from municipal tramways as a means of subsidising its social 
improvement and public health programmes. In Millward's generalisation, 
municipal enterprises were used as cash cows, where profit transfers were 
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welcomed as a form of non-tax revenues, which had the virtue of obviating 
legislative approval.130 
3.10 The introduction of surface-contact trams 
Due partly to the controversy surrounding the form of electric traction to be 
installed, Wolverhampton was relatively late with the electrification of its tramways. 
Although there had been a system of horse-drawn tramways in Wolverhampton 
since 1878, other cities such as Leeds had introduced overhead traction as early 
as 1891, effectively a showcase for the American Thomson-Houston system. 131 
Even the nearby smaller towns of Walsall, Darlaston and West Bromwich had an 
overhead system by 1892 (the second in the country), serving parts of South 
Staffordshire. This eight-mile network was eventually purchased by BET in 
1897.132 
The increasing pressure from promoters to install electric traction led to 
Wolverhampton Council setting up a special committee in 1896 to consider the 
respective merits of overhead, conduit and accumulator systems. 133 The 
Committee reported back to the full council meeting in July 1898 recommending 
the adoption of the overhead system. After much discussion, the recommendation 
failed to be endorsed on the grounds that councillors wished to explore all 
possibilities further. 134 
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In October 1899, the Electric Car Syndicate approached Wolverhampton Council 
with a proposal to install a modification of the Kingsland mechanical surface-
contact system on a 200 yard experimentalline. 135 The Kingsland employed no 
electro-magnets or other equipment on board, the trams being propelled by a 
series of ratchets operated through an electrical impulse. 136 The cars were 
therefore considerably lighter.137 The system was widely used in Dresden in 
Germany. Representatives of the technical press visited the experiment in May 
1901. They concluded that the worst aspect was the noise produced by the 
tappets hitting the driving wheels, but also pointed out that current leakage was 
likely to be considerable. 138 Costs were estimated to be £6,500 to £7,500 per mile 
compared with £5,000 to £6,000 for overhead wires and £10,000 to £12,000 for 
conduits. Although the experiment lasted for more than a year, Wolverhampton 
Council decided not to proceed with full installation because of fears about the 
safety of having a third rail, although the danger from studs being left live would 
only occur in the case of a derailment. 139 
In parallel with the trials, the Tramways Committee had again recommended the 
overhead system in October 1900, thereby pre-empting the decision about the 
Kingsland system. On this occasion, the council endorsed the recommendation, 
and authorised an invitation for tenders for the installation of overhead equipment 
along the route from Ettingshall Road to Tettenhall, via New Hampton Road. 14o 
This was a cross-city route of some 4 miles. The reasons given were that 
'overhead traction was economical and efficient; moderate cost of construction; 
135 Webb and Addenbrooke, A History of Wolverhampton, p.SS. 
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cheap to operate; simplicity of working; easy to repair; small disturbance to streets; 
and could be combined with street lighting by fitting lamps to support poles,.141 
Contracts were placed for nine tramcars to be fitted with overhead trolley booms 
and the Lighting Committee was given permission to attach street lamps to the 
traction poles.142 
However, uncertainty entered the deliberations in March 1901 when Sir Charles 
Mander, the chairman of both the Lighting and Tramway Committees, drew 
attention to the Dolter surface-contact system, then currently operating in Paris. 
Consequently, the committee visited Paris to inspect the system. 143 As a result, 
tenders were invited for the construction of both an overhead and a Dolter system, 
but the committee deferred acceptance of any of the tenders subject to further 
consideration. 144 
At this point, the Lorain Company arrived on the scene. The Tramway and Railway 
World had already been suggesting: 
Some of the more important cities in the world absolutely forbid the erection of 
trolley poles and wires in the streets. They are cumbersome, crude and 
sometimes even dangerous. Lorain system in operation in Washington is the 
answer.145 
Senior members of the Lorain Company themselves also put pressure on the 
decision makers, insisting that their system was 'at the cutting edge of new 
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propulsion techniques, employing fully developed methods at the frontiers of 
knowledge,.146 Since it was the first adopter in the UK, Wolverhampton was 
expected by contemporary observers to go down in history as the pioneer of the 
surface-contact system.147 
In the following month, representatives of both the Lorain and the Dolter systems 
were invited to present their relative merits to a special meeting. 148 Subsequently, 
the committee recommended the installation of the Lorain system (see Appendix 
10). Because of continuing fears about an untried system, a full council meeting 
debated an amendment that it 'should not endorse any experiments until further 
independent experts had had investigated mechanical and commercial aspects 
and directly recommended it' .149 Angry exchanges ensued and the amendment 
was lost by 25 votes to 18.150 
Eventually, the council decided to accept an offer to equip 11.375 miles of single-
track from the Lorain Company. A contract was signed between D Coolidge 
(President) and PM Boyd (Secretary) of the Lorain Steel Company of Ohio and 
CEC Shawfield, the electrical engineer of the Corporation, on 26 July 1901. 151 
Exercising caution with an unproven technology and in an apparent move to 
appease the dissenters, the contract stipulated that an experimental length of 
seven-eighths of a mile of double-track be installed on Bilston Road within three 
months of signing. Provided no problems developed after operating with three 
cars, Wolverhampton would instruct the company to install the remaining sections 
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within thirty days. If following a Board of Trade inspection the system was not 
approved, the company would be required to remove it and the contract would 
terminated.152 
The contract contained other stringent clauses. The Council was to operate the 
system commercially for one year, at the end of which they would decide whether 
to accept or reject it. Commercial success was defined in terms of the reliability 
and safety of the system, the comparative consumption of electrical energy per car 
mile, the cost of operation, and the cost of maintenance, against similar 
considerations for overhead.153 The contract acknowledged that due allowance 
should be made for the greater expense of maintaining and operating surface-
contact. In case of a dispute about commercial success, five arbitrators were to be 
appointed: the borough electrical engineer and a party chosen by him; a 
representative of the Lorain Company and a party chosen by him; and a party 
nominated by the Board of Trade, all with equal voting rights. 154 The cost of 
installing 11.375 miles of single-track was £20,475 and the cost of three specially 
built tramcars £3,000. 155 The Lorain Company must have been convinced of the 
eventual success of the operation given the capital sums risked. They possibly 
also regarded the installation as a potential loss-leader in the hope of winning 
further contracts. 
Installation of the experimental section began in December 1901, under the 
watchful eye of Lorain's European representative, Earl P Wetmore. 156 Applying 
unsubtle pressure on the council to complete the whole network, he proclaimed: 
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'Wolverhampton has lagged behind for too long. Its antiquated omnibuses and 
obsolete horse-trams are a crying disgrace,.157 Tests were carried out between 6 
February and 7 March 1902, during which time the Board of Trade inspectors, 
Colonel Yorke and Mr Trotter declared they were prepared to grant a licence to 
operate Lorain traction for twelve months if the council so desired. The Board of 
Trade informed the Town Clerk that if under Section 41 (4) b of the Wolverhampton 
Corporation Act 1899 they considered the system a danger to passengers or the 
general public, they might direct operation to cease or to be continued only subject 
to conditions to be imposed. 158 
Continuing his doubts about the Lorain installation, Councillor Thorne pressed for 
an appraisal by an independent electrical expert during the trials. 159 He opposed 
the involvement of the borough electrical engineer, CEC Shawfield. 16o 
Consequently, H Lea was appointed. Lea found no inherent problems, but felt 
unable to predict ultimate success or failure after such a short experiment. He 
recommended completion of the 11.375 mile single-track network, but stressed 
that the fullest possible records must be kept. 161 
3.11 Networks of power - the middle classes 
The part played by Wolverhampton's middle classes in subsequent debates about 
extending the network was crucial. In the nineteenth century, British towns were 
'substantially the creation of their middle class, and in turn provided the theatre 
within which that middle class sought, extended, expressed and defended its 
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power,.162 This was certainly true in industrial cities such as Wolverhampton where 
despite being only 3% of the population, 163 wealthier residents exercised 
disproportionate power and influence through their representation on the council 
and involvement in municipal decision-making. The existence of middle-class 
residents clearly affected the social atmosphere of a town, and engendered 
feelings of superiority on the one hand and resentment among the lower classes 
on the other.164 
But despite society's stratification, by no means all members of the middle and 
upper classes lacked empathy with the lower classes. In Wolverhampton during 
debates about traction choices, a section of the wealthy industrialist councillors 
., 
showed great concern over the plight of the working classes.165 They had different 
priorities, and failed to see how a more expensive but aesthetically pleasing 
surface-contact solution would benefit the poorest sections of society. In their 
view, the money would have been better spent on improving housing and 
alleviating poverty.166 While such protestations might reflect the genuine concerns 
of the higher classes, sceptics would point out that philanthropic gestures actually 
did little to alter the social structure. 167 In fact, philanthropists' continued aloofness 
simply reinforced the existing power relationship. 
One historian has suggested that Black Country towns 'developed and retained 
frontier characteristics that would impede the emergence of a local social system 
162 RJ Morris, 'The Middle Class and British Towns and Cities of the Industrial Revolution, 1780-
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and complicate enormously the tasks of socialleaders'.168 In practice, that was not 
entirely the case. The first official visit made by Queen Victoria after the death of 
her consort was to Wolverhampton, much to the chagrin of the greater cities of 
Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester. Such a visit would not have been made if 
the social system was only in the early stages of evolving. Nevertheless, the press 
reacted with 'abusive astonishment', declaring that the area comprised 'unrelieved 
environmental ugliness and human brutality' .169 While such views may reinforce 
the frontier stereotype, they have to be set against evidence of the gradual 
development of a sophisticated social and political system. 
Society tensions continually spilled over into debates about the provision and form 
of tramway systems. Public transport in Wolverhampton had progressed steadily 
from omnibuses to horse-drawn trams, and finally to electrification of the tramway 
system. There was a fleeting but unsuccessful attempt to introduce steam trams, 
but the serious controversy about the form of electric traction was also a battle 
between opposing political powers within the same class. 17o 
3.12 Religious influences 
In Wolverhampton, as in other cities, politics and religion were closely intertwined, 
with the result that decisions about technological change were susceptible to both 
political and religious interests. Sectarian issues caused deep political divisions, 
and surfaced where economic decisions were involved on issues such as tram 
traction. To understand the depth of feeling generated, it is important to set these 
events in context. 
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As the nineteenth century progressed, great changes had occurred in people's 
attitude towards religion. In the villages, religion 'reflected and reinforced notions 
of hierarchy' .171 In the cities, community ties were loosening and the notion of 
social position and religious affiliation were diverging as a result. Briggs cites how 
the religious census of 1851 revealed that the mass of the working population in 
towns and cities did not attend church, and had little belief in religion. 172 Instead, 
reason began to replace faith, strongly held beliefs were questioned and in some 
cases crumbled, and were replaced by new ideas based upon science and 
technology. 173 There was an increasing feeling of isolation from nature, particularly 
for city-dwellers. This led to sharp divisions within religious denominations which 
inevitably began to influence technological choices 174. 
Before 1835, most towns were in the hands of 'self-selecting Anglican Tories',175 
. 
but Liberal nonconformists with strong Methodist links were slowly increasing their 
presence among the elite.176 After local government reform, the situation changed 
somewhat, though democratisation was no easy process. By the end of the 
century, Primitive Methodists and Catholics had also 'gained minor shares of 
representation' within the Liberal and Tory bodies of opinion respectively. 177 
Wolverhampton however, with its strong non-conformist tradition, was an 
exception to the decline in religious belief that was taking place elsewhere. 178 
Douglas A Reid attributes this phenomenon to 'local factors, such as evangelistic 
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blitzes on the exploited workforces of the Black Country, which affected regional 
patterns,.179 It is certainly true that Charles Wesley preached in Wolverhampton on 
several occasions. Indeed, nonconformist religion took such a hold that in the last 
years of the nineteenth century, Wolverhampton has been described as a civic 
gospel town wherein religion became a support for civic co-operation rather than 
the basis of strife. 180 However, the suggestion that non-conformism was the only 
religion in town is not entirely borne out by the facts, particularly as far as the 
debates about traction choices were concerned. Even before the advent of Irish 
immigration in the mid nineteenth century, Roman Catholicism was a strong force, 
to the extent that a Catholic cathedral existed there between 1743 and 1765, 
serving not only Birmingham but also the entire West Midlands region.181 
Catholicism remained a force and religious diversity, especially within the council, 
ensured lively discussion and frequent dissent about key issues. 
In the 1890s and the early years of the twentieth century, divisions were evident in 
the political composition of Wolverhampton's Council. Developments included the 
growth of the Labour party, which brought 'new techniques, new aims, and a new 
style' .182 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Radical Liberals and the 
Labour Party sought to end what they viewed as the easy-going alliance of 
Conservatives and conservative Liberals on the Council. 183 
By 1900, three significant groupings had developed on the Council in line with 
what were now customary political and religious affiliations. There was an Anglican 
Conservative group consisting of men with high social status, whose businesses 
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were located in the wards they represented. Thus 'Anglicanism and Conservatism 
went together and the Church Party was the Conservative Party'. 184 The second 
group were men of similar high social status, but Liberals belonging to a Methodist 
Congregational church. The third grouping represented occupations of a lower 
social standing, such as shopkeepers, who were mainly temperance reformers 
belonging to Baptist and Primitive Methodist chapels. 185 Politically, these 
councillors were Radical Liberals who sought to overturn a social order based on 
privilege and property.186 
Many of the issues raised were rooted in the plans of these temperance reformers, 
mainly the Radical Liberals, to improve social conditions in the industrial eastern 
suburbs of Wolverhampton. 187 The Radical Liberals argued consistently at annual 
council elections that drink was the cause of the appalling social conditions 
prevailing there. They strongly opposed the choice of surface-contact traction on 
the grounds of expense when that became an issue. 188 
However, the first major issue to inflame passions was education. There was a 
fight between: 
the ill assorted union of the forces of the Protestant Church of England with 
those of what is alleged to be the elder branch of the Christian faith whose 
foundations are laid in Rome, aided by the equally strong ever dominant 
power of the 'trade', pitched against what is termed 'Chapel influence'. 189 
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These divisions were reflected in the debates about the method for propelling 
trams, which followed soon afterwards. On the one side were the champions of the 
surface-contact system, the Anglican Conservatives supported by the Catholics, 
while on the other were the non-conformist Liberals, whose stated aim was to 
check extravagance and achieve efficiency.19o To that end, the Liberals argued 
that the system was too costly to install and maintain, and that it would burden the 
ratepayers far more than an overhead system. 191 They preferred to spend money 
improving conditions in the socially deprived eastern suburbs. Thus sectarian 
issues were very divisive, especially when they concerned spending public money. 
3.13 Corruption and freemasonry - were they factors in the decision-making 
process? 
In the nineteenth century, crime was generally considered to be the province of the 
lower classes. However, the middle classes by virtue of their positions in society 
were able to perpetrate crimes against property of much higher value. This was 
especially true of public servants acting against local authorities.192 Such crimes 
were perceived as 'threatening the generally respected structure of urbanised 
society,.193 
Corruption in municipal authorities took many forms. In the USA, administrative 
'machines' run by powerful politicians overspent on public works to supply their 
supporters with jobs, as well as to line their own pockets. 194 The malleability of 
municipal officials was notorious. As a result, there was greater reliance on 
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competitive bidding. 195 Companies often achieved extensions to their systems by 
resorting to bribery. While this practice was less prevalent in the UK, it might have 
been an additional reason why long-term franchises did not emerge in British 
cities. 196 In the UK there was also competitive bidding, but eventually some cities 
realised that the monopolistic nature of tramway operations called for a more 
effective regulatory system. 
Contemporary writers who were in favour of the overhead system expressed 
concern about Wolverhampton council's decision-making process. At a meeting of 
the Municipal and County Engineers in Wolverhampton in 1902, a Mr Green 
presented a controversial paper claiming that the corporation had until eleventh 
hour intended to install overhead wires, having previously seen many such 
systems during their visit to Paris. 197 He concluded 'great must have been the 
attractions offered by the Lorain Company to change the council's minds'.198 In 
. 
fact, there is no hard evidence to suggest that any form of 'persuasion' took place; 
nevertheless, suspicions were aroused. 
Prior to the First World War, most senior officials were local men, or long-term 
migrants, with strong business and professional involvements in the locality. There 
were often social connections also. Doyle refers to the Masonic links between 
councillors and officials in Wolverhampton.199 Whether such associations had any 
effect on the policies of the Council is difficult to judge as the main function 
appears to have been social cohesion, 'providing opportunities to meet and forging 
social links between individuals which might help them to unite on matters of 
195 John P McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, p.94. 
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Council business'.2oo What is clear from the following table, however, is that no 
Labour councillors were freemasons: 
Year Conservative Liberal Labour Total 
1888-89 2 1 0 3 
1903-04 4 1 0 5 
1919-20 9 1 0 10 
Table 3.4· Wolverhampton councillors who were Freemasons.201 
Jones concludes that Freemasonry was strong among both council members and 
officials, and they tended to help each other and stick together. But given that in 
Wolverhampton between 1888 and 1926, the Council's constitution consisted of 
12 Aldermen and 36 Councillors, it seems unlikely that such a small percentage of 
freemasons could exert much influence, unless they were the chairmen of 
important committees. 
3.14 The controversial extension of the system 
The Fine Art and Industrial Exhibition in Wolverhampton in May 1902 was a 
catalyst for tramway action. The event followed a series held since the Great 
Exhibition at Crystal Palace in 1851. The Great Exhibition was an expression of 
the UK's progress and power, and was intended to enhance the nation's 
200 Jones, Borough Politics, p.137. 
201 Ibid. 
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international standing. Since the Industrial Revolution, the UK had gradually risen 
to dominate world trade and was now the richest country in the world. Individual 
towns soon realised that similar exhibitions would enhance their reputation. Major 
events helped develop a separate urban identity, and played an extremely 
important role in reinforcing a sense of civic pride and achievement. 202 
The Wolverhampton Exhibition was an enormously significant expression of the 
city's self-image as an important international centre of industry, technology and 
creativity.203 It was the largest exhibition in the UK since that held at the Crystal 
Palace fifty years earlier. Thirty-two acres of the West Park were transformed by 
several enormous pavilions, representing not only the Midlands but also the rest of 
the country. International pavilions included exhibits from Russia, Japan and 
Canada. The intention was to promote confidence in the image of the city, as well 
as increasing trade and wealth. Opened on 1 May 1902 by the Kin~'s brother, the 
Duke of Connaught and his wife, it was considered by the press to be a 
resounding success.204 More than 1.5 million visitors attended before the end in 
November. It was subsequently described by the Earl of Dartmouth as the 
awakening of Wolverhampton.205 
Both the Council and the manufacturers of the Lorain system viewed the Exhibition 
as a great opportunity to showcase the tramway's surface-contact system.206 The 
influential Tramway and Railway World trade magazine predicted that 'when the 
tramways are open they will form a feature of the greatest interest to all connected 
202 Morris, 'Structure, Culture and Society' in Daunton (ed), p.412-414. 
203 Jones, Story of the Municipal Life, p.272. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid, p.301. 
206 The Tramway and Railway World, Volume 11 (13 February 1902), pp.65-76. 
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with tramways who visit the Exhibition'. 207 The Lorain company clearly recognised 
the commercial advantage and ensured that a direct route from the railway station 
to the exhibition site , a total of six route-miles, was completed on time and opened 
on the same day.20B The public reaction 'gave an additional cause for rejoicing, .209 
Unfortunately for the company, no further orders were generated despite the 
enthusiasm of the technical press. But the newly installed surface-contact system 
certa inly fulfilled Wolverhampton 's apparent desire to be different. 
Figure 3.1 - The art nouveau fa~ade of the Industrial Hall. One of the many fine pavilions 
built for the Exhibition. None of them have survived. 21 0 
After the Exhibition, serious concerns resurfaced about the attitude of BET. During 
a council meeting on 16 June 1902, Alderman Craddock, the acting chairman of 
207 The Tramway and Railway World, Volume 11 (13 February 1902), p.338. 
208 Webb and Addenbrooke, A History of Wolverhampton, p.31 . 
209 Jones, Story of the Municipal Life, p.272. 
210 A Contemporary picture postcard 
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the Tramways Committee, accused BET of thwarting and opposing the council at 
every opportunity.211 Mr Lycett, the BET representative, had made it clear that the 
company would not spend any money on any portion of their lines in the 
neighbouring Black Country towns unless the Corporation agreed to equip the 
routes to Willenhall, Bilston and Dudley within the city boundaries with the 
overhead system.212 Lycett raised again the question of isolation and the 
interchange of through traffic. With the support of the council, the town clerk 
replied to BET that Wolverhampton was not 'playing with the Lorain system', and 
believed that it would prove successful. 213 To accede to the terms of BET would be 
to stultify themselves in the eyes of the country.214 Wolverhampton would not be 
held to ransom, and installation of the complete system would continue. Although 
BET was a powerful enterprise, Wolverhampton council was clearly not overawed. 
The twelve-month maintenance period began on 17 April 1902.215 ~hortly 
afterwards, CEC Shawfield reported on the Lorain system after the first year of 
operation.216 His assessment was carried out according to five previously agreed 
headings: safety to people and animals; reliability; consumption of electrical 
energy per car mile; cost of working; and cost of maintenance. With regard to the 
dangers of the system, the report concluded that the risks were more apparent 
than real.217 The main problem was studs left live, the result of scrap iron 
collecting and causing short-circuits. The incidents were at known crossing points, 
and occurrences were carefully controlled by inspectors or police on pOint duty. 
Even so, the average level of incident was six per month (or seven per track-mile). 
211 The Tramway and Rai/way World, Volume 12 (July 1902), p.213. 
212 Wolverhampton City Archives, Council Minutes, June/July 1902, p.759. 
213 Wolverhampton Chronicle, 14 October 1903. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Wolverhampton City Archives, L07, The Wolverhampton Journal, Nos 1-12, 1902. 
216 Wolverhampton City Archives, L388, Report on the Lorain system. 
217 The Electrician, Volume 51 (24 April 1903), p.44-46. 
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This compared favourably with incidents caused by falling wires in overhead 
systems in Liverpool where there were 10.16 per track-mile, but less so with 
Sunderland (4.07) and Bolton (3.54).218 No deaths to either people or animals 
were reported in the twelve-month period, although seven horses received shocks 
and fell, causing bruising, and two pedestrians received mild shocks.219 
The number of car-miles lost per 1000 miles was only 1 Yl, a rate which compared 
very favourably with the reliability of overhead systems. Consumption of energy 
per car-mile cost an extra 0.41 pence, or 22% more than overhead power, but 
there was no difference in working costs. There was an additional cost of 
maintenance of 0.813 pence per car-mile (representing 33% more) when 
compared with fifteen towns using overhead systems. This translated to £1250 per 
car-mile per annum.220 
Although more expensive to operate than overhead traction, the Lorain system 
offered some advantages of simplicity and economy over earlier surface-contact 
systems.221 Table 3.5 shows a comparison with overhead for the first year: 
218 The Electrician, Volume 51 (24 April 1903), p.44-46. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Ibid. 
221 The Tramway and Railway World, Volume 11 (13 February 1902), pp.65-76. 
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Cost in pence per car-mile 
Lorain surface-contact system Overhead 
Annual repairs Annual provision Annual repairs Annual provision 
and maintenance for future and maintenance for future 
Track equipment 0.165 0.404 0.216 0.100 
Car equipment 0.135 0.095 0.064 0.016 
~. 
Electrical energy 2.310 
-
1.900 . 
Total 3.109 2.296 
Table 3.5 - Report by eEe Shawfield on the first year's operation of the Lorain system.222 
The deliberately simple comparison presented by Wolverhampton's chief 
tramways engineer in the above table gives a false impression. The additional cost 
of the Lorain system of 0.813 pence per car-mile made no allowance for interest 
payments and the sinking fund to payoff any loans, making any direct comparison 
very difficult. 
Following Shawfield's report, a decision had to be made regarding the extension of 
the system. The Wolverhampton Chronicle reported in great length, at times 
verbatim, an extraordinary and heated debate in full council in October 1903 
222 Wolverhampton City Archives, L388 Report to Wolverhampton Tramways Committee, March 
1903. 
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lasting for almost five hours. The Tramways Committee had requested a mandate 
to equip a" further routes in the borough with the Lorain system. The Chairman of 
the Tramways Committee, Sir Charles Mander, moved that the request be 
approved. 
When surface-contact systems were being considered, those involved with the 
decision-making process - mainly the more influential members of the governing 
party - seemed unconcerned about the prospect of isolation from adjacent towns, 
despite the objections of shopkeepers and tradesmen who were very definitely 
worried by it. 223 But there were many other reasons why a resolution took so long. 
The champions of the surface-contact system believed that it would avoid the 
unaesthetic cluttering of the streets. Opponents had numerous objections. It would 
be costly to install and maintain: it would add extra burdens for the ratepayers; it 
would be dangerous to people and animals; and cyclists and carriages would find 
avoiding the plates a nuisance.224 Other opponents argued that as no other town 
in the country had adopted the system, it would be a costly and risky experiment, 
and would soon become obsolete. The Council was urged to rely on tried and 
trusted British methods of traction.225 The Lorain system was viewed as an 
'American gamble' as it originated in that country (see Appendix 11).226 The 
question of whether to adopt a surface-contact or overhead system was felt to be 
one of the most momentous public issues ever to be considered by the Council. 227 
One councillor said 'I never remember being present at a meeting of this Council 
at which I have heard language so strong',228 
223 Wolverhampton Chronlc/e, 14 October 1903. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Jones, Borough Politics. p.42. 
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One of the main opponents of the surface-contact system was GR Thorne, a 
Liberal councillor who was elected mayor for the year 1902-03. He eventually 
replaced Sir Henry Fowler as MP for Wolverhampton East in 1908. Like Fowler, he 
was a solicitor by profession, but had a strong social conscience and believed that 
'every citizen should do his utmost to improve the place in which he dwelt'.229 To 
that end he was 'zealous in connection with the establishment of electric trams 
with a view to improving the means of transit in the Borough,.230 Thorne was 
something of a philanthropist, believing strongly in the cause of education, and 
showing great sympathy with the working-class section of the community. 
Although a strong supporter of electric trams, when the matter of traction 
technology was being discussed he firmly believed that the cheapest system 
should be adopted, particularly in view of Wolverhampton's heavy rate burden. He 
was also concerned that trade could not progress unless there was 
- -
interconnection with adjacent towns. He strongly opposed any system that 
resulted in isolation.231 However, Alderman Sir Charles Mander was equally 
vociferous in his support of a surface-contact system, pointing out that any other 
choice would be playing into the hands of BET, who were 'fighting tooth and nail to 
take over the Wolverhampton system,.232 
Mander suggested that the extra cost of surface traction, estimated to be £729 for 
the whole of the borough, was a 'mere flea bite' compared with receipts of more 
than £50,000.233 He accused the local newspaper, the Express and Star, of 
misrepresenting facts in their attempts to influence councillors against the Lorain 
229 Jones, The Story of the Municipal Life, p.305. 
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231 Webb and Addenbrooke, A History of Wolverhampton, p.44. 
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system. He also had the BET in his sights, accusing them of undue influence over 
the neighbouring suburbs of Bilston and Sedgley, which at that time lay outside the 
boundaries of Wolverhampton, and had been equipped with overhead traction by 
BET. Turning the tables, he suggested that those small towns had 'sold their 
birthright for a mess of pottage' and they were responsible for the lack of inter-
connection between the systems.234 He implied that if those towns had persuaded 
BET to equip their trams with skates, inter-connection would not have been a 
problem. If they wished to take advantage of Wolverhampton's facilities, they 
should apply pressure on BET. Further heated exchanges took place on the 
question of isolation and the impact on trade. Wolverhampton's population at that 
time was more than 100,000, but there was a danger of isolating a further 80,000 
people in the surrounding towns, a considerable potential market. 
In the subsequent debate, Councillor White moved an amendment that the 
Tramways Committee should reconsider their recommendation on the grounds 
that communication with surrounding towns was absolutely necessary. He 
stressed that Wolverhampton would be cut off from Bilston, Sedgley, Willenhall 
and Dudley, and the council was 'building a wall around itself. They must break 
down those walls and give the greatest facilities that could possibly be got,.235 
Other councillors were convinced that isolation would inevitably result in shop 
closures, empty houses, and a decline in economic prosperity. 
A subsequent author has asserted that the 'rapidly burgeoning towns like 
Wolverhampton could make provision for local undertakings without worrying 
unduly about any unexplained benefits from links with neighbouring towns'. 236 
234 Wo/verhampton Chronlc/e, 14 October 1903. 
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However, contemporary dissenters viewed tramway isolationism as nothing short 
of disastrous. Shopkeepers and the Tradesmen's Association urged the council to 
adopt a system compatible with others in the Black Country. The council 
responded that if the Association felt so strongly, they should have complained 
earlier.237 It was not until later in the twentieth century that a more regional 
transport focus was adopted, eliminating any political tensions and local rivalries. 
In view of the intercommunication problems between the neighbouring towns, the 
full Council Meeting also considered the cost of installing an overhead system 
combined with the surface-contact technology already installed. The consensus 
was that the additional costs incurred by a dual system would be too great, and 
the only practical policy was to extend the Lorain system. On intercommunication, 
Wolverhampton had no powers to operate outside its boundaries. Supporting 
councillors insisted that the onus was on outlying districts to ensure there would be 
,. 
tramcars to meet up with the Wolverhampton vehicles. In addition, no serious 
disadvantage had been observed on Bilston road, where transfer between the 
systems was necessary. Tram return statistics had shown a steady increase in 
receipts as shown in Table 3.6 regarding the Bilston Road route where 
passengers had to change trams at the boundary. BET's Black Country services 
operated on the overhead system from that point onwards. 
237 Wolverhampton City Archives, L352 Council Minutes and Reports, 1902-03, p.819. 
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Car-miles run Receipts Receipts per car-mile Number of 
In pence passengers carried 
£ s d 
August 1902 6,487 2921311 10.83 70,247 
August 1903 9,799 485 8 6 11.89 97,096 
Increase 3,312 192 14 7 1.06 26,849 
Table 3.6 - Comparison of receipts for the months of August 1902 and August 1903.238 
The percentage increases, ranging from 9.8% for receipts per car-mile to 65.8% 
for total receipts, are even more impressive given that the period only partially 
covered the Wolverhampton International Fine Art and Industrial Exhibition, which 
ran from May until November 1902. Overall, the number of passengers carried 
increased by 38.2%. 
Notwithstanding the economic argument, the question of class status came to the 
fore. Councillor Sharrocks contended that so far, only the convenience of the 
upper classes in the western suburbs had been considered. 'What was good for 
Tettenhall and the Waterloo Road was equally good for Wednesfield and 
Willenhall, where the masses lived and worked',239 He suggested that the working 
classes should have the same comfort and convenience for travel to their places 
of employment as the upper classes. If a dual surface-contact and overhead 
system was introduced, preferential treatment would be given to the better-class 
238 Wolverhampton Chronicle, 14 October 1903. 
239 Ibid. 
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roads and streets to the detriment of the inhabitants of the poorer districts. The 
former would continue with surface-contact, while the latter would suffer the 
intrusion and dangers of overhead wiring. 24o Everyone should 'all join hands in 
working together for the best interests of Wolverhampton at large', not for just the 
privileged few.241 
As an alternative, the Council also considered a proposal to equip BET's 
overhead-powered trams with skates to allow them to run into Wolverhampton. 
However, it was pointed out that the cost would be £225 per tram, and the 
tramcars would have to carry the additional skate weight of 25 hundred-weight 
over their whole system for the sake of a mile or so into the centre of 
Wolverhampton. Further discussion raised the spectre of company monopoly if 
lines were leased to BET. Wolverhampton was happy to refer the matter to the 
Board of Trade, but only on the basis of two broad principles. Thes~ were that the 
borough 'absolutely controls its own traffic, and all earnings within the borough 
stay within borough,.242 In no circumstances would competitive arrangements be 
allowed as it would be prejudicial to the borough's own undertaking. Needless to 
say, BET failed to take up the offer. 
In support of the Lorain system, Mander offered the following comparative working 
costs: Wolverhampton (Lorain) 6.75 pence per car mile; Manchester (overhead) 
6.95 pence per car mile; Bradford (overhead) 7.026 pence per car mile.243 At face 
value, the results were persuasive, but they omitted maintenance provision and 
extra capital costs of installation. They were also based on one particular month 
and were therefore selective and grossly unrepresentative. 
240 Wolverhllmpton Chronicle, 14 October 1903. 
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Other councillors opposed to the Lorain system sarcastically referred to Alderman 
Mander as the 'oracle of the Chamber, whose authority should not be 
contradicted, a master of etiquette and deportment'. Alderman Price Lewis 
accused Mander of playing with townspeople's money. He suggested that those 
who had faith in the Lorain system should show it by instituting a guarantee fund to 
meet any losses that might be incurred, adding 'you'll put your townspeople's 
money at stake, but not your own'.244 Price Lewis continued that he was perfectly 
content to see the Lorain system extended along those routes already laid down, 
, but pleaded for overhead traction on other lines to the suburbs to prevent isolation. 
Councillor Reade felt it was not incumbent on residents of neighbouring authorities 
to pressurise their councillors to effect the desired inter-communication with the 
Lorain system. That responsibility lay with Wolverhampton. Reade declared that 
the surface-contact plates were a great nuisance to cyclists and carriage-owners. 
They caused 'a dangerous jarring to the wheels when passing over them'.245 He 
proposed that the overhead system should be installed on future routes, so that 
'the two classes of people referred to would be saved from the annoyance,.246 
Reade, who was a Liberal shopkeeper, then described the dual system in 
Bournemouth, a smaller resort town on the south coast. Within the centre, a 
conduit system was installed, but the outskirts had overhead wires. Reade 
attacked the extension of the Lorain system because in his view it imposed a 
heavy burden on the ratepayer: 
244 Wolverhampton Chronicle, 14 October 1903. 
245 Ibid. 
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it frequently happened that when matters of this kind were taken in hand by 
men of easy circumstances and in possession of great wealth, they could not 
find that consideration for struggling tradesmen and shopkeepers and 
hardworking artisans, who had to get their living and reside in the town, that 
was desirable.247 
He hoped that the Council would consider the classes of ratepayers who had to 
work hard for their money, and come to a decision similar to that adopted by 
Bournemouth. 
It was all to no avail, however. The overall technical conclusion was that the Lorain 
system fulfilled all conditions.248 Mander, the supremely powerful Chairman, won 
the day and Wolverhampton resolved to extend the Lorain system throughout the 
borough. As a result, five dissenting members of the Tram Committee, who 
remained unconvinced of the reliability of surface-contact, resigned their positions: 
Alderman Lewis, and Councillors Bantock, Parkyn, Weaver and White. To 
reassure the continuing doubters, the tramways general manager vowed to make 
the system a success. He would not 'starve it of engineering as had occurred on 
other surface-contact systems'. He had experimented, introduced improvements 
and would continue to manufacture spare parts in-house.249 
A further attempt in Council to reverse the decision was lost on 12 October 1903, 
but still the doubts persisted.25o In an attempt to frighten the Lorain Company to 
complete the system on even more favourable terms, the council advised that the 
247 Wolverhampton Chronicle, 14 October 1903. 
248 The Electrician, Volume 51 (24 April 1903), p.46. 
249 Wolverhampton City Archives, L 388, Report on Lorain Surface-contact System to the 
Tramways Committee, March 1903. 
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installation did not meet the full conditions of contract and that they would appoint 
counsel and experts if the company decided to proceed to arbitration. Secretly, the 
council feared that arbitration might find in favour of the company, and litigation 
would in any case be a long expensive process.251 A conference was held at 
which a settlement was reached and the network was completed.252 
For the year ending 31 December 1902, Wolverhampton recorded a profit of 
£8,682 with the Lorain system.253 The remaining horse traction lines continued to 
make increasingly unsustainable losses as follows: 254 
Year ending 31 March 1901 
Year ending 31 March 1902 
Year ending 31 March 1903 
Year ending 31 March 1904 
£143 15s 3d 
£696 17s 10d 
£2084 19s 1d 
£1273 19s 8d 
In general, questions of economy became central in local political argument. 255 
Across the spectrum, councillors had different priorities and were frequently at 
odds with each other. On the one hand, there were those councillors who believed 
they had a duty to improve living conditions, and on the other were those with 
grandiose schemes for town embellishment.256 The method of calculation of 
perceived benefits became enormously important. During the debate about 
extending the Lorain system, Alderman Gibbons saw no reason why the council 
should not adopt the more economical overhead traction in the neighbouring 
districts, 'where it was working so successfully'. 257 He believed that the Lorain 
251 Jones, Borough Politics, p.41. 
252 Wolverhampton City Archives, l 388, Council Minutes, p.659. 
253 The Electric/an, Volume 51 (10 July 1903), p.512. 
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system would 'hold its own' in the centre where it had already been installed, but it 
would never make a profit elsewhere. To replace the system in the central areas 
would simply add to the overall costS.258 
However, a paper by Twelvetrees in 1905 suggested that Wolverhampton's 
surface-contact system was a financial success, although working costs were 
higher. He carried out a comparison between Wolverhampton and an average of 
thirty-nine other tramway undertakings, and concluded that the Lorain installation 
was a commercial as well as an engineering success.259 Somewhat of an 
enthusiast, Twelvetrees acknowledged that the Lorain system was less than 
perfect, but nevertheless urged other authorities to consider it as an alternative to 
conduit and overhead traction. It is unlikely, however, that he took full account of 
the need to set aside funds for asset depreciation. In common with other 
undertakings at the time, his statistics therefore offer a distorted vie~. In the UK, 
the amount set aside for wear and tear averaged only 1.1 %, while around 2% was 
kept for a sinking fund.26o Although inadequate, any profits would have been 
severely threatened if sufficient funds had been set aside. 
In fact, for the financial year 1904-05, the Local Government Board criticised the 
general practice of failing to set aside sufficient finance for renewals.261 The Board 
was equally concerned by 'the custom of holding the tramways responsible for 
only a third of the expense of maintenance of that portion of the streets which they 
occupy' .262 The practice of cross-charging from one account to another by local 
authorities masked actual losses and increased apparent profits. 
258 Wo/verhampton Chronicle, 14 October 1903. 
259 Twelvetrees, 'A Report on Surface-contact Traction', p.13. 
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Wolverhampton Average of thirty-nine 
undertakings 
Percentage of Costs to revenue 59.3% 66% 
Percentage of Gross Profit to 6.9% 6.08% 
Average Capital 
Passengers per Car Mile 9.4 S.9 
Journeys per Head of Population SO SO 
per Annum 
Revenue per Car Mile 10.S9Sd 9.75d 
,. 
Average Fare 1.15d 1.12d 
Total Operating Costs per 0.69d O.7Sd 
Passenger 
Units per Car Mile 1.58d 1.34d 
Repairs and Maintenance per O.S44d 1.03d 
Car Mile (including electrical 
equipment) 
Management O.77d O.92d 
Total Operating Costs per Car 6.55d 6.75d 
Mile 
,-2l)J 
Table 3.7· Reproduced from WN Twelvetrees, 'A report on surface-contact traction. 
263 The Engineering Review, Volume 12 (December 1905), p.12. 
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After the Lorain system had been extended, Wolverhampton's income increased 
to £43,822 in 1906/07. Total expenditure was £24,537, leaving a book profit of 
£19,285. The undertaking made a contribution to the renewals fund of £5,300, an 
interest payment of £7,742, and a loan repayment £4,129, leaving an actual profit 
of £2,114.264 On the face of it, Wolverhampton's tramway operation was financially 
sound. Lessons had clearly been learned since the earlier calculations by 
Twelvetrees. By comparison with Wolverhampton's 6.55d per car mile, the 
Griffiths-Bedell system in Lincoln was costing slightly more at 6.98d per car mile in 
the same year.265 
3.15 Aesthetic amelioration 
By 1904, most towns in the UK had adopted the overhead system despite 
aesthetic objections. To overcome these, designers introduced modifications to 
support poles with the object of making them more attractive and therefore 
acceptable. Poles 'attained a certain elegance and blended gracefully into the 
urban scene'.266 They were also adapted for street-lighting purposes (see 
Appendix 12). 
There were conflicting views on the impact of surface-contact traction. 
Wolverhampton's Lorain system was described as inconspicuous. 'Nothing meets 
the eye except a one inch up-stand of studs, and section pillars which the trolley 
has anyway,.267 Road users viewed the studs differently. They broke cab axles 
and damaged springs, which resulted in uncomfortable rides for the carriage-
owning community when their vehicles passed over raised studs. 
264 The Electrical Review, Volume 60 (15 March 1907), p.1006. 
265 Ibid, p.971. 
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To enhance the urban scene, Wolverhampton adopted decorative street furniture 
for power supplies to the tramways. The equipment for isolators and supply 
junctions was housed in 'Lucy boxes'. These were green cast-iron boxes about 
one metre high, sited on the city's pavements. The name was derived from the 
manufacturer, the Lucy Foundry in Oxford. The equipment enabled a section of 
tram route to be isolated or bypassed so that maintenance could be carried out 
while running continued . The Board of Trade required isolators for the Lorain 
system every half mile. Many have survived and are now preserved in situ for 
posterity: 
On one side is the pre-
1898 Wolverhampton 
coat of arms and the 
other side has the post-
1898 coat of arms. One 
side or the other might 
be a later replacement. 
The box is marked 
'Callenders Co Ltd 
London and Erith '. 
Figure 3.2 - Typical example of a decorative 'Lucy box' in Wolverhampton.268 
Despite the best efforts of the tramways department to protect operations, the 
aftermath of the First World War had resulted in a shortage of materials. In 
addition , the Lorain company had long since ceased manufacture and spare parts 
were unavailable. These factors , combined with extra war-time demands on the 
268 The story of electricity supply in the Wolverhampton area, chapter 7, p.2 
http://www.historywebsite.co.uk/articles/electricity/Electricity.htm#menu (accessed on 7 
October 2010). 
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system, meant that the network was in a badly worn state and required complete 
replacement.269 In 1920, the council again debated whether overhead wires should 
replace the Lorain system in a meeting lasting more than five hours.27o This time 
the pro-Lorain lobby, led once again by Sir Charles Mander, lost the argument 
because the costs were far too high. Conversion to overhead wires was finally 
carried out in 1921 and the Lorain studs disconnected.271 The on-board Lorain 
equipment weighed more than 1 tonne, and on removal the lighter tramcars 
tended to pitch and roll quite badly.272 The last trams to be purchased worked only 
on the overhead system, but they had a very short working life as a programme of 
conversion to trolley buses began in 1923.273 
3.16 Conclusions 
An analysis of the social structure shows that Wolverhampton Council was 
dominated by industrialists, who had accumulated their wealth by dint of their 
entrepreneurship and innovation. Decision-making rested with them and their 
closely allied religious groups. This elite group had 'significantly expanded the 
town's institutions while learning to cope with a relatively strong factory base and 
labour movement'.274 Despite the keen and sometimes acrimonious debates about 
surface-contact traction, a sophisticated political structure had emerged, with a 
mandate for initiative, and a fair amount of independence', and strong leadership 
had developed within the main factions.275 
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Wolverhampton was at the forefront of the Industrial Revolution, and consequently 
the working classes tended to live near their mines and factories in areas subject 
to heavy pollution. A large percentage of the population was categorised as 
socially deprived. Social segregation, increasingly facilitated by new transport 
systems, imparted both strength of feeling and a sense of belonging to wealthier 
residents. They wished to live in neighbourhoods with their social equals and not 
to mix with inferiors, But that was not the only dynamic. The wealthy in general 
'showed a propensity to migrate westward in search of better land and purer 
air',276 In Wolverhampton, the prevailing winds ensured that the western suburbs 
were free from smoke and pollution. 
In general, the voice of religion was influential in determining and shaping ideas, 
and as such, influenced debates in the council chamber. It gave a sense of 
cohesion to the community, and a reason for being in the growing towns and 
cities. In Wolverhampton the main opposition during traction debates came from 
churchmen councillors, who desired the least-cost, most economically viable 
solution. Their strongly held beliefs persuaded them that money would be better 
spent on helping the socially deprived. Religious background therefore helped to 
focus the decision-making process. 
It is unlikely that population size alone had a direct impact on the forms of 
technology chosen. Wolverhampton was one of the larger cities in the UK, and 
allowed steam trams prior to electrical traction, but only in the less desirable, more 
polluted districts. However, there were smaller towns in the UK which developed 
both horse-drawn and steam traction. Population size in itself therefore could not 
have been the determining factor. 
276 Cannadins, Lords and Landlords, p.396. 
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Wolverhampton council was cautious in proceeding with an electrification 
programme, and remained sufficiently proud and independent not to follow its 
fellow Black Country towns into a headlong rush for an overhead system. The 
council also had to fight the commercial intentions of the BET who were pressing 
for a unified system throughout the Black Country. From the beginnings with the 
setting-up of a special committee in 1896 through to the final decision in 1902, the 
path was littered with indecision and referrals back and forth between committee 
and council. Within that time scale, several traction schemes were considered, 
including overhead. The final decision to adopt surface-contact traction was not 
taken lightly, and was the result of several complex interactions between factors 
such as the environment, aesthetics, and a variety of political issues. Opposition to 
surface-contact encompassed an irrational dislike of foreign inventions and a 
strong sense of nationalism as well as civic rivalries. 
The result was by no means a techno-economic solution. It was neither the easiest 
in terms of engineering knowledge at that time, nor was it the most economically 
viable, despite Twelvetrees' assertions to the contrary. Rather, it was a solution in 
which the strength of personality of key players in the process played a part. The 
initial experimental stage did not attract much opposition except on economic 
grounds. After that phase was completed, there was a threat of litigation by the 
manufacturers and licensors of the Lorain system hanging over the council. Some 
councillors feared the outcome as the agreement to proceed with full 
implementation depended on assessments of success which were open to 
interpretation. A judgement in favour of the council was therefore by no means 
certain. A substantial minority of councillors felt embittered at the devious way they 
had been tricked into adopting surface-contact traction. In the end, it seems likely 
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that the supporters of the Lorain system had been led into a situation from which 
they could not extract themselves. 
Trades Associations had a powerful voice in some towns, and they had a certain 
amount of influence in Wolverhampton. Their objections on the key question of 
isolation from adjacent networks was clearly recognised and debated, and the final 
decision to proceed was not unanimous, but the persuasive powers of the 
Chairman of the Tramways Committee, often operating his personal agenda, 
reigned supreme. Mander was determined to commit the council to the Lorain 
system, regardless of the consequences. After full council approval, responsibility 
for installation was passed to officials, and on completion, the tramways general 
manager pledged to do everything in his power to make the system a success. 
As I have argued in this chapter, the outcome was the result of a complex set of 
political and other considerations. Clearly, in Wolverhampton's case, aesthetic 
values were considered to be important, but masked other issues as Schmucki 
suggests.277 However, with such a long and successful traction history, surface-
contact could hardly be considered a failure. 
277 Schmuckl, 'The Machine in the City', p.1076. 
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CHAPTER 4 - HASTINGS: A SEASIDE TOWN 
'A strong odour of sulphur and goat's skin, with behind the scenes the cloven hoof of the 
arch-fiend, tramways,.1 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the urban development, demography, and the political 
climate of Hastings to analyse whether there were any common factors between it 
and the other towns which adopted surface-contact traction. Early transport 
developments are also included as well as the creation of the Omnibus Company 
which preceded the tramways. 
Seaside towns were generally much smaller than their urban counterparts. They 
were accordingly more dependent on landowners' finance and enterprise, and 
offered 'greater scope for the wielding of aristocratic power in an urba*n context 
during the second half of the nineteenth century'. 2 In the St Leonards district of 
Hastings, development was heavily dependent upon the landowning Burtons, 
without whom it is unlikely the area would have existed. Even so, there were 
marked differences in the origins and development of each town. 
Social groupings and identity were also important. Smaller towns, like Hastings 
and the ancient cathedral city of Lincoln, had a higher proportion of middle-class 
residents compared with industrial cities such as Wolverhampton. In both it was 
more than 6% compared with Wolverhampton's less than 3%.3 The higher 
proportion not only affected the social atmosphere but also enabled the middle 
1 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 10 September 1904. 
2 David Cannadine, Lords and Landlords: The Aristocracy and the Towns 1774-1967, Leicester: 
Leicester University Press, 1980, p.62. 
3 Richard H Trainor, 'The Middle Class', in Martin Daunton (ed), The Cambridge Urban History of 
Britain, Volume 1111840-1950, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 678-687. 
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classes to wield a disproportionate influence when choices about the mode of 
mass transport were being considered.4 
The main opposition in Hastings centred on the need for any tramway system at 
all. Over a thirty year period at the end of the nineteenth century, several attempts 
were made to introduce trams but all met with failure due to the opposition from 
the wealthier sections of society. The strongest objections came from the elegant 
St Leonards area, where influential residents feared that the physical intrusion of 
trams would affect their lifestyle. There was also strong opposition on economic 
grounds from both hoteliers and the health sector, who were outraged by the 
possible loss of earnings if visitors to the town were deterred by the noise and 
visual intrusion of overhead-powered trams. 
Eventually, overhead traction was reluctantly accepted, but not along the elegant 
Frontline. As a consequence, two separate sections were constructed with no 
interconnection along the promenade. It was to be another year before the Dolter 
surface-contact system was installed as a compromise. 
During the controversy, political in-fighting and religious opposition served to delay 
the decision-making process. The debates did not end after the installation of the 
unpopular Dolter system. Opposition from the media, symbolic gestures such as 
posters and parades, and the threat of direct action through strikes by employees 
of the Hastings Tramways Company, also created tensions. Throughout the 
controversy, freedom of expression for all sides in the debates was particularly 
important. Over time, the aesthetic argument, such as it was, against overhead 
traction became closely bound with economic reality. This chapter therefore 
.. Trainor, 'The Middle Class', in Daunton (ed), p.686. 
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investigates whether aesthetics were surrogates for other factors when tram 
traction was being considered. 
4.2 The development of Hastings 
The wealthier sections of society were vociferous in raising objections to trams in 
Hastings. As in Wolverhampton, they inhabited quite distinct areas and jealously 
guarded their lifestyle. Urban growth was influenced and constrained by the town's 
topography, which also impacted on its demographic distribution. 'High, wooded, 
well-drained hills tended to attract the most wealthy of residents, while the working 
classes and those few necessary industries tended to congregate on the lower-
~. 
lying land'. 5 The land rises inland from the shore, and the area consists of a series 
of steep ridges reaching heights of more than five hundred feet in places, 
dissected by valleys running down to the sea. The original settlement. of Old Town 
was located in the Bourne valley, but as the town grew, development moved 
further west to the Priory valley. Eventually, this area became the town centre. In 
the late eighteenth century, Hastings 'moved quietly with increasing self 
importance, from fishing village to watering place and eventually seaside resort,.6 
It had become fashionable for the wealthy to spend the summer by the sea in the 
belief that bathing in seawater was good for health. Although fishing was still the 
main industry, change was taking place. The nature of the town became more 
introverted, primarily concerned with the people who lived there, 'the rich and the 
poor, the poets and politicians, the artists and soldiers, the famous and the 
infamous, and the ways in which they changed Hastings'. 7 The conservative 
5 Cannadine, Lords and Landlords, p.411. 
e Rex Marchant, Hastings Past, Chichester: Phillimore & Co, 1997, p.14. 
7 Ibid, p.14. 
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nature of the population shaped their class interests and they became resistant to 
anything which might upset the status quo. This was reflected in their opposition to 
tramway development. 
The main battleground in the debates about surface-contact traction lay in the 
suburb of St Leonards to the west of Hastings proper. Concepts of grandeur and 
harmony were central to the planning of the well-known London architect, James 
Burton, who designed and created St Leonards between 1827 and 1837.8 His 
equally famous son, Decimus Burton, added further buildings in the 1850s and 
1860s. The Burtons purchased the area from the wealthy Eversfield family estate, 
and a local Act in 1832 gave commissioners legal powers to manage the new 
town. 9 
5t Leonards was conceived as an elegant, custom-built seaside resort for the 
wealthy to rival Brighton and Eastbourne. With the arrival of railways in 1851, St 
Leonards quickly became popular with royalty and aristocracy. Queen Victoria was 
a frequent visitor, and other notable residents were Princess Sophia, the author Sir 
Henry Rider Haggard, and Robert Tressell, author of The Ragged Trousered 
Philanthropists. 1o Tressell modelled his book on the wide social divisions between 
the relative poverty of Hastings' old town and St Leonards. 
The architectural style of the St Leonards area was particularly attractive, being in 
the Classical and Gothic styles, in which the Burtons specialised. Houses and 
mansions were clearly intended to attract only visitors of the better class. It was a 
model new town: clean, ordered and refined, with roads and walkways laid out in 
8 http://www.1Q66online.co.uk/hastingshistory.htm (accessed on 11 April 201 0). 
" Marchant, Hastings Past, p.53. 
10 Ibid, p.1 00. 
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the grand manner. St Leonards was entirely separate from surrounding areas. The 
town centred on a large picturesque park area designated for residents only. It 
contained an Assembly Hall, which became the focus of all social activity including 
balls, receptions, banquets and card parties. 11 Despite its attractions, a 
contemporary writer considered the town 'a trifle dull' compared with Eastbourne, 
although that might be construed as sour grapes as the writer was extolling the 
virtues of the latter.12 
Even within the small suburb of St Leonards, there was the marked social 
segregation that typified such developments. The lower classes were only 
represented by retinues of servants. The area known as Mercatoria on the eastern 
edge was the original service area of Burton's town, containing the tradesmen's 
and laundrywomen's quarter.13 The area which is now the corner of Mercatoria 
and Norman Road was originally called Lavatoria Square: it was her~, that the 
washerwomen lived and worked. A map of St Leonards is shown in Figure 4.1. 
11 http://www.1066online.co.uklhastingshistory.htm (accessed on 11 April 2010). 
12 Arthur Beckett, The Eastbourne Pictorial, Eastbourne, TR Beckett Ltd, 1912, p.7. 
13 http://www.1066online.co.uklhastingshistory.htm (accessed on 11 April 2010). 
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Figure 4.1 - Map of the St Leonards district of Hastings .14 
St Leonards was administered separately from Hastings proper by a Board of 
Commissioners, who received money from special rates levied on the residents. 
Eventually, the land in between Hastings and St Leonards was developed, and in 
1875, they were officially amalgamated .15 By then, a huge disparity in rates had 
arisen between the two, and residents looked jealously at the much lower amounts 
paid in Hastings proper. Despite St Leonards' higher rates, the commissioners 
decided they could no longer afford to provide services at an acceptable level. 16 
Consequently, pressure from residents forced the amalgamation and provided the 
opportunity to equalise rates and improve services. 
Development of other districts in Hastings was also rigidly controlled . Quite apart 
from St Leonards, much of the town was preserved for the more sedate and 
14 http://www.10660nline.co.uklhastingshistory.htm (accessed on 11 April 2010). 
15 http://www.1066.netlburtons/intro.htm (accessed on 11 April 2010). 
16 Ibid . 
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respectable longer-stay visitors, on whom the hoteliers depended. The pattern of 
growth caused its own problems. It occurred not in a steady and sustained 
fashion, but rather in a series of spurts, followed by periods of virtual stagnation in 
concert with national building cycles. During the peaks, a larger labour force was 
needed than could be employed in the troughs. The periods of unemployment 
caused great hardship and poverty for many. At the turn of the twentieth century, 
the town was therefore demographically and socially divided. 
Wealthy residents did bring benefits to the wider community. In 1891, the 507 men 
employed as coachmen or grooms to people of independent means comprised the 
second highest employment category in the town.17 Private carriage ownership 
therefore played an important role in the local economy, and when the nature of 
the town began to change, the impact was dramatic. The decline of Hastings' 
popularity as a fashionable resort for invalids and the wealthy, combi.ned with the 
growth of the motor car, resulted in a change in social mobility. The wealthy were 
able to travel further afield to the more glamorous and warmer resorts of 
continental Europe. By 1910, the number of private carriages to be seen on the 
sea front had fallen significantly. Hastings was becoming a more traditional British 
summer-holiday resort, 'even rather vulgar as the lower-class holiday crowds 
grew,.18 
Although the area of Hastings remained constant at 3,083 acres for more than 
seventy years from 1801, population growth followed the pattern of many other 
towns at the time. 19 The largest percentage increases occurred in the years 
17 Marchant, Hastings Past, p.112. 
18 Ibid. 
19 http://www.visionofbritain.org.uklunitl101425681cubeITOT POP (accessed on 15 September 
2012). 
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following the arrival of the railways in 1851 and the merger with St Leonards in 
1875. Population details are as follows: 
1801 3,318 1871 37,842 
1811 4,080 1881 49,755 
1821 5,786 1891 58,546 
1831 8,976 1901 60,264 
1841 9,500 1911 62,036 
1851 14,016 1921 64,142 
1861 25,929 2001 85,027 
Table 4.1 - Population statistics for Hastings. 2O 
The expansion of Hastings can be explained in part by London's close proximity, 
which enabled wealthy landowners and commuters to take advantage of improved 
transport Iinks.21 Indeed, such was the extent of Victorian commuting that a 
contemporary author described Hastings as 'in reality, an isolated suburb of 
London'.22 By the end of the nineteenth century it became a virtual dormitory town, 
where many rich merchants and stockbrokers lived. Unlike other towns and cities, 
particularly Wolverhampton and Manchester, there is no evidence in Hastings of 
what Briggs described as a 'shopocracy,23, wherein shopkeepers played a 
particularly influential role in local politics. 
Hastings' polycentric structure is a poor fit with any urban model. The town 
comprises four entities. The Old Town consisted of the former fishing village with 
easy access to the harbour. In the late nineteenth century, a new town centre was 
20 http://www.visionofbritain.orq.uklunitJ101425681cubeITOT POP (accessed on 15 September 
2012). 
21 Cannadine, Lords and Landlords, p.62. 
22 Sidney J Low, 'The Rise of the Suburbs', The Contemporary Review, Volume LX (July-
December 1891), p.S47. 
23 Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities, London: Pelican Books, 1968, p.1 08. 
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constructed to the west. Prior to that, St Leonards was developed as a separate 
entity for the wealthy wishing to enjoy the climate. In later years, new housing 
estates were built on the edges of the town. The spatial layout therefore follows a 
combination of planned development superimposed on organic growth. 
4.3 The political dimension 
Trams were adopted as a symbol of technological progress and civic pride and 
reflected on a town's identity.24 Politicians therefore played a crucial role in the 
debates about tramway development as decisions rested within the council 
chambers. The political framework of Hastings showed distinct characteristics. In 
1835 Hastings became a borough under the Municipal Corporations Act. To 
achieve that status, towns had to be recognised as active and expanding urban 
settlements, a requirement which Hastings clearly fulfilled. In 1888, Hastings was 
elevated to county borough status under the Local Government Act. By then, the 
area between Hastings and St Leonards was developing by the process of infill as 
the town became more popular with commercial people from London. In 1897, the 
Local Government Board approved the extension of Hastings' boundaries to 
include the outlying villages of Ore to the east of Old Town, and Hollington to the 
north of 8t Leonards.25 
Hastings Council was fairly evenly balanced between the Tories and the Liberals, 
a balance that reflected the physical divisions of the town. In the last election 
before the town's boundaries were expanded in 1897, the Tories held 13 seats, 
24 Barbara Schmuckl, 'The Machine in the City: Public Appropriation of the Tramway in Britain and 
Germany, 1870-1915', Journal of Urban History, 38/6, (April 2012), p.1075. 
25 Hastings & St Leonards News, 16 April 1897. 
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the Liberals 10, and there were 7 Independents.26 By 1903, the majority party was 
still the Conservatives with 21 seats to the Liberals' 19. Included within these totals 
were 8 Conservative aldermen and 2 Liberals.27 
In the following year, the balance of power changed, with 22 Liberals and 18 
Conservatives elected. An editorial in The Mail heralded the result as a sweeping 
condemnation of Tory municipal policy. 'Hastings is disgusted with Tory 
mismanagement, muddling and extravagance. Prior to the election, the town was 
ruled by expensive Tory party partisans,.28 Political differences were reflected in 
other towns also. Wolverhampton's city fathers were 'experimental, adventurous, 
and diverse, while others such as those of Hastings and Torquay were considered 
to be 'solid, uniform and pacific,.29 These distinctions became crucial in the early 
years of the twentieth century in Hastings at the time of the heated tram debates in 
the town. 
4.4 Early transport developments 
To begin with, transport services were welcomed. The first recorded omnibus 
began operations in 1869 when a 'handsome three horse omnibus, after the model 
of those introduced in London in 1862, commenced running between the 
Fishmarket and the railway station, leaving the latter on the arrival of each train 
and returning in time to meet the up trains'. 30 By 1876, the service had been 
expanded to include the sea front, known locally as the Frontline. The service was 
26 Hastings & St Leonards Chronicle, 1 November 1897. 
27 Hastings & St Leonards Mail, 7 November 1903. 
28 Ibid, 5 November 1904. 
29 Briggs, Victorian Cities, p.185. 
30 Hastings & St Leonards Chronicle, 5 March 1869. 
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operated with two vehicles by George Kerridge, but his horses suffered from the 
epidemic referred to in section 2.4 when four of them died. 31 
To spread the risk, soon afterwards Kerridge floated the idea of a publicly owned 
omnibus company, canvassing support from leading residents and town officials. 
By the end of November 1877, the Hastings and St Leonards Omnibus Company 
had been founded, and on 9 April 1878 services commenced between the 
Fishmarket and the Archway in St Leonards, along the Frontline. 
As the 'mini explosion' in tramway schemes gathered pace in the late 1870s, the 
first attempt to introduce horse-drawn trams in Hastings occurred in October 1877. 
By then, many towns in the UK, including Wolverhampton, had already gone 
through the legal processes and in some cases installation was l!nderway. A local 
solicitor, FG Phillips, acting on behalf of an unnamed existing promoter, applied to 
the town council for their consent to an application to the Board of Trade in the 
ensuing session of Parliament. The application was for a Provisional Order 
authorising the construction of a tramway.32 The line was to run from the Bo-Peep 
Hotel along the Frontline to the Memorial, where it divided with one line 
proceeding to the Fishmarket, and the other along Queens Road to the Pleasure 
Gardens. The proposal was for a 3'6" gauge tramline. 
In support of the application, the promoters claimed that the proposed system had 
been thoroughly tested, and quoted the Select Committee of the House of Lords 
and Commons, which in 1871 had conducted a 'most elaborate enquiry' under the 
chairmanship of Lord Eversley. The committee had concluded that 'wherever 
31 Clifford Mewett, The Hastings & St Leonards Omnibus Company 1877-1906, Bognor Regis: 
Clifford N Mewett Publications, 1998, p.3. 
32 Hastings & St Leonards News, 26 October 1877. 
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tramways have been formed they appear, with few exceptions, to have given 
general satisfaction, and to have afforded great accommodation to the public,.33 
The promoters added a long list of towns in the UK, the United States, and 
continental Europe, where tramways had been successfully introduced. 
The House of Lords and Commons Select Committee had ruled in favour of the 
adoption of steam power where appropriate, and the promoters therefore stated 
that 'it is a matter for consideration whether steam power should be employed in 
Hastings,.34 On the other hand, the Select Committee also highlighted 'one of the 
greatest drawbacks attributed to the use of steam, namely the danger to horses'. 35 
In a town such as Hastings, dominated by the wealthy horse-owning community, it 
is unlikely that steam traction was ever a serious contender, and indeed the mere 
suggestion of steam power on the attractive streets strengthened the opposition to 
trams. 
Despite the apparently strong arguments in favour of trams, opposition was soon 
galvanised by the wealthy carriage owners. Referring to speculators' plans 'to spoil 
our beautiful sea-front', a letter to The News insisted that a tramway would make 
carriage driving a nuisance instead of a pleasure, and would destroy the town's 
prosperity since wealthy visitors would cease to visit. Tramways were permitted 
elsewhere because of the 'necessity for providing for the humbler classes a ready, 
cheap and convenient system of intercommunication'; as a result, 'those who 
owned carriages and horses were compelled to give up their individual enjoyment 
for the benefit of the mass of the population'. 36 Hastings was 'a place where the 
33 Hastings & St Leonards News, 26 October 1877. 
34 Ibid. 
35 JS Webb, 'The British Steam Tram', paper presented for the Walter Gratwicke Memorial Lecture, 
November 1981, Brightlingsea: Tramway and Light Railway Society, 1983, p.10. 
36 Hastings & St Leonards News, 2 November 1877. 
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rich enjoy a drive with the least possible interference, and a tramway would drive 
away those whose wealth and patronage have made Hastings a charming resort 
of fashion, of beauty and of the highest intelligence in the land'.37 
Other opponents cautioned potential investors to compare returns from omnibus 
companies. George Kerridge quoted dividends from the London & General 
Omnibus Company of 12%% compared with 1 %% from the corresponding 
tramways company.38 As he was an omnibus operator in Hastings himself, he 
clearly had a vested interest in opposing any competition. Others warned that 
newly laid roads would be torn up, horses thrown, wheels of carriages broken, and 
'the best three-mile carriage drive in the country along the sea front ruined,.39 
An editorial in The News attempted to take a more balanced view, urging rational 
discussion in which residents would consider the greatest good, not simply the 
prospect of a successful investment. However, the newspaper also pointed out the 
implications for existing competing omnibus and train facilities. It advised people to 
consider the impact on the employment of cabmen if such a scheme were to be 
approved, pointing out that hundreds of families depended on it for their 
livelihood.4o Arguing that the advantages would need to be sufficient to justify an 
interference with the established order of things, the newspaper concluded that the 
public need of a tram 'is not urgent'. 
Comparisons were also drawn with other towns. A town of a very different 
character, Swansea, ran a steam tram along the bay as well as cabs and 
omnibuses. This was the Swansea & Mumbles (Oystermouth) railway, which 
37 Hastings & St Leonards News, 2 November 1877. 
38 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 27 October 1877. 
39 Ibid, 3 November 1877. 
40 Hastings & Sf Leonards News, 2 November 1877. 
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began operations on 17 August 1877, just two months previously.41 There were 
plans to extend the tram system further. But despite being twice as large in terms 
of population, Swansea only had one quarter of the omnibuses that Hastings 
possessed. The newspaper's conclusion was that 'the traffic of a dirty mining and 
commercial district affords scarcely a parallel to a tidy watering-place,.42 
Realising they were fighting a difficult battle, the promoters emphasized the 
advantages of tramways over omnibuses. They offered greater comfort, and 
whereas the latter could charge any fare they pleased, tramway fares were 
regulated. In an attempt to appease the influential members of society, the 
promoters stressed the benefits for the ratepayers too. Under the Tramways Act, 
1870, operators were compelled to contribute at least one half the cost of road 
maintenance, estimated to be £500 per annum per mile. The poor state of roads in 
Hastings had been a major concern for some time between the council and the 
ratepayers. It was also suggested that tramways reduced accident rates, although 
this claim was disputed by opponents in other towns. 
On 2 November 1877, the promoter placed an application for a tramway before the 
Urban Sanitary Authority of Hastings Borough Council, accompanied by a report 
from the Roads Committee. The application was unanimously rejected. The 
Observer newspaper wondered what could have induced the applicants to seek 
permission for 'such a wild, almost childish scheme' best suited to large business 
towns. 'The idea was preposterous and would kill Hastings' commercial 
prosperity' .43 Not surprisingly, The Observerfully supported the Council's decision 
and praised them as acting like a shrewd body of businessmen, thereby meeting 
41 HA Whitcombe, 'History of the Steam Tram', Locomotion Papers No.9, Surrey: The Oakwood 
Press, 1954, p.44. 
42 Hastings & st Leonards News, 2 November 1877. 
43 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 3 November 1877. 
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with the 'hearty and unanimous approval of the whole borough'. The following 
week, a single headline appeared, 'Exit Tramway', with no further comment. 44 
The wealthy residents along the sea front welcomed the decision and continued to 
guard jealously their right to parade daily in their carriages without disturbance 
from rails sunk into the road. In keeping with Hastings' role as a health resort, 
many invalids stayed to recuperate on doctors' orders, bringing much wealth to the 
local economy. There was a feeling that the advent of tramways would curtail this 
important enterprise, severely affecting the incomes of local tradesmen and bath-
chair men. 
During this episode, the views of the 'humbler classes' went unrecorded. There is 
no evidence that they were even consulted. The weight of the argument appears 
to have come solely from the wealthy residents and visitors, who fought hard to 
retain their lifestyle. On the other hand, it is difficult to gauge the benefits to poorer 
people of such a scheme, unless it would have been to increase their leisure 
activities. There were no obvious industrial or commercial advantages. Perhaps 
the more influential residents along the proposed route resented the possible 
intrusion of the humbler classes into their select area, a class phenomenon 
observed in London and elsewhere. 
Strong class tensions continued between the carriage-owning community and the 
'humbler classes'. As an example, the solidly anti-socialist and eventual Liberal 
Prime Minister Lord Rosebery said 'tramways were the inconvenience of the 
opulent and the luxury of the poor. You may always measure exactly the extent of 
44 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 10 November 1877. 
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the democracy of a country by the extent of its tramways'. 45 However, Rosebery's 
view reflected his middle-class attitude towards democracy, neither wealthy nor 
poor. The carriage-owning community enjoyed recreational riding for leisure and 
health reasons. The activity enabled wealthy people to display their status in 
society with their expensive carriages and horses. 
A more determined effort to introduce trams occurred in mid-1879. The promoter J 
Kincaid sent an open letter to the Town Clerk, TG Meadows. Kincaid requested 
the Council's permission to present a Bill in Parliament for a system of horse-
drawn trams in Hastings and its immediate area. In anticipation of strong 
opposition to the scheme, the letter stated: 
it would be almost unprecedented were the proposal to meet with no 
opposition from the carriage riding section of the inhabitants, but as we 
have successfully encountered such opposition in other places, we hope to 
do the like in Hastings. The proposed tramway will be laid out as to afford a 
maximum of accommodation, with a minimum of interference with the 
susceptibilities of a class to which I have referred.46 
The proposal was similar to the earlier one, for a single tramway from the Bo Peep 
Hotel, continuing along the Frontline to the Memorial and thence along Queens 
Road and St Andrews Road. However, from there it diverged from the earlier 
proposal by continuing along St Helens Road to the junction with Downs Road. 
The intention was to provide a service for residents of the recently developed 
45 Lord Rosebery, 'The True Leverage of Empire', presidential address to the Social Science 
Congress in Glasgow, 10 September 1874, cited in AD Ochojna, 'Lines of class distinction: an 
economic and social history of the British tramcar, University of Edinburgh, PhD thesis, 1974, 
e·269. 
6 Clifford Mewett, The Hastings Tramways Company 1899-1959, Bognor Regis: Clifford N 
Mewett Publications, 1999, p.3. 
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Blacklands area of the town. Trams were to fulfil a latent demand there, a prime 
example of urban expansion before transport facilities were in place. 
Anticipating any opposition, the proposal made it clear that the tramcars would be 
'light and elegant and drawn by one horse on a single line. The rails were to be 
laid to the unusual gauge of three feet, and the operation would comprise an 
extreme width of only 5'6" so as to leave ample space for ordinary traffic,.47 
Omnibuses catered for passengers travelling to the east of the Memorial. 
The News described the proposal in detail, but pointed out that the recent 
formation of the omnibus company would no doubt be raised as an objection.48 
Nevertheless, a notice of application to the Board of Trade for a provisional order 
to construct street tramways was served on the borough council. Plans and 
sections of the proposed route were deposited on 29 November 1879.49 It was 
intended to lay the provisional order before the Private Bills Office of Parliament by 
23 December 1879 under the 1870 Tramways Act. A new undertaking, the 
Hastings Tramways Company Limited, was proposed. Any objections to the 
scheme were to be lodged by 1 January 1880. The total length was 2.8 miles of 
single track, including 0.3 miles of passing places.5o The application was signed by 
Kincaid's solicitor and parliamentary agent, W Webb of 23 Queen Victoria Street, 
London EC (the same address as the Wolverhampton Tramways Company), and 
AL Sayer, a local Hastings solicitor. 
47 Hastings & St Leonards News, 21 November 1879. 
4slbid. 
49 Lewes, East Sussex County Council Archives, Hastings Tramways Deposited Plans, file 
QDP/449, 29 November 1879. 
50 Ibid, Hastings Tramways, file PAR/365/22/7, 29 November 1897. 
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The proposal immediately produced a flood of letters to the newspapers from 
objectors. One pointed out that Hastings was not a commercial centre, where 
tramways had become a necessity. Traffic was both private and by visitors who 
enjoyed 'a clear drive of over two miles,.51 Another letter suggested that Hastings 
was not a business centre, but a pleasure and health resort which depended for its 
prosperity on visitors and winter residents rather than the conveniences a tramway 
would provide to the local population.52 Others pointed out that Hastings' streets 
were too narrow and tramways would reduce the space available for private 
carriages to the point where 'the nobility and gentry would go elsewhere where 
they would be free from this annoyance,.53 A further letter suggested that trams 
would 'vulgarise the town'. 54 
Despite the opposition, the tramway promoters, Messrs Sayer, Webb and Kincaid, 
were invited to explain the scheme at a Council in Committee meeting on 21 
November 1879. It was resolved after a proposal by Councillor Huggett, seconded 
by Councillor Brown, that further consideration was necessary. 55 After this 
meeting, The Observer urged its readers 'to keep their minds unbiased, and to 
give a fair and full consideration, free from prejudice, to the proposal, which on the 
face of it, appears likely to promote the welfare of the locality'. 56 
However, the influential residents were not finished, and called a meeting at the 
Royal Victoria Hotel on 22 November 1879. It was attended by more than 600 
people, who expressed a 'strong and unanimous opposition to the project'. 57 It was 
51 Hastings & St Leonards News, 21 November 1879. 
52 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 29 November 1879. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Lewes, East Sussex County Council Archives, Hastings Council Minutes, file DH/B 19/16,21 
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56 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 22 November 1879. 
57 Ibid, 29 November 1879. 
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decided to mount a petition against it. Within two days, 916 property owners had 
signed the petition, representing an annual rateable value of more than £64,000, a 
considerable sum at the time. 58 Noting the powerful interests of the ratepayers, the 
Council were persuaded that a tramway would be in no way desirable in the town. 
Other strong objections followed, including one from a resident of Wolverhampton 
who was a frequent visitor to Hastings. He claimed that the tramway installed there 
three years previously was a 'great nuisance', causing not only blockages but also 
loss of trade to shopkeepers as customers' carriages were prevented from 
'drawing up to make their purchases'. 59 
Due to the strength of opposition, at a Council in Committee meeting on 3 
December 1879, a letter was read from Sayer stating that 'the promoter has 
withdrawn his proposal for this year and would not proceed with the application for 
the present time,.6o The full Council met on 5 December 1879 when further 
discussion took place. Alderman Dr Croucher said that the opposition to the 
scheme had been so powerful that 'he hoped it would prevent any further 
application of this nature. Any Company might rest assured that the inhabitants 
would not lose any opportunity in endeavouring fairly and legally to oppose all 
such schemes'.61 The Chronicle noted that the strong opposition generated 
'should deter any other body from again introducing the subject for the next ten or 
twenty years,.62 
58 Hastings & St Leonards News, 12 December 1879. 
59 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 6 December 1879. 
60 Lewes, East Sussex County Council Archives, Hastings Council Minutes, file DH/B 19/16, 3 
December 1879, p.784. 
61 Hastings & st Leonards News, 12 December 1879. 
62 Hastings & St Leonards Chronicle, 10 December 1879. 
207 
The Observer noted that 'it is not probable that the people of Hastings can ever be 
educated into accepting a tramway system'. 63 There were signs, however, that 
support for tramways was increasing among council members. Sayer himself 
became mayor a few years later, and both the existing mayor and his deputy, 
Aldermen Winter and Gausden, spoke in favour, though it was not until 1891 that a 
further attempt was made. In the meantime, omnibuses and private carriages 
continued to dominate the non-pedestrian movement of people in the town. 
4.5 The Hastings and St Leonards Omnibus Company 
Other forms of transport provide useful insights into how divided Hastings' society 
became, a situation which was to continue for many years. While initial attempts to 
introduce horse-drawn trams were being debated, moves were afoot to form the 
publicly-owned omnibus company mentioned in section 4.4. Kerridge, the private 
operator, was experiencing financial difficulties with his services. A report in The 
Observer gave notice of intent, claiming that the mayor, several councillors, 
professional and influential tradesmen and others, desired to become 
shareholders.64 It was proposed to have two or more omnibuses operating 
throughout the day from Silverhill, West Marina Station, St Andrews, and the 
Fishmarket, thus almost shadowing the suggested horse tramway. The Observer 
suggested that the service would 'doubtless be a boon, not only to visitors but also 
to businessmen who live a distance away from their places of occupation'. 65 This 
clear support by The Observer for an enhanced omnibus service contrasted 
starkly with its vigorous opposition to the introduction of horse tramways. 
63 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 6 December 1879. 
64 Ibid, 13 October 1877. 
65 Ibid. 
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The first public meeting on 30 October 1877 was adjourned because of lack of 
support, and the difficulty in raising £1,000 from shareholders to enable the 
company to be set up. However, a prospectus detailing the objectives was 
published the following month, stating that the company would be formed for the 
purpose of establishing an efficient omnibus service between Hastings and St 
Leonards to fulfil a public need.66 The company was registered on 16 November 
1877. By the end of that month, 58 shareholders had been attracted, and the 
company confidently expected to pay a fair dividend. Clearly an omnibus system 
was considered a great advantage to Hastings while a horse tramway was not. 
Many of the shareholders were local businessmen, whereas the investors in the 
tramways company would have come primarily from elsewhere, as tramway 
subscribers tended to operate nationally. The influential residents did not welcome 
the imposition of an outside solution to their apparent transport problem. 
The omnibus company soon encountered difficulties. The operation had proved 
expensive and a consequent comparison with the London and General Company 
revealed that each horse was costing 2s 6d per week more to feed in Hastings. As 
a result of these financial problems, no dividends were paid to shareholders for the 
first six years of operation.67 The problem was solved when Skinners, a local 
private carriage operator with expertise in the management of large stables of 
horses, agreed to amalgamate and form a new company.68 A new board was 
constituted and further routes were opened, so that by 1885, a dividend of 25% 
was achieved.69 
66 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 24 November 1877. 
67 Mewett, Hastings Omnibus Company, p.11. 
68 Ibid, p.12. 
69 Ibid, p.13 
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However, the omnibus company faced serious competition from other quarters. 
Apart from Skinners, another operator named Dick Russell had extensive stables 
and several hundred horses.7o By 1885, there were more than fifty one-man 
operators, all controlled by the Hackney Carriage Regulations.71 As competition 
increased. the private operators formed a rival undertaking called the Hastings 
Suburban Omnibus Company, and services began on 31 May 1886. The company 
was poorly run as the board lacked business expertise, and debt soon 
accumulated. In April 1887, the suburban service was absorbed by the Hastings 
and St Leonards Company.72 
In St leonards, the wealthy residents continued to oppose omnibuses. They 
resented their intrusion and increasing numbers. A petition was organised, stating 
that omnibuses impeded carriages and damaged the roads. The town's gentry 
clearly wanted to safeguard the 'best carriage drive on the South Coast', and as 
they represented a rateable value of £44,462, their views had to be taken 
seriously.73 Other protestors claimed that the invalid trade was being badly 
affected as the omnibuses disturbed their peace. The Council gave serious 
consideration to the objections, but eventually resolved against the petitioners. 
As opposition to omnibuses increased, other sections of the community made 
comparisons with the benefits of tram systems. Omnibuses were 'uncomfortable 
for passengers and destructive to public roads, while trams would be smaller, 
lighter and cleaner'.74 The feelings were not universal. The wealthy residents and 
long-term summer visitors to the Frontline were determined that neither form of 
70 Mewett, Hastings Omnibus Company, p.14. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid, p.16. 
73 Ibid, p.17. 
74 Ibid, p.19. 
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transport would spoil or impede their right to enjoy recreational trips along the 
Frontline in their private carriages, as the numerous letters to the local 
newspapers indicated?5 The scene was set for a battle which continued for 
several years. 
The Omnibus Company, anxious to placate opposition and also fearing the 
inevitability of trams, began to investigate the introduction of motor buses. The 
Board was keen to modernise its operations, having for some time been criticised 
on the grounds of cruelty for using horse-drawn vehicles in the hilly areas of the 
town. After visiting an embryonic commercial motor show at Crystal Palace in 
1903, the Board were so impressed that they purchased the Milnes Daimler motor 
bus show model. A service began in March 1903 and was so successful that three 
more were ordered before the end of the month. A novelty was that buses would 
only stop at pre-arranged places, unlike horse-drawn vehicles which stopped on 
demand. 
The introduction of these new-fangled vehicles re-energised the anti-Trammites, 
who displayed posters proclaiming: 'motor buses are coming - what need of 
trams,.76 Hastings was clearly at the forefront of motor-bus operation. Deputations 
arrived from many towns in England, including London and Preston. Under a 
banner headline 'A Double-Decked Motor Omnibus - How to Meet Obnoxious 
Tramway Schemes' a periodical The Car praised Hastings' far-sighted Omnibus 
Company and concluded that motor-bus services would do more to quash the 
tramway scheme than any amount of public antagonism.77 The euphoria was 
short-lived. Although some costly horse-drawn buses were withdrawn, the 
75 Hastings & St Leonards Weekly Mail, 21 January 1899. 
78 Mewett, Hastings Omnibus Company, p.23. 
77 The Car, April 1903. 
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Company soon encountered further problems orchestrated by religious groups, 
when an application for a licence to run omnibuses on Sundays was made to the 
Town Council in January 1904. A petition in favour was presented to the Council in 
March, but in April, the Council decided to let the company make the decision as 
Sunday running did not offend the bye-laws.78 A strong Sabbatarian movement 
developed, with the backing of the influential Lord's Day Observance Society, 
which declared that 'it would be disturbing to God to run motor buses on the 
Sabbath'.79 
Organised Sabbatarianism had reached its peak in the mid-1850s, but clearly 
prevailed in Hastings much later.BO The hold of religion over leisure and work 
activities was twofold. Firstly, there was the moral injunction against all labour on 
the Sabbath except those tasks necessary for the welfare of society. Secondly, 
there was the legal framework enshrined in acts of parliament which detailed all 
permitted activities. The restriction on transport was particularly oppressive in 
some towns, where the middle classes saw it as a means of retaining urban public 
order. By the 1880s in the UK, only Blackpool had overcome the opposition to 
Sunday tram services.81 
For several months, debates raged in Hastings, and a petition was raised in 
opposition and presented to the Council. The campaign against was led by the 
Lord's Day Observance Society and church leaders. In May, the company 
organised a vote amongst its shareholders, and not surprisingly, those in favour of 
Sunday services won by 537 to 443.82 In June 1904, one of the most outspoken 
78 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 3 September 1904. 
79 Mewett, Hastings Omnibus Company, p.2S. 
80 Douglas A Reid, 'Playing and Praying', in Daunton (ed), p.7S2. 
81 Ibid. 
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critics, the Reverend Gilbert Muir denounced the Town Council, suggesting that 
councillors and others who voted in favour were 'the enemies of God's Sabbath 
and as such were the enemies of man,.83 The company made no further 
announcements until Saturday 27 August, when the directors announced that 
Sunday services would commence the next day, between the hours of 10 am and 
10 pm. Although the service proved very popular with a large section of the 
community, with more than 10,000 people taking the opportunity to travel, the 
company's action immediately inflamed the opposition.84 
The Reverend T Scott, a Congregational minister, insisted that Sunday motor 
buses would 'make it easy to be tempted away from religious instruction, and 
, -. 
therefore care was needed to safeguard the morals of young people,.85 The tooting 
of horns was said to disturb worshippers at many of the town's churches, and 
others objected to the noise made by the motor buses. The same arguments were 
to be levelled against Sunday tram services two years later. 
Petitions against Sunday motor-bus services were quickly organised both by the 
clergy and the Lord's Day Observance Society. Church leaders declared motor 
buses to be 'a terrible nuisance, morally wrong, and highly detrimental to the 
town's prosperity'. 86 They predicted that 'large numbers of our best visitors, for 
whom a quiet Sunday is a chief attraction, will go elsewhere if they are rudely 
disturbed,.87 There were already a number of empty houses along the seafront. 
83 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 18 June 1904. 
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The petition was signed not only by Anglican clergy, but also by ministers of the 
Wesleyan, Congregational, Baptist, and Primitive Methodist churches.88 
The Lord's Day Observance Society took a different line, their petition pointing out 
that more than 3,000 ratepayers and influential residents were opposed to the 
service.89 The Society also stressed that drivers and conductors were entitled to 
their day of rest on a Sunday. An analysis of the petition by the omnibus company 
discovered surprising anomalies among the signatories. 1,045 gave the same 
address, 621 were from the same family, and 109 appeared to have the same 
handwriting ,90 
In a letter to The Observer, the Reverend A Hodges expressed his heartfelt sorrow 
that the Company had allowed a public desecration of the sacred day of rest, and 
urged reconsideration 'to uphold the sanctity of the Lord's day of rest and 
worship,.91 The formidable Reverend J Awdry Jamieson referred to 'the riff-raff 
who are likely to patronise the omnibuses', and said he would infinitely prefer 'six 
day trams to seven day omnibuses if the tram people could give a solemn pledge 
not to operate on Sundays,.92 It was to be another two years before he fought the 
same battle with the tramways company. 
Other correspondents characterized the users of the service as domestic servants, 
lads and loafers and saw no justification in catering for them. Furthermore, 
according to them the better-class residents would be driven away, thus affecting 
the town's prosperity and respectability. Some complainants even suggested that 
88 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 3 September 1904. 
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'young people were thinking of nothing else but amusement' and Sunday working 
would simply play into their hands.93 Correspondents in favour of Sunday services 
detected in petitions and protests against them a 'strong odour of sulphur and 
goat's skin, with behind the scenes the cloven hoof of the arch-fiend tramways,.94 
A more balanced view posed this question: if the rich could get about 
unchallenged in their motor cars and private carriages, why should the poor not 
have a ride in humbler vehicles?95 In this view, the wealthy were trying to deny the 
working classes their right to leisure pursuits. 
Clearly, there were those amongst the citizens of Hastings who saw positive and 
progressive advantages in the introduction of Sunday services. They would 
encourage leisure activities such as visits to cemeteries, and the opportunity to 
meet with family members in other parts of the town. The opposition, however, 
viewed such activities with some dismay, and wanted to cling to custom, 
conviction and sentiment, objecting fiercely to anything which failed to serve their 
own interests. In their view, public transport became a secularising force that 
helped change Sundays from a day of rest to a day of restless activity, carrying 
passengers to theatres, parks, and local amusements.96 
These debates showed a deep division in Hastings' society between on the one 
hand those who represented traditional conduits of power, either through the 
Church, or in the form of property or by payment of rates, and on the other hand, 
the lower classes who were becoming more politically aware. The Liberals 
approved of Sunday services and were generally seen as politically progressive, a 
93 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 3 September 1904. 
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stance similar to that taken by the party during debates in Wolverhampton. 
Sceptics pointed out, however, that a senior member of Hastings council, 
Alderman Bradnam, was the chairman of the omnibus company, and councillors 
Prior and Glenister were fellow directors and shareholders.97 They were therefore 
bound to support the scheme because greater profits and bigger dividends would 
ensue. The Council eventually compromised by deciding that Sunday motor-bus 
services would commence only after lunch. The decision was welcomed as a 
moral victory for the Church.98 
By the summer of 1904, the Omnibus Company was feted and praised as being a 
model for Europe at a luncheon in its honour in London.99 However, within a few 
months, opponents of the motor bus, mainly the supporters of trams, were already 
considering them to be old-fashioned. 100 As soon as trams were introduced, the 
Omnibus Company's trading position quickly worsened, and by November 1905, it 
was decided to withdraw motor buses completely. They were reintroduced briefly 
in April 1906 and worked alongside the ten remaining horse omnibuses on the 
Frontline before trams were allowed to operate on the Dolter system. Unable to 
cope with competition from the trams, the Hastings and St Leonards Omnibus 
Company was finally wound up in May 1906. The fleet of eleven motor buses was 
sold for £7,000, a considerable loss. 84 horses were sent for auction, with 60 
being sold and 24 withdrawn. 101 The demise of the omnibus company had a social 
impact. Many of the younger employees had already joined the tramways 
company, but the older ones were considered unemployable and became 
dependent on charity from a public appeal. 
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4.6 The threshold of a new era 
After the initial attempts, the question of tramways in Hastings did not surface 
again until a council meeting on 1 May 1891, when Councillor Pigott moved that 
'the Council take into consideration the advisability of permitting the construction of 
a tramway between the Baths and West Marina'. 102 Charles Chadwell, an engineer 
and tramway promoter, had approached him with details of a scheme and asked 
that it be put before council. Chadwell's scheme involved battery-operated trams, 
running on a single track of 4 feet gauge along the Promenade itself, parallel with 
the Frontline.103 After some debate, it was decided by nine votes to three to refer 
the proposal to Council in Committee. 104 
Chadwell claimed economic benefits for his system, quoting costs of 4% pence per 
mile for accumulator power compared with 5% pence for steam and 9 pence for 
horse traction elsewhere 105 (Hastings never adopted horse-drawn trams). 
Experiments with similar accumulator-driven tramcars had been carried out in 
Brussels, Berlin and Paris, as well as London, from 1884 onwards, but met with 
little success. Average traction costs in those cities were found to be 5 pence per 
mile compared with 6% pence per mile for horse traction. 106 Strong objections 
were raised on the grounds of safety as passengers were concerned by acidic 
smells given off by the batteries, damage to clothing from spills, and overheating. 
Consequently, Brussels abandoned their scheme in 1890, although London 
102 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 2 May 1891. 
103 Ibid, 9 May 1891. 
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tramway companies persisted for some time in view of the perceived economic 
benefits. 107 
In support of the project, Councillor Pigott believed that a tramway along the 
Frontline would relieve traffic congestion. 108 Others thought that omnibuses would 
be badly affected and the omnibus company's shareholders, several of whom 
were councillors, would face financial ruin. Writing in The Observer, 'Asmodeus' 
estimated that omnibuses carried 'upwards of a million passengers every year in a 
town of only 60,000 inhabitants. The service has become a local institution, which 
is so much a public necessity that it may not be shelved or broken up at the 
solicitation of a strange tramway promoter' .109 In fact an inspection of 
'Asmodeus's' statistics reveal that with an average of fewer than 3,000 passenger 
journeys per day, only a minority of Hastings' population were travelling by 
omnibus on a regular basis. Sociologically, the service was patronised by a select 
group of townspeople. 
In common with the earlier scheme, Chadwell proposed to form a company which, 
with the approval of the Council, would apply to Parliament for powers to 
construct, maintain, and operate the tramway. However, it was to differ from the 
earlier schemes by using electrical propulsion by means of accumulator batteries. 
When fully charged, these had a maximum range of 36 miles, which translated to 
a half day's work in Hastings. When each tramcar had exhausted its supply, it 
would be returned to depot to recharge. Despite opposition, Chadwell persisted, 
107 lET, The Electrical Engineer, Volume 5 (21 March 1890), p.221. 
108 Hastings & st Leonards Observer, 2 May 1891. 
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revealing that he had recently completed 76 tramline miles in the north, operated 
partly by steam and partly by horse. 11o 
Supporters of the proposal likened it to Volk's electric tramway in Brighton, and 
envisaged that it would provide a great attraction for visitors. A visitor to the town 
prophesied that 'when St Leonards sweeps round the bay to Bexhill, as it is bound 
to do eventually, the slow lumbering omnibus of the present decade will not satisfy 
the visitors on the four mile front'.111 
Chadwell was asked to appear before the Council in Committee and explain his 
proposal. Although not exactly innovative, the chances of success for Chadwell's 
.. 
scheme in such a conservative town as Hastings were limited in the extreme. Not 
surprisingly, he failed to dissuade the Committee from recommending rejection, a 
decision endorsed by the full Council on 3 July 1891. Much heat was generated in 
a subsequent debate, with Councillor Pigott accusing the committee of disgraceful 
behaviour and incivility towards Chadwell.112 He suggested that no tramway would 
be approved in Hastings until the Council contained fewer members of the 
omnibus company. While neither supporting a tramway nor objecting to it, 
Councillor Stubbs insisted that if there were to be one, it should be the property of 
the corporation, and under its control. Thus the opening shots were fired in the 
debate about municipalisation.113 
In September 1895, the residents of St Leonards wrote to the town council about 
'the deplorable state of roads between the swimming baths and The 
110 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 9 May 1891. 
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Colonnade'.114 The communication was referred to the Roads Committee for a 
report. Nothing appears to have been done, but in October 1896, Charles 
Chadwell had craftily written to the council extolling the virtues of a tramway 
system and pointing out that a tramways company would be responsible for 
maintaining the roads under the Tramways Act, 1870.115 Chadwell's letter was 
ignored, and the borough engineer presented a report to the Council in Committee 
on 4 May 1897 recommending improvements along the same section of road 
between the pier and the South Colonnade, but without trams. His 
recommendations were accepted.116 
With time, objections to trams began to wane in some quarters, and an editorial in 
The Hastings and St Leonards News supported the 'easy-gliding, artistic-looking 
trams, propelled without noise, a decided improvement on heavy, lumbering, road-
destroying and road-impeding omnibuses' .117 Such a romantic view of trams 
influenced certain sections of the community. At a meeting of townspeople shortly 
afterwards, a resolution in favour of a tramway was passed. 118 
Chadwell continued to press for an order to promote a tramway. A letter was 
received in support of his action from solicitors Tahourdins and Hitchcock. It was 
discussed by the Council in Committee on 16 February 1897 and it was resolved 
to pass it to the council's solicitors, Langham, Son and Douglas.119 Hastings 
Council was feeling the pressure building from other possible tramway promoters, 
and on 5 February 1897, the full council gave a remit for a committee 'to give more 
114 Lewes, East Sussex County Council Archives, Hastings Council Minutes, file DH/B 18/2, 19 
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careful consideration to tramways than previously, and for six members to form a 
Special Committee on Tramways in order to collect information and report back to 
the Council'. However, the committee was given instructions to 'decline to 
entertain the idea of a tramway in any form along the sea-front' .120 The Tramways 
Committee was inaugurated on 18 March 1897 with the mayor in the chair.121 It 
was resolved to send a questionnaire to the town clerks of Glasgow, Blackpool, 
Swansea, Dover, Portsmouth, Southampton, Plymouth, Leamington, Edinburgh, 
Belfast, Leeds, Manchester, Douglas and Sheffield. 122 On 9 April 1897, the town 
clerk issued the questionnaire requesting answers to the following questions: 
1. Have you tramways in your principal streets? 
2. If so, do they belong to the Corporation, or are they in private hands? 
3. What is the motor power - horse, or electricity, cable or overhead wires? 
4. What is the width of the roads in which the tramways are laid? 
5. Are the tram lines single or double? 
6. Do omnibuses in addition ply through any of the streets in which trams are 
laid? 
7. Are the trams worked at a profit? 
8. What is the fare for any given distance? 
9. In what substance are the trams laid? 
1 O.lf you have any sketch or detailed plan of a line, could you oblige the 
Committee with a copy? 
11.At what expense per mile are the trams run, including interest etc on capital 
outlay for plant etc? 
120 Lewes, East Sussex County Council Archives, Hastings Council Minutes, file DH/B 18/3, 16 
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12. What was the average cost say per mile, or any less length, of construction 
of the tramways? 
13.lf the trams are in private hands, what is the estimated proportion of cost of 
maintenance of the roads along which they run, which is borne by the 
owners? 
14. What was the cost of obtaining the necessary Act of Parliament, or 
Provisional Order, and was there any opposition? 
15. The committee will be glad of any other general information on the subject 
which you are in a position to supply, and may be useful. 
This was a very comprehensive questionnaire, covering many areas of concern, 
but at the same time indicating that the council was not going to rush into the 
adoption of new technology without careful consideration of all facts. Several other 
town councils adopted a similar set of questions for circulation before reaching a 
decision on the form of traction. 
Simultaneously, another player appeared on the scene. This was William Martin 
Murphy, an Irishman who had visited the United States and took a leading role in 
the construction of electric tramways in Dublin, Belfast and Cork, and also in 
Bournemouth, south London, and much later in Torquay. In 1897 he formed the 
Hastings, Bexhill and District Light Railways (Electric) Company Limited, which 
was registered through the Provincial Tramways Company.'23 
123 Mewett, Hastings Tramways Company, p.S. 
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The Provincial was one of three major nationwide promotional companies floated 
in 1871 and 1872, orig inally focusing on horse tramways. 124 Their stated raison 
d'etre was 'for the purpose of acquiring and working tramways in several large 
provincial towns, generally through the organisation of local companies, but under 
one central management and control, whereby greater efficiency and economy will 
be obtained' .125 By organising local companies, the Provincial sought to alleviate 
the problems of parliamentary control and of local suspicion, which was certainly 
rife in Hastings. But as Ochojna implies, there was an ulterior motive to their 
operations. He suggests that 'the company was designed to guarantee for its 
promoters a flow of future business, but in tramway promotion and construction 
rather than tramway operation,.126 Profits were generated by the former rather than 
the latter. 
Murphy applied to the Light Railway Commission and deposited a parliamentary 
bill for powers to construct a system of trams in the town. He proposed the 
construction of 12 route-miles of 3'6" gauge tramways from Hastings to 8exhill, 
from the Memorial to Ore, from the Memorial to Silverhill, and from Silverhill to the 
Frontline to link with the 8exhillline. 127 Thus Murphy's plans conformed closely to 
Ochojna's characterisation of Provincial's tramways routes as 'not speculative, 
following existing omnibus routes for the most part, and running mainly from the 
suburbs to the central business districts,.128 
124 AD OchoJna, 'The Influence of Local and National Politics on the Development of Urban 
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His application provoked strong opposition from the Conservative members of the 
council. Townspeople were split into two factions, the progressive Trammites who 
supported the introduction of modern forms of transport, and the anti-Trammites 
who strongly opposed such schemes. The latter, who included some wealthy 
residents of the Frontline, distributed posters insisting that trams would destroy the 
town's image and cause its deterioration as a health resort. Aesthetics and the 
beauty of townscapes were becoming closely entwined with political and moral 
attitudes within Hastings' influential classes.129 At one end of the spectrum were 
the style and fine buildings which constituted the urban fabric. At the other end 
were the intrusive and lumbering trams. In support of the anti-Trammites case, 
emotive language was displayed on large posters, urging townspeople to defend 
the town: 
Ratepayers beware! Will you allow Hastings and St Leonards to be 
disfigured by trams? Never were you threatened by a more insidious foe. 
Picture the town disfigured by trams. Imagine your beautiful seafront 
invaded by them. Picture the danger of overhead wires during our annual 
gales and all the miseries of a tram infested borough. 13o 
At a public meeting on 7 June 1897, further objections were raised by the London, 
Brighton and South Coast Railway who insisted that a tramway running from 
Hastings to Bexhill would seriously affect their trade. Bexhill, a neighbouring town 
of some 10,000 people, enthusiastically welcomed Murphy's proposal. The Bexhill 
Council believed that a tramway would generate development and enable 
workmen from the poorer areas of Hastings to travel there, which in turn would 
129 Caroline Arscott, 'The Representation of the City in the Visual Arts', in Daunton (ed), p.813. 
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generate houses, shops and other infrastructure. 131 In support, Bexhill pointed out 
that the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company had refused to 
provide a station in the town. Although progressive by comparison with the much 
larger Hastings, the residents of Bexhill clearly felt isolated, and watched with 
amazement as Hastings went through contortions in its deliberations. 
Nevertheless, in the face of such determined opposition, Murphy withdrew his 
proposal. 
Although Hastings Council had publicly stated that a tramway would ruin the town, 
they were persuaded by their Trammite members that 'the Council should give a 
more careful consideration to the question of local tramways than it has so far 
done,.132 Consequently, at a meeting of the Special Committee on Tramways on 
17 August 1897, the Town Clerk read out all the information thus far obtained, and 
Alderman Tree gave particulars about the working of trams on the Continent. It 
was resolved that the information be tabulated and referred to the Chairman, and 
that Alderman Tree and the Borough Engineer should compile information about 
the working of different systems on the Continent for presentation to the 
Committee.133 
The consequential report by the Borough Engineer, PH Palmer, referred to 
Hastings within the general context of tramway construction as 'not difficult, but 
straggling, with extremities more than three miles from the centre'. 134 The Special 
Tramways Committee met on 27 September 1897 to consider the survey results. 
There was an overwhelming response, and the towns which provided information 
131 Mewett, Hastings Tramways Company, p.6. 
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included Brussels and Liege in Belgium, Hanover, Hamburg, Berlin, Dresden, 
Elberfeld and Reimscheid in Germany, Milan and Genoa in Italy, Paris and Rouen 
in France, Budapest and Vienna in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and from the UK 
Blackpool, Bristol, Birmingham, Walsall, Wednesbury, Edinburgh, and Dover. 
Many cities in America also responded. A summary of the report is shown in 
Appendix 13. 
Reimscheid was particularly interesting because it was a small town of similar size 
to Hastings, and built on a hilltop with factories and a railway station on the 
surrounding flatlands. An electric tramway, powered by overhead wires, enabled 
trams to climb the steep grades of more than ten per cent, and was 'a resounding 
technical and commercial success'.135 Topographically, the operation of a tramway 
system in Hastings presented the same problems. 
Apart from Murphy, another promoter was also pressing for the introduction of a 
tramway system. At a Council in Committee meeting on 20 August 1897, a letter 
was read from a Mr Barber, submitting his plans for laying down tramways in the 
town. The letter generated much discussion and divided opinion about whether 
construction should be allowed to pass into the control of a private company. It 
was resolved that consideration should be delayed until the next committee 
meeting. 136 In the meantime, however, Barber informed the Council in Committee 
on the 28 September 1897 that he wished his proposal 'to stand over for the 
present,.137 Clearly, interest was growing, and it was fortunate that the council had 
had sufficient foresight to set up a comprehensive investigation of their options. 
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136 Lewes, East Sussex County Council Archives, Hastings Council Minutes, file DH/B 18/3, 20 
August 1897, p.359. 
137 Ibid, file DH/B 18/3,28 September 1897, p.389. 
226 
Sensing that the Committee's recommendations might eventually go against them, 
the anti-Trammite group enlisted several influential businessmen to their cause, 
including members of the medical profession. They presented the Council with a 
petition which referred to the damage that they claimed a tramway would cause to 
the invalid business and to Hastings' reputation as a renowned health resort. 138 
The petition ventured into the realms of the absurd by suggesting that a field 
hospital would have to be built in case of disaster, and that all tramway users 
would have to be issued with rubber gloves to avoid shocks from the electrical 
equipment. Although the anti-Trammite group's feelings were heartfelt, sections of 
their argument displayed evident ignorance of tramway operations. 
Nevertheless, the Committee recommended the construction of a tramway system 
using overhead wires, but acknowledged that they were unsightly. In their favour, it 
was pointed out that such a system would be cheaper to install, ea::;ier to operate, 
and less difficult to maintain. To overcome any objection on aesthetic grounds, it 
was suggested that ornamental support poles would be provided, which could also 
be used as lamp standards, thus simultaneously introducing street lighting. Such 
benefits had by then become standard practice in Europe. 139 The Committee 
clearly hoped that such ornate and decorated columns and brackets would blend 
elegantly into the urban scene. 
Although a Council majority now supported Murphy's proposal, the depth of feeling 
generated by the anti-Trammites led to an inquiry, held on 8 June 1898, and 
chaired by lord Jersey. In reporting on the outcome of the inquiry, The Weekly 
Mail called it a miserable farce, because: 
138 Mewett, Hastings Tramways Company, p.7. 
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in deference to the thoroughly self-seeking desires of a few members of 
the privileged class to which he belongs, the President of the 
Commission abruptly closed proceedings and intimated that in effect 
that he did not think of sanctioning an enterprise which would certainly 
benefit the whole town, while it might possibly prove a source of 
inconvenience to a handful of individuals whose wealth enables them to 
furnish themselves with private conveyances, and places them above 
considerations of economy.140 
Some anti-Trammites had hardly dared to hope for such an outcome, and 
proclaimed that the rights of the Omnibus Company were to remain inviolate. 
Others continued their fight against omnibuses also, but there was a general 
feeling that the movement for trams had been effectively stifled and silenced 
forever. Calling themselves 'progressive reformers', the Trammites refused to 
capitulate before such an 'arrogant doctrine', insisting that 'the monopolists will not 
be left undisturbed in the enjoyment of their monopolies', and using emotive terms 
such as 'hyper-sensitive' and 'super-aristocratic' against such democratic 
contrivances as the electric tram.141 
It was not that straightforward, however. In view of the depth of feeling, a 
Committee vote on the possible construction of three alternative lines was carried 
by a majority of 12 to 4. Overhead traction was acknowledged to offer a 'cheaper, 
more convenient and more expeditious method of locomotion'. 142 The result was a 
reversal of earlier Council policy and a setback for the anti-Trammites who 
severely criticised the decision. It encouraged Murphy to submit a new scheme on 
140 Hastings & St Leonards Weekly Mail, 7 January 1899. 
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behalf of the Provincial Tramways Company. His proposal comprised only two 
routes, from Ore through the town centre to Silverhill, and from West St Leonards 
via Bexhill town centre to Cooden Beach. The proposal carefully avoided the 
contentious stretch along the Frontline, and consisted of two separate schemes 
with no interconnection. 
A further problem then arose. The Council decided to explore the possibility of a 
municipally-run tramway. The decision was unsurprising as several other councils 
had already taken similar steps as part of a general trend towards municipal 
ownership. In the meantime, Murphy's proposal was considered by the House of 
Commons Tramway Committee who unexpectedly rejected it on the grounds that 
.. 
it would be harmful to the prosperity of the town. 143 The committee supported the 
anti-Trammites' view that a tramway system, with its noise and general disruption, 
would harm the image of Hastings as a seaside watering-place for ~he wealthy and 
convalescents. A banner headline in the Hastings & St Leonards Observer 
captured the triumph of the tramway's opponents: 'Mr Murphy vanquished; Trams 
ruinous to a health resort' .144 
It was obvious that the Observer was strongly anti-tram. The pro-tram lobby were 
quick to point out that its proprietor, Fred Parsons, was also chairman of the 
'horse-focused' Hastings and St Leonards Omnibus Company. In the event of the 
introduction of trams, his Company's profits would inevitably suffer. In opposition, 
a new local journal appeared, the Weekly Mail and Times, which accused Parsons 
of secretly funding the anti-tram movement (see Appendix 14).145 
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By now, Hastings' townspeople were becoming impatient with delays and 
demanded immediate action. Outlying suburbs formed District Committees, and a 
mass open-air meeting was called. But the problem of the Frontline reappeared. 
Opposition to overhead wires had not disappeared: residents now declared that 
such a system would blot out the sun. Murphy entered into negotiations with the 
Council, offering again to provide ornamental support poles, but to no avail. 
Matters did not rest there. At a public meeting held on 15 December 1898, more 
than 800 people attended, with several speakers both for and against a resolution 
empowering the Council to proceed with a Bill. When a vote was taken, less than 
fifty people opposed it.146 The Weekly Mail dismissed the opposition as self-
interested privileged individuals, with little concern for the well-being of the great 
majority of residents. 147 The newspaper also predicted the doom of 'that fat 
monopolistic body, the Omnibus Company, paying 17%% dividends to its few 
shareholders at the expense of the general public'. 
Regardless of the enormous majority in favour of the resolution, Councillor 
Carless, a Liberal, exercised his right to call another poll. The Weekly Mail 
sarcastically commented that as a Liberal, Carless should have believed that the 
good of the many should not be subordinated to the interests of the few. 148 He was 
supported by Conservative councillors, who insisted that the poll should only 
include owners and occupiers of property in the town. According to The Weekly 
Mail, they would have been prepared to carry their opposition to Parliament should 
they have been defeated.149 
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Before the ballot took place, a Tramways Support Committee was set up to 
combat the Anti-Trammites. Several councillors were members, including Dr Gray 
and Dr Lewis, and Messrs Boutwood, Baily, Wickens, and Bones, with Councillor 
Laite as the general secretary. The aim of the Committee was to assist in securing 
a majority in favour of the introduction of trams at the poll to be taken on 23 
January 1899. To add to the confusion, Hastings Council decided to pursue further 
the possibility of a municipally owned tramway through a question on the ballot 
paper. 
The poll was taken under the Public Health Act, 1875 but was based on the 
cumulative property principle established by the Sturges-Bourne Acts of 1818-
19.150 The poll was so structured as to give men of means, most of whom were 
anti-Trammite, an advantage. Under this process, the greater the property wealth, 
the more value was attached to the vote through a weighting system. In some 
instances, one man could have as many as twelve votes, while others had no vote 
at all. Even the polling form was unusual in that voters had to initial the 
appropriate column and sign their name rather than place an X in favour. In 
addition, voting papers had to be kept at home until collected on the day of the 
poll. Those sent to the Town Hall were disqualified. Thus it was very difficult for 
people who worked to register their votes. The Weekly Mail was outraged, 
rejecting the process as anachronistic, and insisting that the law 'is completely 
antagonistic to the spirit of the times and will be repealed by the first Liberal 
government in power,.151 
In a similar fashion to Wolverhampton, opinions on the introduction of tramways 
were split on political lines, although the debate in the Black Country was more 
150 Hastings & St Leonards Weekly Mail, 17 December 1898. 
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concerned with the type of system to adopt. In Hastings, it was a matter of whether 
to adopt any system at all. The anti-Trammites were mainly Conservative, while 
the proponents were the more progressive Liberals. Conservative councillors 
opposed included Messrs Bray, Ford, Langham, Stubbs, Tree, and Tharle, and 
one Liberal, Carless. 
The opposition to the tramways published a nine-point manifesto against the 
introduction of trams prior to the pol1.152 The points were: 
1. Trams invariably lower the character of a locality and depreciate property. 
2. Hastings' streets, with their steep gradients and narrow roads, are unsuited 
to trams. 
3. Wealthy visitors in the spring and winter, and wealthy residents, would 
depart instantly when trams come. 
4. Trams are noisy and would disturb the quiet and rest of summer season 
visitors. 
5. Many cabmen and tradesmen reliant on horse-drawn vehicles would lose 
their employment. 
6. Shop owners in outlying districts would lose their trade as residents would 
transfer their allegiance to town centre shops. 
7. Accidents would increase. 
S. The Front Line would be disfigured. 
9. Trade in St Leonards not on the proposed routes would be diverted 
elsewhere. 
152 Hastings & St Leonards Weekly Mail, 21 January 1899. 
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In support of objection 6, shopkeepers and tradesmen in the suburbs of Bohemia 
and St Leonards urged that trade would be badly affected as trams would enable 
people to travel more easily to the town centre to buy goods. To refute the claim, 
The Weekly Mail produced an extract from the Douglas Report on Kingswood, a 
suburb of Bristol: 
The deputation was informed that one certain result which had followed the 
opening of the electric tramway line to Kingswood had been an extensive 
and marvellous development of the districts traversed by the line, there 
being every sign of a vigorous growth in population and trade. Indeed, the 
prospects of the whole neighbourhood of Kingswood and St George .~as 
[sic] brightened very greatly, as it is fully recognised that by the electric 
tramways system, a stimulus has been imparted to the district, the effect of 
which is daily observable and augurs well for the adoption of electric 
traction in other districts. 153 
Despite the anti-Trammites' fears, support for the trams did come from some 
wealthy visitors who spent the winter months in Hastings. Calling the struggle 
'between light and darkness simply despicable', one visitor accused the doctors, 
lawyers, parsons and journalists of 'stupidly opposing nearly everything calculated 
to benefit the place and the people. 154 
In response to the anti-Trammites' manifesto, The Weekly Mail produced an article 
drawing on experiences elsewhere, in order to dismantle their argument against 
trams. The newspaper accused 'the most excellent of citizens, gentlemen worthy 
of the highest respect and honour' of a lack of financial experience, travel and 
153 Hastings & St Leonards Weekly Mail, 14 January 1899. 
154 Ibid. 
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observation, and a 'crudity of thought and employing a worn out, hackneyed 
fallacy of argument'.155 
Before the voting took place on 23 January 1899, The Weekly Mail took one more 
opportunity to press for support. The newspaper referred to an inquiry that the 
Light Railway Commissioners had recently conducted in Ealing, 'that most 
charming London suburb principally inhabited by the class of people who patronise 
Hastings during its best seasons' .156 Prior to the inquiry, Ealing's Town Clerk had 
sent telegrams to other authorities to ascertain their views on the overhead 
systems already installed in their towns. The responses were unanimous in 
support of such systems. Instead of depreciating property values along the route, 
they reported that values had in fact increased. On both sanitary and economic 
grounds, overhead traction was found to be preferable to horse, steam, or any 
other tramway system. Although objections had been raised similar to those 
expressed in Hastings, 'all opponents had been converted' .157 The result of 
Hastings' poll was an overall victory for trams by 8340 against 4821, but municipal 
ownership received little support. Nevertheless, the result was hailed as 'a 
magnificent victory for the tramways.158 
In parallel with Hastings' contortions, Bexhill Council began to worry that their own 
aspirations to have a tramway system in the town were now in jeopardy. They duly 
approached BET to construct a system from Cooden to Bo-Peep in St Leonards. 
The eastern section of the proposed system lay within Hastings Council area, but 
nevertheless, BET proceeded to prepare the Bexhill and St Leonards Tramroads 
Bill. 
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Simultaneously, Hastings Council prepared the Hastings Corporation Tramways 
Bill, and both came before the House of Lords Tramways Committee on the same 
day. The Hastings Bill was lost, while the Bexhill Bill received approval. The 
Bexhill Observer triumphantly declared that 'in view of the fact that their Lordships 
declined to allow the Hastings Corporation Tramways Bill, the result has therefore 
been all the more gratifying,.159 Clearly, there was much tension between the two 
towns. 
Incensed by events, Hastings Council mounted a huge campaign against the 
Bexhill Bill at its next hurdle, and enlisted the assistance of Murphy to organize a 
vigorous opposition to BET. This was surprising in view of the fact he had 
previously been declared persona non grata by the Council's anti-Trammites. The 
main thrust of the contra-argument was that one and a half miles of the Bexhill 
proposal lay within Hastings Borough, and that Bexhill had no right to control 
Hastings' streets. 160 
Confronted by such opposition to the Bexhill Bill, the House of Commons Tramway 
Committee rejected it outright. The Bexhill Observer referred to Hastings' 'old 
fashioned attitudes' and declared: 'it is only too plain that Hastings is so 
obsessively jealous of the rapid advancement of Bexhill that nothing comes amiss 
to the Corporation of that Borough in trying to put a drag on our wheels,.161 
After his appearance at the House of Commons, Murphy's skills as a conciliator 
came to the fore. He called a meeting between the Bexhill Tramways Committee 
159 Mewett, Hastings Tramways Company, p.5. 
160 Ibid, p.1 O. 
161 Ibid. 
235 
and BET representatives, after which Murphy was given the task of preparing a 
joint Bill for the two towns. The Bexhill Observer rued the fact, sarcastically 
referring to Murphy as 'the pet of Hastings Council' .162 
Murphy's Provincial Tramways Company submitted the Bexhill and 5t Leonards 
Light Railway Order in March 1900 under the Light Railways Act of 1896. The 
order was confirmed on 6 June 1900.163 The Hastings Tramways Act, 1900 for the 
whole network, was confirmed on 30 July 1900.164 This act also enabled the 
creation of the Hastings Tramway Company. However, during the passage of the 
Bills, Murphy admitted under cross-examination that he had financed Hastings' 
Council dispute with Bexhill which had killed off BET's attempt to build a separate 
scheme.165 The conflict between towns and BET has parallels here with 
Wolverhampton, whose council strongly opposed BET's attempts to 'fight tooth 
and nail to take over the Wolverhampton system' .166 
Although the Bills' assent gave Murphy an entree into Hastings' network, there 
was still local resistance to the Provincial Tramways Company itself. Once again, 
the question of municipal ownership and operation was raised, with supporters 
pointing out that other towns were able to run their own tramways efficiently. 
Murphy was referred to as 'the Irish capitalist, who did not come all the way to 
Hastings out of love for the people, but to make profits for his shareholders'.167 
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Similar views had been expressed by Manchester's Special Committee in 1896, 
when advocates of municipalisation intoned that 'tramways are a monopoly of a 
public necessity and as such should not be used to put large dividends into the 
pockets of shareholders,.168 The council put the question to the vote but failed to 
achieve the necessary two-thirds majority, and the motion was finally lost. 
Meanwhile, Murphy continued to exert pressure on the council to allow trams to 
operate along the Frontline. The council finally relented, but stipulated that no work 
would commence until all construction planned under the 1900 Act was 
completed. They also insisted that overhead wires would be prohibited on the 
Frontline. The Hastings Tramways (Extension Act) 1903, which received Royal 
Assent on 21 July 1903, decreed that the Frontline would be operated by 
whichever system the Council chose, subject to approval by the Board of Trade. 
With the continued refusal to allow overhead wires along the Frontl:ne, the 
Traction Corporation of Westminster approached Hastings Council with their 
product, the Kingsland surface-contact system. The company reported that it had 
been successfully installed in Dresden where it was in daily operation, and invited 
town councillors to inspect the system there. In support, the company revealed 
that the installation was also being considered in two Indian cities. 169 Once again, 
the council decided not to proceed.17o 
4.7 The final stages 
Hastings Council continued to agonise over the subject of municipalisation of 
transport operations. In September 1904, a motion was put to the council that a 
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committee of five members should be appointed to consider the establishment of a 
service of municipal motor omnibuses in the town. 171 A heated discussion then 
took place, during which the proposer, councillor Shoesmith, extolled the virtues of 
municipalisation. Nevertheless, the motion was lost and it was resolved that 
operations of both tram and bus should remain in the private sector. 172 
Nationally, the rise in municipal trading was attributed to the possibility of 
monopolisation of services, the fear being that 'private companies cannot be 
trusted to exercise the powers of monopoly with discretion,.173 There was an 
economic argument in that 'tramways were the monopoly of a public necessity and 
as such should not be used to put large dividends into the pockets of 
shareholders'.174 These views were held by a minority of councillors in Hastings 
who declared that profits should be for the benefit of the public. Millward argued 
that such views might engender the desire for public control, but not necessarily 
the desire for public ownership.175 
Emerging from the fog of uncertainty, Murphy seized his opportunity and in 
December 1904 announced that 'trams would arrive during 1905 and never yet 
had omnibuses, whether horse-drawn or motor traction, been able to live 
alongside tramcars' .176 Construction of the overhead network, with the exception 
of the Frontline, began on 7 December 1904, and the first tram service 
commenced on 31 July 1905. Immediately, omnibus services felt the pinch. Motor 
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buses were hopelessly outnumbered, with 'alien trams' following each other in 
quick succession.177 
On the section of line between Bo-peep and Bexhill, Sunday services were 
operated from the start as permission was embodied in the Bexhill part of the 
Act. 178 However, in 1906, the question of Sunday tramway operation throughout 
Hastings was raised. As the Dolter section was yet to be installed, the Hastings 
section operated independently with no interconnection at this stage. Once again, 
both the Church and the Lord's Day Observance Society opposed the application, 
this time from the Tramways Company. Clearly, the road to salvation would not be 
achieved via a tram eitherl The council decided to test public opinion by organising 
a poll of the townspeople, which resulted in a victory in favour of Sunday services 
by 4,109 votes to 2,689. 179 Consequently, the Council approved the application on 
a strictly annual basis for two years. If in the third year (1908) there was no 
opposition, no further permission would be necessary. 
Even among the commercial services, opinions on trams continued to be divided, 
as evidenced by hoteliers' advertisements. One establishment was placed in 'an 
ideal situation, away from the noise of the trams' and another offered 'rest, comfort 
and pleasure', as it was 'beautifully situated off the tram route on a delightful part 
of the sea front' ,180 Others viewed the trams as an advantage, describing their 
hotels as 'charmingly situated and convenient for electric trams', and 'convenient 
for trams and station',181 
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Further evidence of the friction between the tramways company and the council 
surfaced regarding the rate assessment levied. As the system had been 
constructed under the terms of the Light Railways Act, rates were assessed at one 
quarter of an undertaking's net annual value compared with the full value under 
the Tramways Act. In January 1907, the Hastings Tramways Company wrote to 
the Hastings Council complaining about their rate assessment. Only one quarter of 
the rate assessment of £45.10 shillings should have been charged, not the full 
amount. The company quoted the 'Wakefield decision', a court case which 
Wakefield Council lost when it attempted to charge the full assessment.182 Shortly 
afterwards, Wakefield Council approached Hastings Council for a £20 donation to 
fund an appeal against the court's decision. Hastings council agreed to the 
donation on the dubious grounds that if the appeal was successful, they would 
have spent £20 to gain more than £34.183 Unfortunately for the ratepayers, the 
appeal was unsuccessful. 
4.8 The installation of the Dolter system 
While overhead traction was being installed elsewhere in the town, the council 
once again turned their attention to the problem of a system suitable for the 
Frontline. A week long demonstration of the Dolter surface-contact system was 
exhibited by a local businessman.184 The council noted this as a possibility, but 
due to the difficulties and delays in resolving the Frontline issue, the Provincial 
Tramways Company sold its interest in Hastings to a new undertaking, the 
Hastings and District Electric Tramways Company. Murphy continued as 
Chairman, and immediately gave notice to pursue overhead traction along the 
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Frontline, but once again the Council opposed him and the proposals were 
withdrawn.185 
In an attempt to solve the deadlock, the tramways company informed the council 
that they were prepared to install the Griffiths-Bedell surface-contact system. 186 
Previously, the council had approached its lincoln City counterpart for its views on 
that system as the length installed there was comparable to the Frontline.187 
Eventually, Hastings Council decided in favour of the open-conduit system, but the 
tramways company rejected the decision on cost grounds, threatening arbitration 
through the Board of Trade if there were further delays.188 Finally, the council 
authorised the tramways company to install the cheaper Dolter system. 
How did this decision come about and is there any evidence of irregularity? The 
main reason for installing surface-contact was to placate the wealthy and 
influential residents of the Frontline. They clearly would have preferred no trams at 
all, but there was a strong economic case to complete the missing link between 
t~e two overhead systems. Viewed from the residents' perspective, there was also 
an economic case not to complete the link because they feared the disturbance 
generated would harm the image of the town as a desirable health resort. On 
balance, and aware of the commercial pressure from the tramways company, the 
council decided to opt for the Dolter system. 
With regard to the possibility of any irregularity, in the UK generally, municipalities 
customarily carried out checks on the financial and engineering soundness of 
185 Mewett, Hastings Tramways Company, p.14. 
188 lET, The Electrical Review, Volume 58 (27 April 1906), p.216. 
187 Lewes, East Sussex County Council Archives, Hastings Council Minutes, file DH/B 33/4, 22 
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188 lET, The Electrical Review, Volume 58 (27 April, 1906), p.676. 
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promoting companies. In order to ensure full scrutiny of the proposals, local 
authority officials or councillors were often made members of the company boards. 
Nevertheless, promoters and contractors, who were experienced businessmen, 
found local representatives to be easy prey.189 The Board of Trade doubted the 
integrity of some promoters, and 'there was a strong influence of irregular 
American financing built into their dealings' .190 The process sometimes led to 
abuses of power, including bribery, which with its hidden additions increased the 
overall construction costS.191 There is no doubt that corruption and sharp practice 
did occur. The notorious entrepreneur Henry O'Hagan in his autobiography 
boasted of his exploits to maximise profits from his tramway operations. 192 
O'Hagan suggested that 'if the act of parliament or provisional order was obtained, 
it was usual for the syndicate to sell it to a contractor or financier at a considerable 
profit over the cost of obtaining it' .193 Vesey Knox held the view that generally, 
'promoters obtained their powers, capitalised them at whatever figure they thought 
the public would stand, floated their company, took their profits, and cleared out as 
quickly as they could'.194 The sale by the Provincial Tramways Company of their 
interest in Hastings supports Knox's views. However, there is no evidence that 
operations in Hastings were tainted by bribery or other forms of corruption. 
Despite the lack of hard evidence, accusations of maladministration were aimed at 
the council by aggrieved residents during its dealings with the tramways company. 
A letter to the Hastings Times alleged that the Hastings Tramways Company was 
189 Richard J Buckley, 'The Influence of Local and National Politics on the Development of Urban 
Passenger Transport in Britain 1850-1900', Journal of Transport History, New Series Volume 4, 
NO.3 (1978), p.138. 
190 Ibid, p.139. 
191 Robert Millward, Private and Public Enterprise in Europe: Energy, Telecommunications and 
Transport 1830-1990, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.26. 
192 Henry O'Hagan, Leaves from My Life: Volume 1, London: John Lane, 1929, p.54. 
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'run by a set of schemers. Their schemes are magnificently done. They are very 
clever and achieve their aims in the same way as a clever burglary is carried 
OUt'.195 The council was accused openly and unsubtly of collusion with the 
company. 
The missing link comprising the Dolter system between St Leonards, the Grand 
Parade and the Memorial was eventually opened on 12 January 1907. 
Immediately, class tensions became even more apparent. The tramways company 
introduced early-morning workmen's trams between Bexhill and Hastings, 
travelling along the Frontline. There were two trams in each direction, commencing 
at 6.45 am from Hollington and 7.00 am from Ore, returning at 5.00 pm and 5.30 
.. 
pm. 196 Fares were half-price, and it was not long before other travellers took 
advantage. Consequently, the Council passed a bye-law, restricting cheap fares to 
artisans, mechanics and daily labourers. 197 A further restriction was placed on 
luggage. Tools of the trade could not exceed twenty-eight pounds in weight. 
The frontagers along the Frontline, where the Dolter system had been installed, 
soon complained that the early-morning services disturbed invalids at their rest. 198 
One resident complained that the service had cost him £500 per annum in rent 
because he had been forced to move home 'for the sake of a few workmen or 
rather their coppers' .199 
195 The Hastings Mail, 9 April 1905. 
196 Hastings & St Leonards Observe" 16 March 1907. 
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An example of the propaganda against the Dolter system was a curious incident 
reported to have happened along the Frontline. An exceptionally large arc was 
said to have formed between the wheels and the rails of a tram, accompanied by a 
loud explosion.2oo Many householders and shopkeepers ran out to see what had 
occurred, but the tram appeared to be proceeding normally. One householder 
reported that 'a ball of fire came through an open window, passed over her head to 
the opposite side of the room, and exploded against a wall'.201 A correspondent 
wrote to the Observer, 'to the horrors of the trams must be added the Jovian 
power of forging thunderbolts and projecting them through houses as they pass'. 
The resident engineers of the Dolter company, Messrs Smyth and Willcox were 
asked to investigate, but not surprisingly decided the event was an illusion as 
there was no damage to either persons or property.202 The reported phenomenon 
did however reinforce the view of many that surface-contact systems were unsafe. 
By far the greatest risk of accidents came from the tramcars themselves, whatever 
the method of propulsion. Foremost amongst these new dangers were 
derailments, head-on crashes, incidents with carriages and carts, and pedestrians 
walking across the tracks. Jumping off moving trams became a symbol of 
masculinity, and reinforced gender differences.203 Women's long wide skirts 
impeded such daring actions. Those that did attempt to jump off often met with 
accidents. The first tramway fatality in Hastings occurred when a young woman 
attempted to leave a moving tram but in the process fell and hit her head on a 
200 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 2 February 1907. 
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kerbstone.204 As regulations forbidding the practice were difficult to enforce, 
eventually dedicated stops were introduced. 
Although there is no evidence to suggest that gender was an issue in the selection 
of traction systems, women as users clearly had an impact on the design of the 
tramcars themselves. Pender described the influence of female passengers on 
tramcar design innovations, especially with regard to staircases.205 It was difficult 
to climb stairs in Victorian dress, and contemporary standards of modesty had to 
be observed with seating arrangements. Seats had to be configured to allow 
women wearing bulky clothing to move around more easily, and decency boards 
were added to prevent the possibility of voyeurism. Around 1900, tramways were 
used mainly by men, but women also had an impact on the quality and nature of 
services.206 They wanted comfort, safety and accessibility.207 The frequent 
interruption of current on surface-contact systems became the subject of ridicule in 
Hastings' newspapers. While not instrumental in the abandonment of the system, 
the constant failure of lighting on board tramcars was particularly disturbing to 
women travellers. 208 
As for surface-contact operation, the heavy cars often needed to be levered from a 
dead contact plate to a live one after stalling. Studs had to be restored to their 
down position using heavy hammers. Men not only had the hypothetical physical 
strength to drive heavy vehicles, but 'the male physique implied better mental 
204 Hastings Chronicle, 18 April 1909. 
205 Pender, 'British electric tramcar', p.28. 
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readiness' however unlikely that might appear.209 This was not the realm of 
women workers. 
In the protected public space of the tramcar, women had a certain level of freedom 
and emancipation. As passengers, they were on equal terms with men. These 
confined public spaces bore witness to some intriguing variations on accepted 
codes of social behaviour, and in particular interactions between men and women. 
Some ingenious party games were suggested by newspaper readers to pass the 
time during frequent breakdowns of the surface-contact system.210 The prettiest 
lady passenger was blindfolded and persuaded to walk up and down inside the 
tramcar. When the lights failed, as they frequently did with the Dolter system, she 
had to sit on the nearest lap. The added spice was the identification of the owner 
of the lap she was sitting on when the lighting system returned.211 There is no 
evidence that such party games happened, but if they had, it is likely that only 
lower-class women would have participated. These suggestions reinforce the view 
that the tram was neither a workplace nor a household, but a place where men 
and women met outside their traditional spheres.212 Surface-contact systems were 
providing an imagined set of social possibilities: inadvertently generating 
entertainment outside the social norms: the pleasure of non-conformity and 
breaking the rules; of the opportunity to forge new acquaintances; of slightly risque 
actions; and of anticipation to see what might happen. The suggested male 
counterpart was the game of 'Jack's alright' in which the phrase was repeated by 
each passenger in turn. When the lights failed, the person saying it had to pay a 
209 Schmuck!, 'On the Trams', p.67. 
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forfeit. This would have involved assisting the conductor to crowbar the tramcar to 
the next live contact plate.213 
Residents continued to complain about the Dolter system, even through poetry.214 
(see Appendix 15). The poem perfectly illustrates the noise and visual impact of 
surface-contact traction from their viewpoint. Each verse is completed with an 
onomatopoeic description of the passage of the trams. An alarming visual aspect 
of the Dolter system was indeed the sparks and flashes emanating from contact 
plates as trams passed over them. As the 'fireworks' were sometimes 
accompanied by loud bangs, horses never really became accustomed to them. 
Internal lighting was also problematic. At night, the trams were plunged into 
darkness by current failure at a stud. The poem ominously refers to the 
threatening possibilities of thieves 'plying their trade'. Restoration of lights came 
after the tram moved to the next stud, either under its own momentum or having 
been levered forward by passengers and volunteers. 
No problems with Sunday tram services occurred during the first two years of 
operation, but the Council had a change of heart in 1908. Recalling that they had 
an option to purchase the tramways company after twenty-five years, they 
recognised that Sunday operations would increase the company's value, and 
hence the amount the Council would have to pay if they exercised their right. It 
therefore decided to withhold permission unless the company accepted a legal 
agreement to exclude Sunday operations in any future valuation.215 The company 
responded that such a request was illegal unless it was backed by an act of 
parliament. In an attempt to pressurise the company, the Council agreed but 
213 Hasting' & Sf Leonard. Observer, 19 January 1907. 
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insisted that the company should submit an act to parliament and bear all the 
costs and charges of the legalisation process.216 Relations between the parties 
continued to deteriorate. The company replied that unless the Council consented 
to Sunday services, they would cease running on Sunday 29 November 1909 
except on the Bo-peep to Bexhililine, which lay outside Hastings' boundaries.217 
The question of Sunday services was beginning to move from the religious arena 
to the political. 
Recognising that feelings against them were running high, the Council decided to 
set up a sub-committee of five to negotiate with the company. Despite holding 
several meetings, the sub-committee made no decisions. With council elections 
due to be held within a few weeks, the tramway employees began to take the 
initiative with their own series of meetings. They based their opposition to the 
Council on an economic argument, pointing out that unless Sunday services were 
approved forty jobs would be lost, resulting in a loss to the local economy of 
£2,700 per annum. Over the seventeen years before the council could exercise 
the right to purchase the company, the ban would result in a total loss of £46,000 
in spending power.218 As the council continued to procrastinate, the tramway 
employees set up a committee of five people who would interview prospective 
electoral candidates to elicit their views on Sunday services. 219 The intention was 
to support only those in favour. Several meetings were held in the following weeks, 
some attracting more than five hundred townspeople. 
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The Hastings & St Leonards Advertiser criticised the council in its pre-election 
editorial:22o 
Hastings Council are past masters in the art of how not to do things. No 
better example of this could be provided than the pretty mess they have got 
themselves into over the Sunday tram question. A more pitiable exhibition 
for a body of so-called astute business men managing the affairs of a large 
community would be hard to imagine. 
The Advertiser accused the council of 'pig-headed obstinacy, with the vague and 
grasping idea that they are furthering the interests of a future generation of 
ratepayers'. The item concluded by calling the idea 'childish in conception' and 
scolding the council for behaving 'like stupidly obstinate little boys'. 221 These were 
strong words from a newspaper that viewed itself as the voice of t~e people. 
On election day, the tramwaymen formed a flying squad, calling at all polling 
stations. In the event, a pro-tramway candidate was elected, demonstrating the 
tramwaymen's visibility and force of argument throughout the town. The council 
now had several new members. Consequently, Sunday operations were approved, 
and both Church and traditionalists were defeated.222 
The Dolter system proved neither satisfactory nor reliable, and within three years 
even the tramway company's employees became vigorously opposed to it. Teams 
were formed to replace studs remaining live after the passage of a tram, and 
sometimes to lever the car to the next contact. Over-cautious traders displayed 
220 Hastings & St Leonards Advertiser, 23 November 1909. 
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notices in their shop windows warning shoppers and visitors of the danger of 
electrocution if they stepped on a live stud.223 
In October 1910, employees held an extraordinary meeting at which they resolved 
to oppose any potential councillor at the November municipal elections who 
supported the continuation of the system.224 A committee of thirteen was 
established with the power to interview prospective council candidates. The 
committee threatened to mobilise opposition 'tooth and nail by means of open air 
meetings' unless the candidates endorsed overhead traction.225 A resolution was 
passed 'that we, the employees of the Hastings Tramways Company condemn the 
actions of the Hastings Council, in insisting on the use of the Dolter system on the 
Frontline and that this meeting pledges itself to strenuously oppose the election of 
any councillor who is not prepared to support the overhead system,.226 
As the meeting was held in the tramway company's office in Silverhill, there was 
clearly collusion. It was also in the company's interest to press for overhead 
traction. In fact, the meeting was informed that the costly Dolter system would 
soon affect the employees' 'splendid pay' as £20,000 was spent on wages and 
£6,000 on wayleaves each year.227 The company employed several hundred men 
with the potential to vote in various electoral wards. It was time to let the council 
see what tramway workers were made of! 
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Throughout the town before the elections, a series of open-air meetings was held 
at which prospective candidates were interviewed. At one, the tram shed foreman 
RW Francis put forward the tramway workers' case: 
The studs caused a great deal of strain on the drivers who had to 
continually look out for dead studs as well as keep a two and a half minute 
service. Car after car had to be pushed along for a considerable part of the 
going. After severe storms, water flooded the line and car after car had to 
go back to the depot at a time when the public needed them most. 
Overhead wires would be better in every way,.228 
The Dolter stud controversy dominated the whole election campaign. Meetings 
were held in the suburbs of Bohemia, Ore, Halton and Hollington. The tramway 
employees 'have not allowed a week to pass without further endeavouring to 
convince the ratepayers of the desirability of returning only those councillors who 
supported their cause'.229 Even on polling day, the tramwaymen were 'whirring 
around the town from polling station to polling station in a motor car bedaubed in 
placards, relentlessly spreading their message right up to the close of voting'. 230 
At the election, only two pro-overhead wires candidates were elected, but others 
received a fair share of the vote. The tramways company decided to await the 
council's reaction before promoting a parliamentary bill to replace the studs.231 As 
the council did nothing, employees then held a short but effective strike, but soon 
realised that the action was counter-productive in the longer run.232 The working 
228 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 15 October 1910. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid, 5 November 1910. 
231 Mewett, Hastings Tramways Company, p.38. 
232 Ibid, p.39. 
251 
class had flexed their muscles, but in the end they achieved very little and within 
two years the influential and wealthy residents of the Frontline had galvanised 
themselves once more in opposition to overhead traction. Although the device was 
unsuccessful, it did achieve widespread publicity and intensified anti-Dolter 
sentiment, and threats of strike action increased the momentum for replacement. 
Throughout its troubled life, the Dolter system in Hastings had a negative effect on 
dividend payments to shareholders. Two months after the introduction of the 
system in January 1907, the Hastings Tramways Company paid a dividend of 4%. 
By 1909, the chairman reported that there would be a large decrease in dividends 
due to the expense of maintaining the system. The chairman estimated that 
servicing had cost £2,562 during the previous twelve months.233 Surface-contact 
traction was draining their resources and he urged replacement by overhead 
wiring. He threatened that if replacement was refused, the company would be 
bound to seek council permission to increase fares. In the following year, no 
dividend at all was paid as the cost of running the Dolter system had consumed all 
profits. It was suggested that one Dolter tram cost as much to run as five fully 
loaded trams on any other part of the overhead system, even on the steepest 
hills.234 By 1910, 1,068 studs needed replacement. 
A Board of Trade report by Major Pringle in 1912 showed a total expenditure of 
£6,538 over four years and three months of operation on two miles of double track, 
equating to approximately £384 per annum per mile of single track.235 Over the 
same period, the comparable figure for overhead traction was £103 per annum. 
The total number of studs installed was 2,108, but 4,648 had needed replacement, 
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an average of 1,072 per annum.236 Moreover, the incidence of studs left live rose 
from 88 in 1908 to 243 in 1911 and 440 in 1912, more than one fifth of the total 
installed.237 Stud malfunctions had become common, and the Dolter system was 
an enormous drain on Hastings Tramways Company's resources, and a major 
reason for their replacement. 
Consequently, the Board of Trade had serious concerns and instructed Hastings 
Tramways Company to discontinue the Dolter system within six months of their 
letter dated 5 March 1913, and to find an alternative.238 The final straw for the 
Board of Trade occurred on 19 March 1914 when a 'fine horse was killed by live 
studs' and shocks were felt by the driver and throughout the tramcar. 239 
Due to disagreement with Hastings Council about an acceptable replacement, the 
Company took no action. The Board of Trade reacted furiously anrl immediately 
instructed their solicitors to pursue a prosecution, hinting also at complicity by the 
Borough Council in failing to apply pressure to replace the Dolter system.240 The 
case was heard by Hastings magistrates on 23 July 1914, the charge being that 
the Company unlawfully used the Dolter system from 1 January to 19 March 1914. 
For two years, the Board of Trade had warned that the system was unsafe, a 
danger to the public, and unsatisfactory. Three horses had previously been killed 
and many people had experienced shocks. Acting for the defence, AD Thorpe 
complained that court action was unnecessary as plans were afoot to replace the 
system, pointing out that the Board of Trade was slow to bring the case to court. 
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However, magistrates found the case proven and fined the Company £5 with 9 
shillings costS.241 
As the First World War approached, the flashes emanating from contact plates as 
a tram passed were an added reason to replace the Dolter system as they 
contravened black-out regulations. It was feared that enemy submarines would 
take advantage of ready targets along Hastings' sea front. 242 The eventual answer 
was to fit tramcars with Tilling Stevens 24 horse-power petrol engines and 
dynamos.243 They remained in service on the sea front until March 1921 when 
overhead wires were finally allowed.244 
4.9 Conclusions 
Whether aesthetic ideals were the driving force behind Hastings' reluctance to 
adopt overhead traction is debateable. From the first attempt to introduce trams in 
1871 to the final acceptance in1904, there was opposition from several quarters, 
mostly focusing on the economic impact on the town. The main arguments 
deployed were noise, safety concerns, reduction in property values, and visual 
pollution created by trams, some of which it was feared would drive away the 
many wealthy people who visited Hastings for health reasons. Landlords, hoteliers 
and even the medical profession were fearful that a reduction in the number of 
visitors would affect their livelihood. 
As in Wolverhampton, commercial pressures were present, but of a different 
character. Hastings, along with 8exhill, formed an almost continuous coastal town 
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and tramway operators saw a strong commercial advantage in linking the two. 
However, they failed to recognise the depth of feeling from powerful residents 
opposing their plan. The section along the elegant Frontline developed into a 
battleground resulting in an unsatisfactory solution using the Dolter system to 
overcome visual intrusion. 
Politically, Hastings was conservative, solid and secure in its values, and this was 
reflected in the debates about traction choices. For most members of the 
influential classes, no trams at all were preferable. The long-running debates are a 
prime example of the ability of powerful sections of the community to resist 
change. After the eventual introduction of overhead traction in 1905 throughout 
most of the town, controversy then centred on the Frontline section. The final 
installation of the Dolter surface-contact system occurred in 1907, but not before a 
prolonged and heated series of enquiries and public consultations had taken 
place. Hastings' residents for the most part did not embrace the new technology 
with the same enthusiasm as elsewhere. 
Religious divisions were not as obvious in Hastings' council as they were in 
Wolverhampton, and played a lesser role in political debates about traction 
choices. However, the church did object strongly to Sunday operations. This 
served to emphasise the rifts in society. Religious groupings contrasted sharply 
with Wolverhampton where the non-conformists were in the majority. In Hastings, 
more than half of the congregations were Anglican in the 1880s.245 
In their fight against trams, the influential classes used local newspapers to air 
their opposition. The media played an important role, but frequently exaggerated 
the impact of trams on the town. The Observer particularly was not impartial as its 
245 Reid, 'Playing and Praying', in Daunton (ed), p.791. 
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proprietor was also chairman of the omnibus company. He clearly had a vested 
interest in avoiding competition. Several councillors, including the mayor, were 
shareholders in the omnibus company at one stage and were able to delay and 
even surreptitiously oppose the adoption of trams. 
After the Dolter system had been in operation for three years, disgruntled 
employees entered the political arena in order to persuade the council to replace it 
with overhead wires on the grounds that it was inefficient, unsafe and difficult to 
maintain. They infiltrated the public space with meetings, placards and posters, but 
with little success. Nevertheless, the working classes were becoming aware of 
their powers to influence traction choices. 
Over a thirty year period, conflicts emerged between the tramways company and 
the council, wealthy residents and the council, wealthy residents and the tramways 
company, newspapers and the council, newspapers and the tramways company, 
employees and the tramways company, the church and the tramways company, 
and even between newspapers themselves. The result was an intriguing set of 
competing interests. 
Apart from those factors, the eventual demise of the Dolter system was aided by 
poor management and maintenance compared with Wolverhampton's Lorain 
system. The inability of the tramways company to run the system efficiently, either 
by choice or through neglect, led to health and safety issues so serious that the 
Board of Trade was forced to intervene and order the abandonment of surface-
contact traction. The replacement of the Dolter system by petrol engine-powered 
tramcars staved off the intrusive overhead wires for a further six years, by when 
that form of traction had become acceptable to the Frontline residents. 
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CHAPTER 5 - THE OTHER SURFACE-CONTACT TOWNS 
'Lord Justice Moulton found it strange that opposing political parties should become 
identified with the conduit and surface-contact systems,.1 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the development of surface-contact traction in Torquay, 
Lincoln, and Mexborough. In particular, it looks at whether aesthetic 
considerations were at the forefront of decision-making, and if not, what the driving 
forces were that led to the adoption of one technological solution over another. 
These towns were a surprising mixture with little in common with each other, and 
so offer contrasting contexts for traction decisions. Torquay was an up-market 
leisure centre similar to Hastings where wealthy people and invalids visited to 'take 
the waters'. Lincoln was an ancient cathedral city and county town, but by the 
Industrial Revolution it was experiencing a slow and steady decline, partly due to 
its geographicallocation.2 Mexborough and Swinton were located in the South 
Yorkshire conurbation where coal extraction was the main occupation, and 
industrial pollution was rife. 
The largest network of the three areas was in Torquay, an elegant town where 
visual intrusion of overhead wires was not welcome. Consequently, the Dolter 
system was installed. Initially, it was largely uncontroversial and was widely 
accepted, but familiar safety fears surfaced after the preliminary euphoria had 
subsided. A slightly different home-grown system, the Griffiths-Bedell, was 
installed in Lincoln after the city council inspected a demonstration at the 
1 AG Gardiner, John Benn and the Progressive Movement, London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1925, 
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1910', in Ralph Roth and Robert Beachy (eds), Who Ran the Cities? City Elites and Urban Power 
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company's Ilford works. This also was uncontroversial and comprised a short 
section following an earlier horse-tram route. The Dolter system installed in the 
Mexborough area was unsuccessful and after many problems with live studs, its 
closure was ordered by the Board of Trade after little more than a year. 
The chapter also covers the debates surrounding the brief 'experimental' section 
of the Griffiths-Bedell system along the Mile End Road in east London. There, 
political issues were at the centre of the controversy, and they offer instructive 
contrasts with the other settlements where surface-contact traction was adopted. 
5.2 The impact of local government reform 
The local authorities in these three towns, and indeed in London and elsewhere, 
had control of the streets and were therefore at the forefront in the battles around 
traction choices.3 They developed in different ways. Municipal corporations 
created by the 1835 Act were regarded by central government as a cheap and 
efficient way of administering expanding towns.4 They provided a pragmatic 
response to the increasing urban problems without centralising responsibility. 5 
Devolved power enabled the newly enfranchised urban middle classes to influence 
and control the town environment and economy.6ln industrial cities such as 
Wolverhampton, the middle classes embraced the opportunity enthusiastically, 
frequently promoting urban improvement and developing unique forms of civic 
identity and raising the national profile of their cities.7 The impact on established 
3 Eric Schatzberg. 'Culture and Technology: Opposition to Mechanized Street Transportation in 
Late-Nineteenth-Century America', in Michael Thad Allen and Gabrielle Hecht (eds), Technologies 
of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press, 2001, p.62. 
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historic towns such as Lincoln was different. There, reform overthrew decades if 
not centuries of social and political leadership. Anglican and Tory patricians were 
replaced by commercial, Liberal and often non-conformist middle class elite,8 
whose strategy was to safeguard 'the development and prosperity of the town's 
vulnerable industry while maintaining urban growth and economic diversity'. 9 
Other towns too were developing their own distinctive political culture, although it 
was not until the Local Government Act, 1894 that urban districts were created. 
These were based on smaller towns. Their powers were rather less than those of 
county boroughs and municipal boroughs and were subject to the control of county 
councils for some services, including transport and highways.10 Mexborough and 
Swinton were in this group. 
The 1835 Act excluded London, which continued to be governed by autonomous 
vestries except for the square mile overseen by the Corporation of the City of 
London. In 1855, Parliament established the Metropolitan Board of Works to 
facilitate an integrated approach to infrastructural needs. 11 However, the vestries 
exercised considerable indirect power over the Board. 12 In order to overcome 
accusations of a lack of financial supervision, incompetence and corruption, 
London's local government was reformed. 13 In 1889, the London County Council 
(LCC) was created with directly elected members and further local government 
legislation in 1899 saw the establishment of London Metropolitan Borough 
II McHugh, 'Running an Unregulated Town', p.72. 
8 Ibid, p.76. 
10 W Eric Jackson, Local Government in England and Wales, London: Pelican Books, 1964, 
pp.36-37. 
Raphael Schapiro, 'PubliC ownership in the British city: perspectives on urban utilities, 1870-
1914', Oxford University, 0 Phil thesis, 2005, p.13. 
12 Jackson, Local Government in England and Wales, p.S4. 
13 Schapiro, 'Public ownership in the British city', p.13. 
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Councils (MBCs) as a second tier of administration. 14 However, many suburbs 
were not included within the new boundaries despite continuing housing 
expansion. Between 1889 and 1899, the vestries continued to be the second tier 
of local government. 15 After 1899, both the LCC and the metropolitan boroughs 
had to agree on the financial arrangements for the provision of new tramways, 
particularly as the latter were the road authorities. Thus, 'there were many 
instances of disagreements over the apportionment of costs'.16 This led not only to 
delays, but also in some cases to the abandonment of schemes. During the period 
of intense reorganisation, an element of civic pride was being engendered within 
the new London authorities, and a realisation that they now wielded considerable 
power.17 The next sections examine the development of the individual towns, and 
how topography, politics, and demographics became important elements in the 
process of traction choice. 
5.3 Torguay - a seaside town 
Until the end of the eighteenth century, Torquay was a very small settlement. The 
Lords Haldon financed the construction of the harbour in 1803. From 1823 
onwards, they constructed high-class leasehold housing and financed other 
development, including a market, public baths, and major extensions to the 
harbour in order to attract the yacht-owning community.18 By virtue of their 
benefaction they became extremely powerful and influential in the affairs of the 
town. However, through his good deeds, Lord Haldon had burdened himself with 
14 Jackson, Local Govemment in England and Wales, p.55. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Schapiro, 'Public ownership in the British city', p.14. 
17 Jackson, Local Govemment in England and Wales, p.S2. 
18 David Cannadine, Lords and Landlords: The Aristocracy and the Towns 1774-1967, Leicester: 
Leicester University Press, 1980, p.386. 
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massive debts and was obliged to sell his estate to satisfy his creditors. 19 From the 
mid-1880s the family's power began to wane as their debts increased. Torquay 
received its incorporation in 1892, and emancipation from the landlord Haldons 
gathered pace. By the beginning of the First World War, the Haldons had left the 
town entirely.2o Their gradual withdrawal from the scene created a political vacuum 
that resulted in several years of indecision when the question of tramway traction 
arose. 
Torquay approximates to Burgess's model, with a horseshoe-shaped concentric 
pattern of development around the harbour, typical of many 'waterside towns' of 
northern Europe.21 The steep topography imposed a road pattern that tended to 
follow the line of contours. The lower part of the town, built round three sides of the 
harbour, was the economic centre, dominated by quayside ac~ivities. 22 It was 
occupied chiefly by tradesmen's shops and houses. The next tier, approached by 
a winding road at each end, comprised handsome terraces where wealthier people 
lived. At the summit were upper tiers, with detached houses and elegant villas, 
towering one above another, on their rocky platforms.23 There was a sharp 
contrast in character between these quiet residential areas and the bustle of the 
harbour and town centre. During the nineteenth century, Torquay was transformed 
from a fishing village to a fashionable resort.24 Unlike Hastings, however, it was 
too distant from London (some 226 miles away) and other centres of population to 
experience the same growth rate, and it remained a quiet backwater until late into 
the Victorian era. 
19 Cannadine, Lords and Landlords, p.386. 
20 Arthur C Ellis, A Historical Survey of Torquay, Torquay: Torquay Directory, 1930, pp.287 -88. 
21 Arne Solli, 'Urban Space and Household Forms', in Lars Nilsson (ed), Urban Europe in 
Comparative Perspective, Stockholm: Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on 
Urban History, 2006, p.14. 
22 H Bishop, Torquay Harbour Conservation Area, Torquay: Torbay Borough Council, September 
2004, p.18. 
23 Ibid, p.4. 
24 Ibid. 
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Torquay's largest increase in population occurred after links with the railway 
network were established in 1848. The connections enabled visitors from London 
and elsewhere to access the town. In 1900, the parishes of Cockington, 
Babbacombe and St Marychurch were absorbed, resulting in the large increase 
shown below. By that time, the area had grown to 1,465 acres. Neighbouring 
Paignton, which eventually benefited from a tram service, had a population of 
1,575 in 1801, rising to more than 6,000 by 1891. 
1801 838 1861 16,419 
1811 1,350 1871 21,657 
1821 1,925 1881 24,767 
1831 3,582 1891 25,534 
1841 5,982 1901 35,000 
1851 11,474 
Table 5.1 - Population statistics for Torquay.25 
Torquay was not far behind Wolverhampton when horse-drawn omnibuses were 
introduced in 1842, although the wealthy continued to travel by bath or sedan 
chairs.26 A regular horse-omnibus service began operations in 1872 to the 
neighbouring town of Paignton.27 Several other enterprises sprang up over the 
following years. In 1876, Mr Speight of Leeds offered to construct, equip and work 
a tramway from Victoria Parade to Torre station via Union Street.28 The council 
rejected the offer on the grounds that the streets were too narrow to accommodate 
a tramway system, and the obstructions caused would disturb the wealthy 
residents in their pursuit of leisure-carriage drives.29 No further attempts were 
25 John F Travis, The Rise of the Devon Seaside Resorts 1750-1900, Exeter: Exeter University 
Press, 1993, pp.68-106. 
26 Fisher Barham, Torbay Transport, Falmouth: Glasney Press, 1979, p.7. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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made to introduce trams until the electrification debates began in 1901 when the 
council was approached by two companies with a combined tramways and power-
generating project.30 However, caution played a part in the decision-making 
process, and the council initiated a tramways sub-committee to investigate 
possibilities. Surface-contact systems were preferred to protect the streets from 
ugly overhead wires and poles, and visits were made to Paris to inspect the Dolter 
system, and to Wolverhampton for the Lorain system.31 Nothing decisive ensued. 
The lack of progress led other transport operators to seize the opportunity to 
provide services. The Torquay and District Motor Omnibus Company was formed 
by a group of local businessmen in 1903. They attended a trial of steam 
omnibuses by Thomas Clarkson of Chelmsford and, duly impressed by their quiet 
operation, ordered one sixteen-seater which went into service on 5 November 
1903.32 By June 1905, a further seven were in service. Meanwhile. the Great 
Western Railway introduced five Milnes Daimler buses at neighbouring Paignton, 
some of which were double-deck. 
To gauge the opinion of the general public towards trams, the council held a 
postcard vote in December 1902. The result was a small majority in favour. 33 
Subsequently, a meeting of ratepayers and residents in October 1903 passed a 
near-unanimous resolution in favour of electric tramways.34 Seizing the 
opportunity, the Dolter Company offered to install their system at no cost to the 
town.35 Dolter promoted the Torquay Tramways Company Limited as a subsidiary 
30 Barham, Torbay Transport, p.7. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid, p.11. 
33 London, The Institution of Engineering and Technology (lET), Tramway and Rai/way World, 
Volume 12 (11 December 1902), p.765. 
34 lET, The Electrician, Volume 51 (16 October 1903), p.1062. 
35 Barham, Torbay Transport, p.11. 
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of the National Electric Construction Company (NECC). The latter company was 
simultaneously involved with the Mexborough system. There was some opposition 
to the Dolter system, but not as vociferous as it had been elsewhere. 
The Torquay Tramways Act received parliamentary approval in August 1904.36 
Construction began in October 1905 on the first four-mile section. Operations were 
inspected on 7 March 1907 by the Board of Trade, which considered the system to 
be largely untested, and consequently insisted on several modifications to the 
specification.37 The Western Evening Herald reported that only one stud was 
found to be faulty and it was not live anyway. The inside-cab lighting was good 
and steady, and the trams operated with a minimum of sparking. They were found 
to be practically silent and smooth running, and successful in every way.38 The 
system opened on 4 April 1907 and was one of the last electrified lines to be 
inaugurated in the UK, only four coming later. 
Competition between the bus operators and the tramways company was keen, 
especially since two other bus companies had commenced operations. These 
were the Paignton and District Motor Omnibus Company which had two steam-
powered Clarksons and two Milnes Daimler motor buses, and the Torquay Road 
Car Company with six second-hand Clarksons.39 However, the Torquay and 
District Motor Car Company sold its eight Clarksons to Harrogate while the 
tramways were being laid. They had been introduced three or four years 
previously, when it was uncertain whether tramways would be built.4o The buses 
were purchased for £6000 but sold for only £2500, a high cost of depreciation as 
36 Barham, Torbay Transport, p.15. 
37 lET, Electrical Review, Volume 60 (15 March 1907), p.598. 
36 Hastings and St Leonsrds Observer, 9 March 1907. 
39 Barham, Torbay Tramways, p.18. 
40 lET, Electrical Review, Volume 60 (15 March 1907), p.101. 
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some were between two and three and a half years 01d. 41 The bus company was 
earning substantial dividends but was scared by the prospect of competition from 
the Dolter tram installation. The Electrical Review thought that the bus company's 
action was somewhat precipitate in the light of the Hastings experience.42 The 
remaining bus companies decided to concentrate their services at the termination 
points of the tramway system, thus providing a co-ordinated transport system 
albeit with buses playing a secondary role to trams.43 
The Dolter Company was keen to extend Torquay's system to neighbouring 
Paignton and offered to promote a Bill in Parliament. If it materialised, the 
company's financial prospects would be considerably improved, as by then Dolter 
was experiencing financial difficulties.44 The town council was under agreement to 
allow extensions as soon as it was satisfied with the working of the system.45 
However, defects frequently became apparent, mainly breakdowns caused by 
current loss, or studs remaining live after tramcars had passed. Although Dolter 
himself, accompanied by the Paris city engineer, visited Torquay to offer advice, 
the problems remained unresolved.46 Torquay residents were also aware of 
adverse comments made by Hastings townspeople who were becoming 
increasingly disenchanted with the Dolter operation along their sea front. 47 
Consequently, the Board of Trade granted licences for only a six-month period 
with the threat of complete withdrawal if no improvements were made.48 After 
further difficulties, the Board advised consent would not be renewed. Seizing the 
opportunity, the Tramways Company put forward plans for conversion to overhead 
.. 1 lET, Electrical Review, Volume 60 (15 March 1907), p.101 . 
.. 2 Ibid, p.186 . 
.. 3 Barham, Torbay Tramways, p.18 . 
.... IET, Electrical Review, Volume 60 (15 March 1907), p.850 . 
.. 5 Ibid. 
48 Barham, Torbay Tramways, p.31 . 
.. 7 Ibid, p.11 . 
.. 8 Ibid, p.31. 
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as well as extending the network.49 The council objected but the Board persisted 
and an arbitrator on the legal position was appointed. He decided against the 
council, who had to give way.50 The company adopted overhead traction without 
fresh statutory powers with Board of Trade consent, and conversion was 
completed in March 1911.51 
5.4 Lincoln - a historic city 
Briggs characterised Lincoln as an old cathedral city, which developed far more 
slowly than the rapidly growing industrial centres of the Victorian era. He likened it 
to a county capital, for centuries carrying out ecclesiastical or marketing functions. 
By the Victorian era, it was 'not so much as passing into eclipse but into torpor,.52 
It had earlier been characterised as a sleepy city where bells rung, clocks struck, 
men drank, women talked, and children danced, eternally. Lincoln was set in a 
predominantly rural location, but the focus of investment and innovation was 
moving from traditional towns to rising industrial centres. Lincoln was situated too 
far east and remained peripheral to the process. In addition, the city was not part 
of an urban network such as the Black Country and possessed only basic 
communication systems.53 
From the mid-nineteenth century, however, it began to develop as a centre for 
tourism, where 'architectural heritage became a source of pride and celebration',54 
The expansion of the railway network combined with increased leisure time and 
49 London, The National Archives, file MT 6/2179/9. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Briggs, Victorian Cities, p.364. 
53 McHugh, 'Running an Unregulated Town', p.73. 
54 Martin Daunton, 'Introduction', in Martin Daunton (ed), The Cambridge Urban History of Britain 
Volume 1111840-1950, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.50. 
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spending power assisted tourism development. Lincoln was therefore far removed 
from the dynamic and enterprising city that industrial Wolverhampton had become. 
That said, Lincoln's development was affected to some extent by the 
industrialisation process.55 As an agricultural marketing centre, it experienced 
limited growth, and answered to the demand for increasingly sophisticated farm 
machinery. 56 Foundries produced diverse items such as agricultural implements, 
winches and stoves. Nevertheless, the iron industry remained vulnerable due to 
the city's isolation from raw materials and markets.57 
Lincoln's development was shaped by its topography. The original settlement, 
known as 'uphill', was built on an extensive plateau. The cathedral, castle, and 
better-class properties were situated there. 'Uphill' was sleepy, picturesque, 
historic and respectable, inhabited by the clergy and urban professionals. High 
Street ran down a steep incline from the commercial areas to working class 
centres in 'downhill' at the base of the hill. 'Downhill' was bustling, dirty, cramped 
and disordered, although not on the same scale as had occurred in the ghettoes of 
Wolverhampton. Socially, 'uphill' and 'downhill' were two different worlds with 
separate value systems and minimal interaction.58 It was to connect these two 
areas that Lincoln's short section of tramway was constructed. 
Detailed investigations of Lincoln, amongst other towns, have revealed the extent 
to which 'walking cities' survived in England into the nineteenth century.59 Their 
limited development, pre-industrial economies and high-status central areas fit 
55 RJ Morris and Richard Rodger, 'An Introduction to British Urban History', in RJ Morris and 
Richard Rodger (eds), The Victorian City: A Reader in British Urban History 1820-1914, London: 
Longman, 1993, p.G. 
56 Neil R Wright, Lincolnshire towns and Industry, 1700-1914: History of Lincolnshire Volume XI, 
lincoln: lincoln History and Archaeology Society, 1982, pp. 137-140. 
57 McHugh, 'Running an Unregulated Town', p.73. 
58 Ibid, p.74. 
59 Sir Francis Hill, Victorian Lincoln, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974, pp.2-S. 
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better with Sjoberg's model than Burgess's.60 It was not until the 1880s that the 
wealthy 'merchant and professional class began to abandon the central business 
district as a place of residence,.51 
Similar to other smaller towns like Hastings, Lincoln had a higher proportion of 
middle-class residents. In Lincoln it was more than 6% compared with 
Wolverhampton's less than 3% (see section 3.11).62 As far as local politics were 
concerned, the middle classes were in the ascendancy. The predominant city 
councillors were solicitors and lawyers, who had a close knowledge of local and 
central government administration, national policy and local economics, by virtue 
of their professions.53 Social, business and familial connections and networks 
enabled them to exert influence and authority in the decision-making process. 
Lincoln started from a higher base population in 1801 than that of either Torquay 
or Hastings. The larger increases happened around the turn of the century, and 
were mainly due to inward migration from the surrounding rural areas.54 Compared 
with the target towns, Lincoln's development was at a much slower rate, as 
follows:65 
eo David Cannadine, 'Victorian Cities: How Different?, Social History, Volume 2, No.4 (January 
1977), p.459. 
61 David Cannadine, 'Victorian Cities: How Different?' in Morris and Rodger (eds), p.11B. 
62 Trainor, 'The Middle Class', in Daunton (ed), p.674. 
63 McHugh, 'Running an Unregulated Town', p.7B. 
64 Hill, Victorian Lincoln, p.306. 
65 Cannadine, 'Victorian Cities: How Different?' in Morris and Rodger (eds), p.118. 
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1801 7,205 1861 20,995 
1811 8,589 1871 26,723 
1821 9,995 1881 37,313 
1831 11,217 1891 41,491 
1841 13,806 1901 48,784 
1851 17,536 1911 57,294 
Table 5.2 - Population statistics for Lincoln.66 
The introduction of horse-drawn trams in Lincoln went relatively smoothly. In 1880, 
the promoters of the Lincoln Tramways Company applied to the city council for 
permission to construct tramways from the city centre southwards to Bracebridge, 
to Carholme Road in the west, the Arboretum in the east, and Burton Road in 
'uphill'. The routes were authorised by the Lincolnshire Tramways Order of 1881. 
In fact, the only length constructed was a section from 5t Benedict's church to 
Bracebridge, a distance of 1.84 route-miles.67 The horse-drawn line was 
constructed to a 3' 6" gauge and opened on 8 September 1882. The operation 
was very successful, and within a few years dividends of 3%% were paid, rising to 
6% by 1897.68 
When track deterioration necessitated modernisation, the corporation exercised 
their right to purchase in 1902. By then the company had 10 tramcars and 24 
horses, and was operating a ten-minute service at a fare of one penny for the 
whole distance. Three quarters of a million passengers were carried by horse-
66 Hill, Victorian Lincoln, p.306. 
67 Parliamentary Papers, Returns of Street and Road Tramways: Board of Trade, London: House 
of Commons Session, 1895, Volume 68. 
66 Hill, Victorian Lincoln, p.226. 
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drawn cars in 1902. The principal controversy centred on the valuation of the 
Lincoln Tramways Company.69 Eventually, John Young, the renowned General 
Manager of Glasgow Corporation Tramways, was appointed arbitrator to fix the 
purchase price.7o The decision about which traction system to adopt was less 
controversial. After a demonstration of the home-grown Griffiths-Bedell system at 
the company's headquarters in liford, the city council was impressed by its 
aesthetic appeal, which it saw as the ideal solution to preserve the urban fabric. 71 
The influential professional journal, The Electrical Review, was also impressed by 
the system, which they found comparatively simple and inexpensive, though it 
raised doubts about its durability.72 As the operating length was so short, it merely 
replaced the 1.84 route-miles of horse-drawn tramway, the journal foresaw no 
problems in Lincoln. The Griffiths-Bedell surface-contact system was installed in 
1905 and eventually replaced by overhead in 1919. After four years of operation, 
the Tramway and Railway World carried a report comparing safety aspects of 
various surface-contact systems and concluded that there were few recorded 
cases of injury to horses or pedestrians in Lincoln.73 By 1915 the total number of 
passengers carried had increased to 1.75 million per annum.74 
5.5 Mexborough and district - small industrial towns 
In view of their industrial nature, Mexborough, Swinton, and Rawmarsh were 
surprising choices for the installation of surface-contact systems. They were small 
adjacent mining towns, developed in a linear pattern along the transport axis 
69 lET, The Electrician, Volume 51 (12 June 1903), p.345. 
70 Ibid. 
71 lET, Electrical Review, Volume 58 (27 April 1906), p.59. 
72 Ibid, p.42. 
73 AP Trotter, 'Report on the Griffiths-Bedell system in Lincoln', Tramway and Rai/way World, 
Volume 25 (1909), p.70. 
74 Hill, Victorian Lincoln, p.227. 
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between Sheffield, Rotherham and Doncaster. The roads and rail systems 
followed a narrow corridor along the valley of the river Don.75 The towns originally 
began as fishing and river transport centres, but pottery manufacture and coal 
mining expanded rapidly in the nineteenth century, followed later by steel-making. 
Industry transformed the valley, which became dominated by factory complexes 
and rows of terraced housing for the workforces.76 By comparison with the other 
four towns, the area developed slowly, and at the end of the century, the 
population of each was only around 12,000.77 Environmental and aesthetic 
concerns must have been low priority in an area blackened by colliery waste and 
industrial pollution. The political parties were evenly balanced. The Liberal party 
held a majority of four in 1894, but five years later the newly emerged Labour 
Party assumed power with a majority of just one.78 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the area was poorly served by public transport. 
There was a sporadic horse-drawn omnibus service north to Doncaster and south 
to Rotherham, but as the community relied on the local coalmining industry for 
employment, townspeople had little opportunity for travel. 79 
Proposals for a tramway were submitted to Parliament in 1876 when a line 
connecting Parkgate at the base of Rawmarsh Hill to nearby Rotherham was 
mooted.8o Although the Bill was later withdrawn, it was revived in 1881 as the 
Rotherham, Parkgate and Rawmarsh Tramways Act, which set out to build a 
single line with passing places. However, the topography of the area proved an 
7S Julia R Ashby, Trams, Tracklesses and Buses, Mexborough: Mexborough and District Heritage 
Society, October 1997, p.5. 
76 Charles C Hall, 'The Mexborough & Swinton Traction Company' in British Bus and Tram 
Slstems, No 33, p.364. 
7 Julia R Ashby, The Village of Mexborough, Mexborough: Mexborough and District Heritage 
Society, 2005, currently out of print. 
78 Mexborough Trade Directory, 1899 yearbook. 
79 Hall, 'The Mexborough & Swinton Traction Company', p.364. 
80 Ibid. 
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obstacle. Animal power was soon recognised as unequal to the hilly sections. 
There were also financial burdens in the form of annual way-leave payments to the 
various councils, and a major bridge reconstruction at the Rotherham boundary.81 
Consequently, the powers were allowed to lapse. Other plans continued to be put 
forward, but it was not until electrification at the turn of the century that any came 
to fruition. 
The promoter, the Mexborough & Rawmarsh Construction Company, set up the 
Mexborough & Swinton Tramways Company which was incorporated in 1902.82 
When the promoter went bankrupt, the National Electric Construction Company 
(NECC) took responsibility for providing a network.83 The NECC had an 
agreement with the Dolter Company to install a surface-contact system, similar to 
their arrangement with Torquay. Clearly, the NECC regarded themselves as 
champions of the Dolter system. Under the powers granted by the Mexborough 
and Swinton Tramways Act 1902, construction began in 1905.84 Running 
northwards from Rotherham Bridge, where it connected with Rotherham 
Corporation's system, the network passed through Parkgate, Rawmarsh, Ryecroft, 
Swinton, Mexborough and terminated at the Old Toll Bar at Denaby.85 
The Board of Trade granted consent for six months, and the first public service 
commenced on Wednesday 6 February 1907 between College Square, 
Rotherham and Parkgate. The service was extended to the company's Dale Street 
depot in Rawmarsh on the following Saturday.86 The whole line was opened on 3 
August 1907, with cars running a 30-minute frequency between Rotherham and 
11 Hall, 'The Mexborough & Swinton Traction Company', p.364. 
12 Ibid, p.36S. 
13 http://www.historicfleetlists.orq.uklfleetlists/mexboro1.htm (accessed on 13 October 2004) . 
... Keith Turner, The Directory of British Tramways, Sparkford: Patrick Stephens Ltd, 1996, p.10S. 
15 Ibid. 
18 Hall, 'The Mexborough & Swinton Traction Company', p.36S. 
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Denaby and a 15-minute frequency between Denaby and the 'Ring 0' Bells' at 
Swinton.87 In order to operate on the neighbouring systems, tramcars were fitted 
with both overhead trolleys and skates for power collection on the Dolter system. 
Almost immediately, problems were experienced. The Yorkshire Telegraph & Star 
reported that during an evening journey in Mexborough: 
at times we seemed to be travelling over sheets of fire with electric flashes 
blazing from beneath the wheels caused by skidding over the studs and not 
finding contact evenly. With the flash comes a swishing sound similar to the 
send-off of a burning rocket. The lights in the car dance in and out with 
frivolous frequency.88 
The report commented that although such phenomena were perturbing, the 
element of danger was absent unless young horses were about. The writer added 
that these effects lent a spice of variety to the journey. However, not everyone was 
similarly enthused as several cases of injury to horses were reported. 89 
Nevertheless, the Board of Trade granted several renewals before consent without 
limit of time was given in February 1908.90 
The Dolter system continued to prove unsatisfactory. By July 1908, the number of 
studs left live after the passage of a tram had become such a danger that the 
Swinton Urban District Council sent an urgent telegram to the Board of Trade. 91 
Consequently, the Board informed the company that in absence of an efficient 
87 Turner, The Directory of British Tramways, p.1 05. 
88 Yorkshire Telegraph and Star, 14 December 1907. 
89 London, The National Archives, file MT 6/2179/9. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Hall, 'The Mexborough & Swinton Traction Company', p.368. 
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method of detection and dealing with them, it would consider withdrawal of 
consent. Matters did not improve, and the Board ordered closure of the system 
between 30 July and 29 August 1908.92 Conversion to overhead began 
immediately under powers granted previously, but left the area without a tram 
service for several weeks. The Board of Trade approved the overhead conversion 
in December 1908.93 Compared with elsewhere, Mexborough's Dolter surface-
contact system was short-lived. The whole line had only been open for little more 
than a year. In their defence, the Dolter company wrote that although the six-and-
a-half route-miles installed in Mexborough were not as efficient as they might have 
been, Dolter 'had made great improvements at Torquay and Hastings,.94In fact, 
the installations in those two towns were already experiencing problems. Buckley 
described the Dolter system in Mexborough as 'an unmitigated disaster, taking 
nearly two years to build, much longer than any other system in the UK,.95 
Fortunately for Mexborough & Swinton Tramways Company, their tramcars had 
been equipped with trolley poles for through running on Rotherham Corporation's 
overhead system and no major alterations to the rolling stock were needed.96 
Following the conversion, Rotherham Corporation cars ran to Parkgate on 
weekdays and Ryecroft on Saturdays, and Mexborough trams operated to 
Rotherham.97 
92 http://www.historicfleetlists.org.uklfleetlists/mexboro1.htm (accessed on 13 October 2004). 
93 London, The National Archives, file MT 6/2179/9. 
94 Ibid, R 174, file MT 6/2179/9. 
95 Richard J Buckley, History of Tramways from Horse to Rapid Transit, Newton Abbot: David & 
Charles, 1975, p.65. 
96 http://www.historicfleetlists.org.uklfleetlists/mexboro1.htm (accessed on 13 October 2004). 
97 Wingate H Bett and John C Gillham, The Tramways of South Yorkshire and Humberside, 
Walsall: The Light Railway Transport League, 1962, p.5. 
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5.6 Urban contrasts in London - the surface-contact areas 
The largest city in the world at the end of the nineteenth century, London had a 
correspondingly complex townscape. This section describes the sharp contrasts 
between the urban landscapes of the East End and the western suburbs, and how 
the provision of public transport developed. In both areas, surface-contact traction 
was considered. In the west, quite distinct small towns already existed. The towns 
were separated from each other by extensive market gardens and nurseries along 
the route beyond Acton. From about 1850, the movement of population from 
central London began, but as most of the new residents continued to have 
workplaces in the central area, improved public transport assisted the process. 
One of the largest urban areas in the west, Ealing contained many grand 
residences set in extensive gardens.98 Their influential owners largely relied on 
their carriages for transport. As the population expanded, Ealing quickly obtained 
its charter as a borough in July 1901.99 Further to the west was Hanwell, rapidly 
becoming a built-up suburb, into which there was already a steady influx of people 
from the more crowded areas of inner west London. Neighbouring Southall was a 
small self-contained market town at the time. 10o The influx of new residents 
resulted in a decline of the social status of the area. This process gathered pace 
with the development of tramway services, and particularly when electrification 
began at the end of the century.101 
98 Michael Jahn, 'Suburban Development in Outer West London 1850-1900', in FML Thompson 
~ed), The Rise of Suburbia, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1982, p.102. 
9 CS Smeeton, The London United Tramways, Volume 1; Origins to 1912, London: The Light Rail 
Transit AssOCiation, 1994, p.78. 
100 Jahn, 'Suburban Development', p.114. 
101 Ibid, p.131. 
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Several companies operated both horse omnibuses and horse-drawn trams in 
London from 1870 onwards, but most were beset by financial problems in the early 
days. To serve the western suburbs, the West Metropolitan Tramways was formed 
on 12 August 1881. Although owned by Henry O'Hagan, a promoter specialising in 
steam tramways, the company's intention to operate with steam was blocked by 
local opposition from wealthy residents to that form of traction, and the company 
continued to operate with horse-drawn trams. The influential classes insisted that 
tramways would interfere with local amenities. 102 There were also objections from 
Ealing, the self-styled Queen of the suburbs, on aesthetic grounds and potential 
damage to buildings.103 They also feared trams would attract an undesirable class 
of inhabitants. Before further extensions were made to the network, there was 
considerable opposition from property developers. One in particular, JT Carr, 
suggested to the Chiswick Improvement Commissioners that they should see 'if 
they could get a class of houses in the parish not dependent upon a cheaper kind 
of traffic'. 104 Clearly, in this area tramways were viewed as socially unacceptable. 
The LCC was controlled at that time by the radical Liberal Progressive Party which 
actively campaigned for cheap travel from the suburbs. The chairman of the LCC 
Highways Committee, Sir John Benn called London's trams 'an inestimable boon 
to the workers' and 'the people's carriage' in his election address in 1895.105 The 
Liberal social critic, CFG Masterman, commented that the 'two greatest boons that 
have come to our working people are the gas stove and the fast electric tram. 
Each workman has had an hour added to his life'.106 
102 Smeeton, The London United Tramways, p.2S. 
103 Ibid, p.48. 
104 West London Observer, 19 February 1881, 7 January 1882. 
105 Daily Chronicle, 20 June 1895. 
106 Lucy Masterman, CFG Masterman: A Biography, London: Nicholson & Watson, 1939, p.83. 
At the turn of the century, Masterman had lived for eight years in a tenement in Camberwell, a very 
poor district of south London in order to study the conditions of the working class. 
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After making heavy losses, the West Metropolitan Tramways Company was re-
conveyed on 21 August 1894 to the London United Tramways (LUT).107 The 
Managing Director was James Clifton Robinson, subsequently knighted in 1905 for 
his services to tramway systems. He was a strong advocate of electrification of the 
system based on overhead trolley lines. His plans for the LUT immediately ran into 
fierce opposition. In particular, the Hammersmith Vestry raised objections on 
aesthetic grounds, but were won over when Clifton Robinson took their surveyor to 
France to view the recently installed overhead system at Le Havre. 
Members of the LCC were less enthusiastic, and when LUT applied for permission 
to install overhead lines, a councillor during a debate proclaimed to thunderous 
applause: 'my objection is that these people - these monopolists - these Company 
monopolists - are going to obscure the blue vault of heaven'. Rep'Jrting on the 
event, the Daily Chronicle spoke of a network of wires disfiguring the streets. 108 
The LCC, through whose area some LUT lines ran, wanted the much more 
expensive conduit system, which they had insisted on elsewhere. 
The ensuing political debate sparked off suspicions surrounding private ownership 
and the dangers of company monopolists, which eventually spilled over into 
traction choices. 109 The Progressive party held the view that: 
London was the richest field of exploitation in the world, and was delivered 
over entirely to private adventure. Companies operated in the interests of 
shareholders without any comprehensive policy or co-ordinated method.11o 
107 Smeeton, The London United Tramways, p.38. 
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Sir John Benn pointed out that when the LCC was formed, there were thirteen 
separate tramway companies, each acting independently, and without even a 
uniform gauge. Clearly, there were similarities with the situation pertaining in the 
Black Country where the BET were attempting to introduce a unified system. In 
Benn's scathing words: 
a more pitiable example of private enterprise in a public service can hardly 
be imagined. The companies had selected the most populous parts for their 
schemes, and in some cases had increased rather than relieved 
congestion. Districts sadly needing tramways and housing were 
neglected .111 
Private interests frequently had powerful friends in the Council, and the idea that 
tramways were the legitimate plunder of the private adventurer was too deeply 
eng rained to be surrendered without a struggle. Even so, Benn continued to press 
for public ownership. Under the terms of the 1870 Tramways Act, past and future 
profits were excluded in any purchase settlement. In an attempt to exploit a 
perceived loophole in the law, the Moderates in London contended that present 
day profits should be included. Consequently, they urged companies to circumvent 
the regulation by submitting a year's profits to coincide with the actual day of 
purchase. The case eventually went to arbitration, but the Board of Trade decided 
in favour of the Council and the Progressive party. The companies were discontent 
and challenged the judgement in the High Court. The High Court upheld the Board 
110 Gardiner, John Benn, p.214. 
111 Ibid, p.21S. 
278 
of Trade's decision, and judgement was finally given against the companies in July 
1894.112 
Before municipalisation proceeded, there was an election in 1895 which resulted 
in an equal number of Progressive and Moderate councillors. Together with the 
election of a Conservative government later in the same year, the effect was to 
delay progress on Benn's plan until the return of a Progressive majority in 1898. 113 
The apparent profitability of some undertakings was seen as a means to reduce 
the rate burden and as a potential gold mine for the council. 114 Others thought 
greater operational efficiency would follow. The more enlightened viewed it as an 
opportunity to improve working conditions for the employees. Benn saw '. 
municipalisation as a great opportunity to introduce model labour conditions, 
ample workmen's cars, uniform management, more frequent service for 
passengers, improved vehicles, and 'a score of other advantages'. 115 It was to be 
three years later before his plan came to fruition and a six-day and sixty-hour 
working week was adopted, without reduction of the average weekly wage. 116 
Meanwhile in 1898, LUT placed their first bill for electric traction before Parliament, 
and Clifton Robinson 'produced a vigorous campaign of propaganda,.117 Gradually, 
the individual local authorities were won over, with only Ealing Urban District 
Council and Richmond in opposition, the former because its residents were 'horror 
struck at the idea of overhead trolley systems,118, the latter by contrast fearing 
112 Gardiner, John Benn, p.219. 
113 Ibid, p.226. 
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interference with the instruments at Kew Observatory, where delicate research 
equipment was housed. 
Ealing also argued that 'trams bring a different element into the neighbourhood. 
The old order disappears, the jerry builder appears and the character of the 
neighbourhood alters'.119 To counter this argument, the Town Clerk of Dublin was 
summoned to give evidence that tramways did not necessarily lead to 
deterioration in property prices. In the northern suburb of Clontarf, expensive 
houses were being built in anticipation of better transport links with the city.12o 
The authorities of Acton, Hanwell, and Southall-Norwood also raised strong 
opposition, and seized an opportunity to obstruct with demands for generous 
concessions at the company's expense. This process took time. One argument put 
forward by local residents was that trams 'would bring in hordes of undesirables 
from the East End of London'.121 All sought to drive a hard bargain with the LUT. 
The terms of the agreement with Ealing were particularly onerous. LUT had to 
reimburse the £900 cost of Ealing's opposition, make an annual payment of £500, 
and pay general rates of between £400 and £500 per annum. 122 Hanwell had only 
two-thirds of a route-mile in their area but still insisted on a way-leave payment of 
£230 per annum, while Southall-Norwood demanded the fixing of lighting to 
traction poles, and the paving of a section of road with wood blocks within the rails, 
and granite setts outside.123 While the extraction of these concessions from 
tramway companies was not dramatic, they are examples of how cultural values 
helped to shape technology. 124 
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LUT eventually became a large system, extending way beyond the boundaries of 
London's suburbs. It was intended to serve Staines, Sunbury, Esher, Epsom and 
Uxbridge. The last was a country town with a market, separated from built-up 
areas by large stretches of open country, but the ultimate tramway target was 
Maidenhead. Although surface-contact traction was considered in west London by 
Clifton Robinson, eventually the cheaper overhead system was installed. 
In complete contrast to the wealthy western suburbs, the East End was a socially 
deprived area. It was the 'home of industry, the docks, and working class 
communities'.125 By 1880 unemployment was high and London was near _, 
economic collapse, with fears of serious social disorder brought about by 
population growth and pressure on space. The perceived threat from working-
class East Enders, who lacked privilege or opportunities, caused great anxiety to 
the middle classes. 126 The East End was 'a shocking place, full of slums and about 
as unexplored as Timbuctoo'.127 Clearly, there were parallels with the Caribee 
island district of Wolverhampton, although on a much larger scale.128 The upper 
classes feared anarchy, and even revolution. Within ten years, however, the 
economic situation improved and these fears had largely evaporated, but the East 
End remained smoky, murky and drably utilitarian. 129 Roads were little more than a 
churned trench of mud, in which carriages became bogged down. It was no 
wonder that the prospect of a mobile East End population, possibly infiltrating 
middle class areas, fuelled opposition to any new form of transport that facilitated 
travel to the more pleasant suburbs. 
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The burden of the electrification of London's tramway system fell on John Benn. 
He devoted three years from 1899 to the task of mapping out a system for the 
whole of the city 'with great enthusiasm and confidence'.13o Benn considered the 
LCC tramways as 'almost his personal hobby and obsession, and ventilated his 
views with rash vehemence'.131 The role of committee chairman appeared to 
attract forceful, single-minded people. In Wolverhampton, Mander and his eventual 
successor Craddock were described in the newspapers as having 'tramways on 
the brain'.132 The following six years were believed by some to be the most 
important in the history of London's tramways. During that time, Benn was largely 
responsible for the LCC's electrification programme and the adoption of the 
conduit system of traction. 133 Open-conduit traction was chosen to protect the 
inner London townscape, but was strongly opposed by the Moderate party on the 
grounds of its capital cost. The plans for the outer suburbs were to install the much 
cheaper overhead system, although surface-contact was considered in the 
northern suburbs but rejected on cost grounds.134 (see section 2.13). 
Prior to the London County Council elections of 1907, the press had levelled 
accusations against the ruling Progressive party of 'waste bordering on corruption' 
with respect to its tramway operations.135 Likening the Progressives to the corrupt 
officials of Tammany Hall in New York, the Standard regretted that 'where 
members have the spending of other people's money, there is a tendency to put 
that money into the pockets of their friends. They throwaway money by giving 
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good prices to friendly contractors, and their method of book-keeping has been 
such that the public has been lied to'.136 By employing such insider construction 
dealing, according to the Standard, the LCC had spent fifty per cent more than if 
the tram system had been managed by private companies. The Progressive 
members of the Highways committee took legal action against the newspaper and 
won their case, but the party had been damaged and it was heavily defeated in the 
ensuing election. 
After the election of the Moderate party in 1907, they immediately attacked the 
open-conduit system and proposed the cheaper Griffiths-Bedell surface-contact 
technology. They estimated that installation would cost from £10,000 to £1.1,000 
per mile compared with the conduit's £17,000 per mile. The intention was to install 
it over the whole of the northern area, with an initial twenty-mile network. At the 
instigation of the new committee chairman, Sir Whittaker Thomp&on, £500,000 
was included in the tramway estimates to finance the work. 137 Benn strongly 
opposed the proposal, arguing that the cheapest system was not necessarily the 
most economical in the longer term.138 He recommended open-conduits rather 
than either the surface-contact system or overhead wires, despite the capital cost. 
The overhead system was 'not ornamental at best, and if they were to be 
accompanied by the ugly trapeze poles of the trolley, the opposition to the 
extension of the lines in many districts where they were much needed, would be 
gravelyaggravated,.139 
Facing such strong opposition, the Highways Committee decided to seek impartial 
advice from an eminent engineer, Sir Alexander Kennedy. He advised that 
138 The Standard, 17 January 1907. 
137 Gardiner, John Benn, p.382. 
138 Ibid, p.379. 
139 Ibid, p.229. 
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overhead systems would not be tolerated in London, given the environmental 
impact on great squares like Piccadilly Circus. He concluded that the open-conduit 
system would be more appropriate, despite the extra costs involved. 14o 
In the east, Stepney Borough Council's objection to overhead wires was a prime 
example of local autonomy and the difficulties of a co-ordinated approach. The 
LCC wanted to install overhead wires, but Stepney refused to allow overhead 
traction to operate through their area. The arterial tramway along the Mile End 
Road headed towards the populous districts of Stratford, West Ham and East Ham 
and offered a natural corridor into London. Despite its areas of social deprivation, 
Stepney council objected strongly on aesthetic grounds to overhead wires along 
the Mile End Road between Aldgate and Bow Bridge. They preferred a 
continuation of the conduit system which was being installed from the city to 
Aldgate. Unfortunately, the surface of the Mile End Road was too close to the soffit 
of a shallow railway tunnel to allow conduits. 141 As a compromise, it was agreed to 
conduct trials with the Griffiths-Bedell surface-contact system in 1908. Although 
other towns had expressed an interest in the Griffiths-Bedell system, most notably 
Hastings 142, the only other actual installation was the short section in Lincoln. 
The system became a celebrated political issue between the Progressives and the 
Moderates, and was adopted as a key factor in the election campaign in 1907.143 
Gardiner commented in his biography of Benn: 
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On the face of it, the method of running a tramway was a purely technical 
question which concerned experts alone, and in regard to which party 
politics were wholly irrelevant. But the angry spirit which was the legacy of 
the election of 1907 converted a question which should have been left to 
the engineering expert into a political issue, and it was the part of a loyal 
Moderate to support the stud tram as it was the part of a loyal Progressive 
to oppose it.144 
The fight was even fiercer than the earlier conflict in london over the relative 
merits of the overhead and open-conduit systems. The defeated Progressives 
attacked the Moderates' surface-contact policy as a fiasco and an example of 
waste, referring to jerry-built tramways. 145 They alleged that the Moderates were 
enamoured by the proposal to pay royalties to the company of £500 per mile up to 
30 miles, and £250 per mile beyond.146 It was suggested that these were 
persuasive hidden costs and no such payments were incurred for the open-conduit 
system. The criticisms were so vitriolic that the Griffiths-Bedell patentees entered 
an action for libel against the Progressive party's leader, Sir John Benn.147 The 
court hearing became a land-mark case, in which the right to free criticism of 
public affairs was challenged. 148 
In his defence, Benn claimed that his criticisms were not against the Griffiths-
Bedell system itself, but were a political attack on the Moderates who had earlier 
charged the Progressives with extravagance prior to the election. In his ruling on 
the libel action, lord Justice Moulton found it strange that opposing political parties 
144 Gardiner, John Benn, p.378. 
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should become identified with the open-conduit and surface-contact systems.149 
The controversy reinforces the point that politics and power are sometimes 
significant ingredients in technological decision-making, and offers striking 
examples of interest group politics, bureaucracy, and class struggles. 
Clearly, there were safety issues with the Griffiths-Bedell system. In a three-week 
period of operation, 927 live studs were encountered along the three-mile stretch, 
although unsuccessful attempts were made at modification. 15o A horse was killed 
and on another occasion, a tramcar caught fire, all of which caused alarm 
bordering on panic in the East End.151 There were explosions, and manhole cover 
lids weighing more than a hundredweight were blown to twice the height of the 
tramcar. 152 There were numerous anecdotal complaints of injured people, roasted 
horses, fireworks at night, and the danger of fatal accidents to anyone who 
chanced to step on a live stud. 153 Feeling was so strong that the system was 
quickly withdrawn in view of the danger to the public and in the interests of efficient 
working of the tramways. In general, such incidents, however unpleasant, had a 
positive side effect. Manufacturers and operators were compelled to introduce 
better insulation.154 
The system lasted for only twenty-three days before it was replaced, but not 
before Sir Alexander Kennedy, had been asked to report again. He discovered 
that the 'experimental' system had cost more than £52,000, which was a 
considerable sum of money at the time. Kennedy observed that: 
149 Gardiner, John 8enn, p.387. 
150 Ibid, p.382. 
151 Ibid, p.380. 
152 Ibid, p.384. 
153 Ibid, p.383. 
154 John P McKay, Tramways and Trolleys; The Rise of Urban Mass Transport in Europe, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, p.88. 
286 
a serious disadvantage with all surface-contact systems is our moist 
climate. The working of the system depends on the permanence of a very 
large number (from 300 to 1500 per mile of single line) of coils of fine wire 
placed in switch boxes or in separate chambers underground, along or 
beside the line. After full consideration, until it is experimentally 
demonstrated that these coils will remain permanently in good order, and 
well insulated under the conditions of ordinary traffic in this country, they 
appear to constitute a serious drawback to the system. 155 
It is somewhat surprising that the Lincoln system installed three years earlier did 
not appear to suffer from the same problems. Similarly, the professional Electrical 
Review had identified no potential drawbacks. 
5.7 Conclusions 
In the nineteenth century, local government reform resulted in the representation 
of wider interests in the decision-making process. The middle classes became 
more influential and in many towns, embarked on a programme of promoting civic 
pride. This new-found freedom often engendered a desire to be different, not least 
with the introduction of electric trams, where towns were able to choose the form 
of traction they felt most appropriate for them. 
In Torquay, however, caution prevailed. It was feared the noise and visual 
intrusion of trams would deter wealthy visitors on whom the local economy 
depended. Aesthetic and environmental considerations thus featured prominently 
155 Gardiner, John Benn, p. 380. 
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in discussions, although it was commercial pressures that finally persuaded the 
council to adopt the Dolter surface-contact system. The system was promoted 
through the tramways company, a subsidiary of the NECC. Similar commercial 
pressure from the NECC resulted in the Dolter system being installed in 
Mexborough, although aesthetic concerns were not so evident there. Neither 
system was particularly successful, but the larger Torquay network lasted for four 
years. 
The NECC's aims were similar to those of the BET but its operations were on a 
much smaller scale. They were clearly champions of the Dolter system and 
pressurised subsidiaries such as the Torquay and Mexborough tramway operators 
to accept Dolter traction. The close arrangement inevitably led to problems, 
particularly when NECC admitted they were misled by an optimistic report on 
Dolter's Paris operations.156 
There was less controversy in lincoln where the tramways were owned by the 
corporation. The Griffiths-Bedell system was adopted for aesthetic reasons on a 
short linear route. The alignment passed through the historic centre of the city 
where environmental protection was vital. Although less than two route-miles long, 
the system operated for fourteen years before being replaced by overhead wires. 
The lack of traffic, and hence less wear and tear on the ground level equipment, 
would partly explain why it lasted for so long. 
In London, metropolitan boroughs were required to agree with their neighbouring 
authorities about the introduction of any new form of tramway system. Such 
governmental confusion led to frequent disputes, and was the chief obstacle to the 
156 London, The National Archives, file MT 6/2179/9. 
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unification of the network and the introduction of standard traction. 157 The plethora 
of local authorities, arbitrary boundaries and local vested interests created tension, 
and the continued expansion of settlements beyond the Lee's boundaries delayed 
a common solution.158 
Local authorities in west London used the aesthetic argument to extract 
concessions from tramway companies who wanted to install overhead traction. In 
east London, the surface-contact controversy became entangled with urban 
politics and localism, and became a victim of party infighting. There, the Griffiths-
Bedell system was a complete failure because of technical shortcomings that 
resulted in serious safety concerns and, as a consequence, its rapid 
abandonment. Given the debates surrounding the use of surface-contact traction, 
particularly the Dolter in Mexborough, it was surprising that such an eminent body 
as the Lee even considered the system for the Mile End Road between Aldgate 
and Bow. 
There was no common pattern to the course of discussions in any of the towns. In 
most cases, it took several years of intense debate before a consensus was 
achieved. It is clear that issues around power and authority, culture, politics, and 
commercial considerations as well as aesthetics and the environment, all had a 
part to play in how each town decided the form of traction most suitable for its 
needs. 
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CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS 
'A technology does not succeed because it is technologically superior, but it is considered 
technologically superior because it has sociologically succeeded'. 1 
Many transport historians (Klapper, Buckley and to a lesser extent McKay) have 
dismissed surface-contact traction as a technological dead end, from which 
nothing developed. The comment by Klapper at the head of chapter one is typical, 
describing the Griffiths-Bedell surface-contact 'experiment' in east London as 
one of the few striking engineering failures of the century, comparable with 
the atmospheric railway of seventy years previously, even if not the 
disastrous nature of the Tay Bridge collapse.2 
Klapper's dismissive comment ignores the fact that the system in East London 
was not solely a technological issue, but a politically controversial one, in this case 
between the warring factions within the London County Council. In fact, it was an 
illustration of how an artefact can become a political football given certain 
circumstances, as I have argued in the cases of Hastings and Wolverhampton. 
In this thesis, I have argued that there are grounds for judging some surface-
contact systems as a success. In the history of the development of a given 
technology, there is an assumption that if an artefact was successful, there is no 
need to investigate what are perceived with hindsight as failures. Such a linear 
interpretation has been described as having an asymmetrical focus. 3 Until recently, 
1 Werner Rammert, Modelle der Technikgenese (Jahrbuch Arbeit und Technik, 1994) quoted in 
Gijs Mom, The Electric Vehicle: Technology and Expectations in the Automobile Age, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004, p.1. 
2 Charles Klapper, The Golden Age of Tramways, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962, p.78. 
3 Trevor Pinch and Wiebe E Bijker, 'Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts' in Wiebe E Bijker, 
Thomas P Hughes and Trevor Pinch (eds), The Social Construction of Technological Systems, 
Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987, p.22. 
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most historians of technology have written 'from the victor's viewpoint'.4 This thesis 
has attempted to avoid that trap by looking closely at all aspects of surface-contact 
development and its subsequent application. I have attempted to show that the 
success or failure of a particular form of tram traction, 'can be understood as a 
social construct'. 5 
Trams had different meanings to different people. To some, they were merely a 
transport mode. To others, they were murderous vehicles. Although they offered a 
superior form of travel in terms of comfort and speed beyond anything before, they 
were unfamiliar items on the streets, and many regarded them as 
incomprehensible. Opposition became part of 'a long struggle over control of the 
streets'.6 Early horse-drawn trams were fitted with plush interiors in order to attract 
the mainly middle-class passengers able to afford the fares. Tram travel became 
fashionable and desirable, and offered vantage points and a platform for 
passengers to view events and surroundings as never before. Middle-class 
passengers could look down on, in their eyes, the riff-raff, thereby helping to 
perpetuate class differences. Later, electric tram design became more utilitarian 
and reduced to basic elements, but trams remained full of character. Eventually, 
tramways helped liberate the masses from their confined residential areas and 
influenced the change in habits and customs of the people. By increasing urban 
mobility, they offered greater opportunities for leisure and new possibilities for 
work.7 
4 Eric Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology in the City: Opposition to Mechanized Street 
Transportation in late-Nineteenth-Century America', in Michael Thad Allen and Gabrielle Hecht 
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Unintended consequences of tram travel followed. Trams became social meeting 
places where new codes of conduct were learned.s There was a passing intimacy 
with fellow strangers, where activities took place which did not happen elsewhere. 
Games were suggested, particularly in Hastings where the Dolter system's 
unreliability was converted to frivolous social activity on board. Outside the tram, 
children absorbed the tramcar into their play.9 They quickly discovered that placing 
metal items on the tram-track before the passage of a tram would transform the 
crushed item into a variety of shapes. Such games offered the added excitement 
of danger, and indeed children were sometimes injured in their pursuits. 
Before the arrival of surface-contact, various forms of tram traction had been 
considered but found wanting. Wolverhampton had experimented with steam 
traction, but it was noisy, dirty and malodorous. Although not so noisy, battp'ry-
driven trams generated acidic fumes. Occasionally fluids leaked, spoiling the 
clothes of passengers. Electric traction was unsuitable because of the intrusive 
nature of overhead wires, and for a time in the USA, both battery-driven and 
underground-conduit traction was considered to be 'more progressive'.'o 
The journey towards surface-contact involved no common path of development in 
the target towns. Unlike the systems in Wolverhampton and Lincoln, public 
transport in Hastings, Torquay, and Mexborough did not develop in a linear 
fashion from horse-drawn traction. The two seaside towns relied on omnibuses or 
the carriage-owning community for urban mobility. Apart from occasional 
excursions into the larger towns of Rotherham and Doncaster, Mexborough 
remained a walking town, workers residing within reach of their workplaces. 
e Barbara Schmuckl, 'The Machine in the City: Public Appropriation of the Tramway in Britain and 
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Due to the strength of objections from influential residents, no tramway systems 
were built in Hastings and Torquay until the early 1900s. By then, moral qualms 
about the maltreatment of horses were gaining in importance, rendering horse-
drawn vehicles largely unacceptable. Furthermore, before the arrival of trams, both 
Hastings and Torquay had a spell of potential competition from motor and steam 
buses, thereby upsetting any tidy linear sequence of urban transport innovations. 
In 1903, the Hastings & St Leonards Omnibus Company announced their intention 
to introduce ten Milnes-Daimler motor buses with immediate effect. In the same 
year, Torquay began the introduction of a fleet of seven Clarkson steam-powered 
buses along with five Milnes-Daimler motor buses. Perhaps surprisingly to any 
proponent of a Whiggish view of the history of urban transport, the motor buses 
were quickly considered to be old-fashioned inferior technology in Hastings and 
were sold at a considerable loss as soon as trams were installed. The buses in 
Torquay were similarly relegated to subsidiary feeder roles for the trams. 
Consequently, the threat to trams from motor-buses did not materialise for many 
years in those two towns. 
A revolution in tram traction came about through the application of electricity as a 
power source. Given a horse-drawn tram and an electrical supply system, it was 
inevitable that an electrically propelled tram would be developed. 11 The 
conundrum was the form that electrical traction should take, and whether it could 
meet contemporary aesthetic values. 
11 Donald Mackenzie and Judy Wajcman (eds), 'Introductory Essay: the Social Shaping of 
Technology', in The Social Shaping of Technology, Maidenhead: Open University Press, 1985, p.8. 
An analogy with their steamboat theory, wherein they state that 'given the boat and the steam 
engine, is not the steamboat inevitable?' 
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The main opposition to overhead traction was founded on perceived visual 
intrusion and urban clutter. Overhead wires were seen as ugly and an infestation 
of streets.12 Schmucki has suggested that opposition on aesthetic grounds may 
have been a surrogate for other reasons. 13 There were indeed other objections 
about noise, safety, and in the USA, the rapacity and corruption of tramway 
companies. But while there were many underlying, and at times complex factors 
influencing the choice of surface-contact, it was the genuinely aesthetic ideal that 
weighed heavily in the decision-making in some towns, regardless of the 
economics. The final solution to aesthetic requirements was always considered to 
be 'just around the corner', but to many it remained out of reach.14 
Wolverhampton and other towns were persuaded that surface-contact systems 
were status symbols, at the cutting edge of technology: a far cry from the. 
retrospective judgements of later transport historians. I have therefore attempted 
to show how the social shaping of electric traction in the five towns was driven not 
only by economic, social and political considerations, but also notions of civic 
pride, modernity and inter-urban rivalries. 
Within an admittedly narrow field, the development of surface-contact systems 
underwent a degree of development in an equally narrow time frame. To improve 
efficiency and meet safety concerns, different systems were developed, modified 
and refined. These changes were driven largely by commercial considerations and 
also Board of Trade requirements, reflecting the importance of state regulation in 
the UK as a framework for both municipal and private tramway services. The 
producers, and later the operators, used a creative, innovative, and imaginative 
12 Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology', p.69. 
13 Schmuckl, 'The Machine in the City', p.1071. 
14 John P McKay, Tramways and Trolleys: The Rise of Urban Mass Transit in Europe, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, p.97. 
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process to develop their equipment. But they still had to be sold. Clearly, there 
was a market, sometimes in the most improbable places. Some towns saw the 
products as off-the-shelf ready-mades, the perfect answer to aesthetic and 
environmental objections. On the other hand, the London County Council tried 
unsuccessfully to modify the Griffiths-Bedell system themselves, an action which 
resulted in a prolonged law suit with the manufacturers. 
Decisions to install surface-contact systems were not reached easily, and debates 
continued for several years. Networks of influential people on both sides of the 
debate played a part, as did the officials responsible for guiding and implementing 
the decisions of the various councils. Commercial pressures exerted by promoters 
and manufacturers, referred to by Schatzberg as the 'rapacity of commercial 
concerns', also lurked behind the scenes.15 Apart from the five towns which 
eventually adopted surface-contact, several others also considered the system but 
opted in the end for overhead traction as opposition to the cheaper but more 
visually intrusive alternative decreased. 
Towns in the UK were quite unlike those in the USA, where transport planning 
took place on a regional scale, an approach that was only adopted in the UK later 
in the twentieth century. The USA also had the benefit of greater spatial 
separation. Towns had seldom developed over many centuries within a few days' 
walk of each other. The development of European cities and the public transport 
which served them was more like that in the UK, except that ancient walled city 
centres tended to be better protected. It was within those centres where aesthetic 
objections to overhead wires were strongest, and where hybrid solutions were 
15 Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology', p.72. 
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preferred. Overhead traction was suitable for the suburbs, but surface-contact or 
open-conduit was the preferred system within the city walls. 
Despite some shared characteristics with the other towns, Wolverhampton 
displayed significant differences. It was a vibrant and dynamic city with a diverse 
industrial base. While the surface-contact system was associated with spatial 
growth there, it facilitated rather than led it. The same cannot be said of the other 
towns, where networks were too small to have any major impact. 
Wolverhampton's city fathers were making a statement and projecting their idea of 
modernity by adopting surface-contact traction, though there was no Otto Wagner 
or Baron Haussman present to guide development. Rather it stemmed from a 
strong sense of civic identity on the part of the city's leaders, for whom the new 
system was a 'visual sign of the city's prestige' and technological progress.16 
There was also an urge to flex their muscles against powerful Birmingham, its own 
adjacent Black Country upstarts, and the BET. 
The five towns which adopted surface-contact traction varied both topographically 
and geologically. The Victorian leisure resorts of Hastings and Torquay were 
seaside towns surrounded by woods and open countryside. Industrial activity was 
on a small scale compared with Wolverhampton. Apart from tourism, the ancient 
cathedral city of Lincoln had a sophisticated agriculturally-based iron industry17, 
while Mexborough was mainly a coal-mining district. 
18 Schmuckl, 'The Machine in the City', p.1075. 
17 Denise McHugh, 'Running an Unregulated Town: Strategies of Lincoln's Municipal Elite, 1860-
1910', in Ralph Roth and Robert Beachy (eds), Who Ran the Cities? City Elites and Urban Power 
Structures in Europe and North America, 1750-1940, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing limited, 2007, 
p.73. 
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The consequent demographic composition gave each town its own distinct 
identity. Although all of them were subject to migration, none absorbed more than 
Wolverhampton, where the influx helped develop the industrial base. There was 
intense rivalry between Hastings and neighbouring Bexhill, but Wolverhampton 
tended to consider itself superior to adjacent Black Country towns. 
In each town, the location of power was instrumental in determining traction 
choice. Unlike the other towns, landowners clearly influenced the development of 
Hastings and Torquay, and their associated public transport systems. The 
development of the Hastings suburb of St Leonards gave no consideration to the 
transport needs of other citizens. The wealthy residents were firmly wedded to 
their horse-drawn carriages. 
Hastings and Wolverhampton conformed to the Weberian model of urban areas as 
places where domination and ongoing conflict were prevalent. 'Virtually no arena 
of urban social, political and cultural relations was exempt' .18 Trams and their 
traction systems were a continuing source of conflict between opposing sides, and 
even Sabbatarians entered the fray. The city and its intrinsic factories and 
transport 'machines' were viewed as godless entities to be opposed, rather than 
as symbols of progress. 
When looking at the deciding factors in traction choices, it is impossible to 
separate technology and culture since both cultural and social attitudes impact on 
technological choices. 19 Debates over trams frequently resembled a class 
18 RJ Morris and Richard Rodger (eds) in 'An introduction to British urban history' in The Victorian 
City: a Reader in British Urban History 1820-1914 (London, Longman Group, 1993), p.16. 
19 Gijs Mom, The Electric Vehicle: Technology and Expectations in the Automobile Age, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004, p.3. 
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struggle, and tensions ran high. However, power was not necessarily confined to 
the wealthier sections of society. 
Given the way in which more general considerations both for and against surface-
contact traction were usually finely balanced, personalities were often of 
paramount importance in the decisions to adopt surface-contact systems. 
Ambitious politicians were often at the forefront of opposition to overhead 
traction,20 especially in Wolverhampton where the dictates of the committee 
chairmen eventually overcame any objections to surface-contact.21 The leading 
figures here were the chairman of the Tramways Committee, Sir Charles Mander, 
and the town clerk Sir Horatio Brevitt. They were assisted by the electrical 
engineer CEC Shawfield, although he appears to have been dominated by their 
more powerful personalities. 
It is ironic that in Wolverhampton, as in other places, the wealthy and influential 
people who objected most to overhead electric traction were those who had made 
their fortunes through heavy industry. Sir Charles Mander himself was a 
household paint magnate who lived in the leafy suburb of Tettenhall while his 
factories polluted the poorer working class suburbs in the east with chemical 
waste, the by-product of his industrial processing plant. 
Whereas in Wolverhampton, the primary actors were mainly the councillors and 
shopkeepers, in Hastings it was the powerful wealthy reSidents, and to some 
extent newspaper proprietors, who showed bias on both sides of the argument. 
Users and non-users of the tramway systems also had strong voices, as indeed 
20 SchmuckJ, 'The Machine in the City', p.1 071. 
21 Sophie Watson, 'Foucault and the Study of Social Policy', in Gail lewis, Sharon Gewirtz & John 
Clarke (eds). Rethinking Social Policy, london: Sage Publications, 2006, p.66-77. (For the 
Foucauldian perspective in a wider sense). 
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did the employees of the tramways companies, particularly in Hastings. Objections 
cascaded upwards and downwards from the upper classes, who wanted no form 
of tramway in their town, through the middle classes who feared economic sterility 
caused by isolation, to company employees, road-users and passengers who 
found the operation of surface-contact systems troublesome. All were influential as 
the controversy raged. 
There was no obvious empowerment of the people during the decision-making 
process. Indeed, the 'socially invisible' classes were rarely consulted. As they 
were consumers of cheap workers' fares, we can assume that they welcomed any 
attempt to ease their financial burden, though there is little written evidence to 
support that view. Much of the available evidence, whether from newspaper 
reports or minutes of council meetings, is culturally situated and does not 
accurately represent the views of the 'humbler classes'. Letters to the editor 
frequently expressed attitudes and emotions, and offer a better insight into local 
feelings than local government archives, though they too offer little insights into 
working class attitudes.22 However, despite any bias, newspaper owners played a 
significant role as a mediation device. Often as in Hastings, the stand in favour of 
surface-contact or against it would change with a new editor. 
Wherever power was exercised, resistance was generated. In the early twentieth 
century, working-class pressure groups began to assert their strength.23 In 
Hastings, employees of the tramway company threatened strike action unless the 
Dolter system was replaced. In Wolverhampton, the fears of economic isolation 
caused by the Lorain system were raised by shopkeepers and commercial 
22 Schmuckl, 'The Machine in the City', p.1 061. 
23 Barry M Doyle, 'The Changing Functions of Urban Government: Councillors, Officials and 
Pressure Groups', in Martin Daunton (ed), The Cambridge Urban History of Britain: Volume 11/ 
1840-1950, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.313. 
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enterprises, but were quickly brushed aside. This powerlresistance dyad24 is also 
evident in the Griffiths-Bedell controversy in east London, but there the debates 
were proxies for political interests.25 
The selection process frequently followed clearly defined stages, with elected 
officials reflecting public concern, and sometimes their own self-interest, while 
engineers evaluated techniques.26 Wolverhampton and Hastings were typical in 
this respect. There was what might loosely be described as 'a normal pattern of 
enquiry and deliberation'.27 Having said that, social shaping was a process in 
which there was no single dominant shaping force. The five towns were subject to 
different pressures and there was no one set of human actors playing a dominant 
role across them over time.28 Influences consisted of impulses and reactions until 
resolution was reached. 
Whether the exercise of power resulted in the best resolution of the townspeople's 
needs is debateable. Ultimately, what is seen as best for one set of actors may not 
be seen as best for another. Factors, such as aesthetics, environmental 
protection, economics, commercial pressures, civic pride and interurban rivalries, 
were considered to have varying degrees of importance in those instances when 
surface-contact finally won the day. 
Commercial pressures were always present. Wolverhampton had to fight to 
prevent the BET from taking control and installing their overhead system to 
complement their own operations and allow through running to neighbouring 
24 Paul Hoggett, 'Social Policy and the Emotions', in Lewis, Gewirtz and Clarke (eds), Rethinking 
Social Policy, p.142. 
25 Schmuckl, 'The Machine in the City', p.1 071. 
28 McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, p.ee. 
27 Ibid, p.89. 
28 Mackenzie and Wajcman, The Social Shaping of Technology, p.16. 
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towns. In Torquay and Mexborough and Swinton, the Dolter Company worked 
hand-in hand with the National Electric Construction Company, of which the local 
tramway companies were subsidiaries. 
Surface-contact systems brought with them new operational structures and a 
plethora of consulting engineering firms and holding companies. The new 
designers were 'not only technically expert but also politically adept'.29 In Hastings 
it was the powerful Irish commercial entrepreneur William Murphy who pressurised 
the council and cajoled them into adopting an unwanted system, almost as a last 
resort. Having persuaded the council to install overhead traction in Hastings and 
Bexhill, the compromise was to adopt surface-contact along the sea front in the 
face of powerful resistance to the overhead system from the wealthy residents. All 
had either political or commercial reasons for resolving and implementing the 
schemes. 
In the national context, Britain had a powerful self-image. The country was the 
dominant world power, and there was an alarmed reaction to foreign innovations, 
especially from France or the USA. Yet the aesthetic ideal necessitated a 
compromise between those views and the intensely held beliefs of the aesthetes 
and modernizing townspeople. The reconciliation of these differences was a 
lengthy process. 
The Dolter system in particular was the very embodiment of French design values 
and culture. In many branches of technology, French academic style was heavily 
influenced by the aesthetic movement of the late nineteenth century, and the 
29 Edward W Constant, 'The Social locus of Technological Practice: Community, System or 
Organization?' in Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, The Social Construction, p.240. 
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Dolter system was no exception. Other types of surface-contact embraced the 
same values, although the Lorain system was an American product. The USA had 
a practical approach to design. It was functional and more pragmatic, in direct 
contrast to the high established culture of continental Europe. Debates about costs 
and benefits 'involved technological choice' and assisted the development of 
specific systems.3D For the pragmatists, however, surface-contact traction was 
whimsical and uneconomic compared with overhead, and was therefore ultimately 
destined for failure in their eyes. 
The 1870 Tramways Act and the 1896 Light Railways Act specified the practices •. 
to be adopted by local authorities, and defined powers and operating parameters. 
The Light Railways Act enabled rail companies to object if tram lines were parallel 
with existing train services. The ploy enabled the London and South Coast 
Railway Company to join forces with the Anti-Trammites in Hastings in opposition 
to tram services between Hastings and Bexhill. Although opposition delayed 
matters, in the end trams were approved. 
Board of Trade regulations and the approval process were sometimes blamed for 
delays in adopting new urban transport technology in the UK. The confused and 
changing local government set-up, and the conglomeration of small but powerful 
councils, each with a particular axe to grind, hardly helped. Bagwell refers to this 
state of affairs as 'the mid century chaos of local administration' although it did in 
fact continue until the 1890s.31 Generally, there were more constraints than in the 
private enterprise culture in the US. An American observer commented on the 
'strict regulation in Europe exercised over companies by municipalities or other 
30 Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology', p.S8. 
31 Philip S Bagwell, The Transport Revolution 1770-198, London: BT Batsford Ltd, 1974, p.1S2. 
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governing authorities, interfering in the operation in a way unknown in this 
country,.32 The historic centres of Europe had other ideals. 
For most towns, the economic benefits of overhead systems were more important 
than the environmental considerations associated with non-standard traction. But 
the assessment of economic benefits involves assumptions and so perceived 
economic advantage cannot fully explain why surface-contact was not more 
widespread. The difficulty lies in understanding the value ascribed to 
environmental protection in those instances where surface-contact was chosen. 
Clearly, to some decision-makers, the environment and people's well-being was of 
the utmost importance and outweighed economic gain, although final resolutions 
may well have been surrogates for other factors, as Schmucki suggests. To 
others, issues of aesthetics were of less value than the pursuit of progress. 
In the development process, the manufacturers were unable to estimate future 
costs, future profits, and the potential market with any great accuracy. While that 
was an admittedly difficult process, the inherent risks were great. Consequently, 
many surface-contact systems had a short life, particularly the Dolter Company's 
design. For the operating companies who had to satisfy shareholders, economic 
benefit was equally important. 
There was another angle to the economic debate. The need for passengers to 
change trams in order to proceed beyond Wolverhampton's boundaries should 
have sounded the death knell for the Lorain system. Clearly it did not, despite 
fears expressed by shopkeepers and commercial operators about isolation if the 
planned surface-contact system proceeded. The city fathers felt sufficiently 
32 McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, p.88. 
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confident economically not to worry about adjacent systems. Economic growth 
was not stunted, and Wolverhampton continued to prosper without the need to 
consider its neighbours. 
Although there were problems, surface-contact traction cannot be judged either a 
failure, or an unfortunate deviation from the true path to overhead electric traction. 
The system endured for many years in Wolverhampton and Lincoln, and to a 
lesser extent in Hastings and Torquay. In those towns, the social issues 
surrounding tram traction choice were clearly powerful enough to persuade the 
decision-makers to opt for surface-contact instead of the almost universal 
overhead system. 
If surface-contact traction was no outright failure, what factors prevented its wider 
penetration into the market when there was a clear demand from some quarters? 
All surface-contact systems met aesthetic and environmental requirements, but all 
had economic drawbacks, particularly the expense of installation. However, while 
economic indicators are a measure of relative lack of success, they should not be 
divorced from the factors that led to ultimate failure. 33 In this respect, technical and 
safety factors were predominant. The inability to develop a stud system which 
remained dead after the passage of a tram resulted in narrow technological 
margins, which in turn were reflected in costs of maintenance and operation. In 
fact there is no evidence that surface-contact studs posed a significant threat to 
humans. If studs remained alive after the passage of a tram, they could give a 
shock. At around 500 volts, the electric shock would be unpleasant, but leading 
engineers 'claimed to have taken the full voltage numerous times with no ill effect', 
33 Mom, The Electric Vehicle, p.284. 
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although none would demonstrate this in public.34 Horses were a different matter. 
Iron horse-shoes quickly conducted electrical charges to their nervous systems 
which sometimes resulted in fatalities, thereby affecting the livelihoods of the 
owners. Although a" systems required continued attention and repair, some 
operators ignored such requirements.35 Safety alone was an inadequate reason 
for the aversion to surface-contact, but the necessity of having a stand-by 
arrangement for ensuring that studs remained dead added to the financial 
discomfort of the operators. These technological defects also crucially led to 
waning user support and to the increasingly baleful scrutiny of the tramway 
regulators. 
The Lorain system in Wolverhampton was the most successful example, operating 
for nineteen years. Early problems, both social and technical, combined with 
pressure from users, forced design changes, a prime example of an interactive 
process helping to shape technology. The system was finally replaced in 1921 
when operating costs became too high through scarcity of spare parts in the 
aftermath of the First World War. It was a tribute to the ingenuity, tenacity and 
enthusiasm of the tramways department's maintenance teams that they were able 
to keep the system running for so long. By then the manufacturing companies had 
either ceased to exist, or no longer provided spare parts. In view of the length of 
time surface-contact operated in Wolverhampton, and also in Lincoln, it was rather 
more than a sideshow or aberration as claimed by some transport historians. The 
reasons for its ultimate demise are clearly more complex than a simple calculation 
of economic benefits; they also say something about the importance of 
technological momentum in the success or failure of technological innovations. 
34 Schatzberg, 'Culture and Technology', p.71. 
35 David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History since 1900, London: 
Profile Books Ltd, 2008, pp.7S-102. 
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First generation surface-contact traction was best suited to certain niche areas at a 
certain time. Consequently, surface-contact systems remained a tiny percentage 
of the total UK electrified network, although it remained a viable alternative and 
was still negotiable until the manufacturing companies ceased business in the 
years before the First World War. Ultimately, the aesthetic ideal was a vitally 
important but nevertheless impermanent contextual factor in relation to tramway 
traction choices. Sensibilities changed: the public's tolerance of overhead wires 
grew, and more care was taken with the design of overhead equipment. The 
Lorain system was finally replaced by overhead traction in Wolverhampton. 
Ironically, overhead traction had a lifespan of only three years in the city before a 
programme of replacement by trolley buses began. 
To reinforce the view that surface-contact was not a failure, after an interval of 
eighty years, the French company Alstom has marketed a second generation 
version of surface-contact traction called alimentation par sol (APS), or ground 
supply.36 APS relies on equipment on board the tram to energise the contact studs 
when directly above the live conductor, similar to the first generation systems. APS 
was installed in Bordeaux in 2003, and since then the cities of Angers, Reims, and 
Orleans in France, and the Gulf States of Dubai and Abu Dhabi have adopted it. 37 
The reasons are said to be aesthetic, in the French cities to protect attractive 
historic centres, and in the Gulf States to prevent the visual intrusion of overhead 
wires. Other cities in Europe are now investigating the installation of APS.38 The 
second generation version achieved impressive reliability figures of 99.8% by 
36 Mott MacDonald, 'Power Distribution for Trams and Electric Trains', Technical Note No 7 (July 
2008), p.2. 
37 Ibid, p.48. 
36 Ibid. 
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March 2007, and the University of Bordeaux is involved in research 'to improve the 
technology further'. 39 
I have attempted to show the justification for judging surface-contact to be a 
success and to show why the adoption and eventual scrapping of first generation 
surface-contact tramway systems cannot be reduced to matters of economic 
viability and technological efficiency, vitally important though these considerations 
were. The striking fact that these decisions were taken in such diverse locations 
frustrates any attempt to construct a grand unified theory of the appeal of non-
standard electric traction. But this conclusion is nevertheless of great value for the 
historian of urban transport and mobility. It shows that the reasons for traction 
choices, at a time of notable experimentation and competition between and within 
different urban transport modes, depends in each case on a peculiar mix of social 
class, political divisions, religious affiliations, topography, geographical location, 
economic function, urban morphology, position in an urban network, and so on. 
Above all, it shows the limitations of a linear, Whiggish account of urban transport 
history. 
39 Mott MacDonald, 'Power Distribution for Trams', p.SO. 
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http://www.genukl.org.uklbiglenglSTSlWolverhampton/ (accessed on 10 July 2009). 
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Appendix 1 - Chronological Charts from 1820 to 1919 
1820s 1830s 1840s 1850s 
Regular omnibus services began 
lasting until well after horse-drawn 
Horse -drawn omnibuses in 1833. trams introduced. 
Horse-drawn omnibuses introduced in 
1842. 
Horse-draW'l omnibuses in London in 
1829. 
Horse-drawn omnibuses in First experimental steam trams in USA 
Horse-drawn omnibuses in New Vorl!. Philadelphia in 1831. . in 1859. 
in 1829. Horse trams in New Vorl!. in 1832 and 
New Orleans in 1835. 
. 
First horse-drawn omnibuses in Nantes Faraday developed the dynamo. Loubat introduced horse-drawn trams 
in 1826. to Paris in 1852/53. 
. 
-
w 
I'.) 
". 
Wolvemampton 
Hastings 
lincoln 
Torquay 
Mexborough and 
Swinton 
London 
USA 
Others 
1860 
Entrepreneur GF 
Train installed 
horse-drawn 
trams in 
Blrtlenhead. 
1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 
Three-horse 
omnibuses 
I introduced. 
I 
GFTrain 
installed horse-
drawn trams in 
parts of 
London. 
GFTrain 
installed Horse-
drawn trams in 
the Potteries 
W 
IV 
<.n 
Wolverttampton 
Hastings 
Torquay 
Mexborough 
UK Parliament 
USA 
Others 
1870 1871 
Select 
Committee in 
favour of trams. 
Tramways Ad.. 
1872 1873 1874 1875 
Horse-drawn 
omnibus 
service began. 
Cable tram Cable trams in 
developed by San Francisco. 
Hallidie. Fireless steam 
Great horse trams in New 
epizootic ~Iness Orleans. 
began. 
Provincial and Horse-drawn 
two other tramway in 
companies set west London. 
up to promote • 
tramways. 
1876 1877 1878 1879 
Wolverhampton Dudley, 
Tramways Tramways Tramway Sedgley, and 
company Order service began. Wolverhampton 
formed. confirmed. company 
founded. 
Horse flu epidemic. 
Omnibus Omnibus 
company services 
founded. commenced. 
First attempt at Second attempt 
horse trams at horse trams 
rejected. rejected. 
First attempt at 
horse trams 
rejected. 
First attempt at 
horse trams not 
proceeded with. 
Deliberations by three separate House of Lords Select 
Committees on steam trams policy. 
Wantage steam Swansea 9.65 kilometres 
tram. steam tram. of steam trams 
in UK . 
Fireless steam Mekarski 
trams in Paris. compressed air 
in Paris. 
W 
N 
0> 
Wolverhampton 
Lincoln 
London 
Other 
1880 1881 
Wolverhampton (Mechanical 
Power) Order. 
. 
Experimental 
steam trams on 
Tettenhall Road 
from May to 
November. 
Lincoln 
Tramways 
Company 
formed. 
lichterfelde 
electric 
tramway 
opened. 
1882 1883 1884 
Line to Dudley Order for steam 
opened by D, S on Dudley line. 
&WCo. 
Horse-drawn 
trams began. 
Cable trams at 
Highgate Hill 
First municipally Accumulator 
owned tramway trams in 
in Huddersfield, Brussels 
steam 
operated. 
82.06 
kilometres of 
steam trams in 
UK. 
1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 
Horse traction Steam on route D,S&W Midland 
ceased on to Dudley Company in Tramways 
Dudley line. began. liquidation. Company 
(MTC) take 
over. 
Kingsland 
approach. 
West Met Thomson· 
Chiswick Walker system 
experiments experiment in 
with Lineff. Willesden. 
Conduit system Sprague 
installed in introduced 
Blackpool. overhead 
swivelling 
trolley in USA. 
--
L-
--- -- -
(.oJ 
N 
-..& 
Wolverhampton 
Hastings 
Others 
1690 
Steam trams at 
peak in USA 
with 527 miles 
Brussels 
accumulator 
abandoned 
1691 
Wolverhampton 
Electric Lighting 
Order 
Third attempt to 
introduce horse-
drawn trams 
Leeds 
Roundhay 
overhead 
system installed 
410.3 kilometres 
of steam trams 
in UK 
1692 1893 1894 
Midlands 
Tramways 
Company 
reconstituted as 
Dudley and 
Wolverhampton 
Tramways 
Company 
(OWTC). 
First electric 
lights and mains 
South Staffs 
overhead 
system. 
1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 
DWTC bought 
by BET. 
Special Committee 
Tramways recommended Council bought 
Committee set overhead. section in city 
up to consider 
options. Approach made 
to install 
Kingsland 
system. 
Chadwell Murphy's Public enquiries 
approach application held. 
rejected by under Light 
Council. Railways .Act. 
Tramways 
Consultative 
Committee set 
up. 
BET approach 
for overhead. 
BET formed BET purchase Steam trams at 
South Staffs their peak in 
operation. UK 
Light Railways 
Act 
Surface-contact 
in Paris. 
--- -
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1900 
Committee 
recommend 
ovemead 
again. 
Hastings 
Tramways Act 
confirmed. 
1901 
Kingsland 
experimental 
system 
dropped. 
Committee 
visited Dolter 
system in Paris. 
Lorain and 
Dolter systems 
explained to 
Committee. 
Committee set 
up to visit 
Dolter in Paris. 
1902 1903 
Councillor 
Lorain system Thome claims 
installed. Lorain too 
costly. 
Approach made 
to install 
Kingsland. 
Motor buses 
introduced. 
Railways & 
Tramways 
Committee 
formed 
Council purchase 
tramways 
company. 
Committee Motor omnibus 
visited company 
Wolvemampton. formed. 
Mexborough & 
Swinton Act 
confirmed. 
1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 
T welvetrees -
Lorain a 
I financial 
success. 
Murphy's Overhead Dolter system 
overhead opened but not installed on 
construction along seafront. seafron. 
started. 
Motor buses Omnibus 
withdrawn. company I 
wound up. I 
Griffiths Bedell 
installed. 
Torquay Dolter surface-
Tramways Act contact system 
confirmed. installed. 
BOT ordered 
NECC agree to Dolter surface- closure. 
install Dolter contact system Ceased to 
I 
system. installed. operate on 
30 July. 
Most tram Griffiths-Bedell Last urban 
I operations experiment in steam tram in have overhead. Stepney. UK. 
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N 
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Wolverhampton 
Hastings 
Lincoln 
Torquay 
Other 
1910 
Dolter 
replacement by 
overhead 
agreed. 
Agreement with 
Dolter expired 
on 8 October. 
BoT extended 
licence until 
end of 1910. 
Most surface-
contact 
removed in 
Paris after 
flooding. 
1911 
Employees call 
strike against 
Dolter 
17 March-
BOT inspection 
of overhead. 
Line opened 17 
July 
1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 
Lorain system 
eventually 
replaced by 
overhead in 
1921. 
Dolter replaced 
by petrol 
electric under 
BOT orders. 
Griffrths-Bedell 
replaced by 
overhead. 
Last surface-
contact route 
removed in 
Paris. 
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Appendix 2 
An illustration of the attitude of some sections of the community to 
the introduction of steam trams on the streets. 
1 The Dart Magazine, Number 328, February 1883. 
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Appendix 4 - The Dolter surface-contact system 
. 
Trant skate app,., achltlg, 
circuit open. arm dl1 pped 
.kat ovr oIl' pads, 
ann rals d OJld ir fill rna 
With acknowledgements to the South Western Electricity History Society 
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Appendix 5 - Advertisement for the Dolter surface-contact system 
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Appendix 6 - Sector model of Wolverhampton (After Hoyt) 
Central business district 
Heavy industry and mining 
High class residential 
Middle class residential 
Low class residential 
Light industry 
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Appendix 8 
Other actors and a brief description of their roles in Wolverhampton 
In 1858, Sir Henry H Fowler, a solicitor by profession, was elected to the Council, 
becoming mayor in 1862/63. In the 1860s and 1870s, he was renowned as one of 
the leading municipal activists in the country. He urged municipal enterprise even 
before Joseph Chamberlain did in Birmingham.1 He was not a radical liberal, being 
a Wesleyan Methodist with conservative inclinations, but was nevertheless 
considered to be a Progressive. 
He was elected to Parliament in 1880 as the Liberal MP for Wolverhampton East, .. 
and was admitted to the Cabinet in 1892. He later became Lord Wolverhampton 
and Secretary of State for India in 1894. He resigned from the Council in 1884 to 
devote his energy to his new position, but continued his close interest in'council 
activities. Although he was a leading proponent of municipal enterprise, he does 
not appear to have entered into the electrification debate. 
WH Jones was elected Councillor in 1864, mayor in 1873174, chairman of the 
Streets Committee for 18 years from 1875 to 1893, and chairman of the Watch 
Committee from 1893 to 1903. He was a leading industrialist in Wolverhampton, 
owning a successful japanning and tin ware business. In 1903 he published a 
book about municipal life in Wolverhampton from its earliest days. 
Sir Alfred Hickman (1830-1910) was the leading spokesman of the iron and coal 
industries in the Black Country. He had built up the most successful iron and steel 
company in Wolverhampton's suburbs. He was elected to be the Conservative 
Member of Parliament for Wolverhampton West constituency in 1885, lost the seat 
1 George W Jones, Borough Politics, p.26 
343 
one year later, but regained it in 1892. He was made a freeman of the city in 1902. 
He was a national figure, knighted in 1891 and made a baronet in 1903.2 He was 
president of the Wolverhampton Chamber of Commerce and a leading figure in 
linking the Black Country to the world beyond.3 
The Organisation of Wolverhampton Council 
The main committees in 1902 were: 
The Watch Committee (Chairman WH Jones), which controlled the police force, 
and the granting of licences, 
The Streets Committee (Mr Plant) for repairs of streets and roads, and building 
new streets, 
The Lighting Committee (Mr Crosbie) for electric lighting, the generating station 
and lighting of streets, 
The Tramways Committee (Sir Charles Mander, acting chairman Stephen 
Craddock) for the electric tramways, 
and another 16 committees, each reporting to the Council and seeking 
confirmation for its actions. 
The original Wolverhampton Tramways Company 
2 M Ie Guillou, Freight Rates and the Black Country Iron Trade (Journal of Transport History, New 
Series Volume 3 (1975-76), p.111. 
3 Richard J Trainor, Black Country Elites, p.132 
344 
In December 1877, Wolverhampton Tramways Company Limited had offices at 23 
Queen Victoria Street in London, and the directors were:4 
*Sir Wilfred Brett, KCMG, Chairman, Sheffield Tramways Company 
T M Mackay, Chairman, Dublin Tramways Company 
J M Gillies, Deputy Chairman, North Metropolitan Tramways Company 
*C E Davison, Director, Sheffield Tramways Company 
A J Lambert, Director, Tramways & General Works Company 
T Selby, Secretary 
*Both men were also directors of the West Metropolitan Tramways Company in •. 
London.5 
.. Stanley Webb and Paul Addenbrook, A History of Wolbverhampton, p.10 
5 CS Smeeton, London United Tramways, p.18. 
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Appendix 10 - The Lorain System 
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Fla. l . - LONO ITUDINAI. .seCTION OF TRACK AND MOTOR TRUCK. 
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Appendix 11 - The Lorain System Washington DC 
4-The Lorain Steel Company's System of Electric Traction. 
PI, ... - THa LO~AIN .neaL CO~lPANV'-' ,sV-'T ~1 OP BLBCT~IC TAACTION 
0\-' LAID DOWN AT WA "INOTON, 
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Appendix 12 - Tramway support poles 
Typical ornate tramway support poles manufactured 
by the Mannesmann company of Ousseldorf1• 
1 McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, p.104 
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Appendix 13 
The Hastings Borough Engineer's report dated 20 September 1897 
to a specially convened Tramways Committee. 
PH Palmer presented the results of a questionnaire on 27 September 1897.1 His 
report revealed that most towns had well equipped systems, the majority using 
electrical traction. A few still used horse-drawn or steam trams, although both 
forms of power were slowly being replaced. Most systems were built to standard 
gauge, with 18" each side of stone pitching. This was cheaper but hard wood was 
quieter. The objections from carriage-owners about the difficulty of driving from 
macadam to stone pitching were 'considerable' but could be overcome by using 
wood blocks. 
Cost comparisons were difficult, as labour and materials varied considerably, but 
. 
UK construction and maintenance was more expensive as general rule. 
Many systems were in operation. Overhead lines were far cheaper to build and 
maintain, and generally in use on the continent. Tramcars with trolley poles were 
more satisfactory to operate, being easier to manoeuvre forward, back, and at 
slower speeds. General interference with traffic was less, roads were not disturbed 
in case of electrical derangement, and repairs were effected with minimum trouble, 
delay, and expense. Construction was quicker with less interference to the surface 
of streets and traffic. The main objection was unsightliness, but ornamental 
columns could mitigate this problem. 
There were nineteen different conduit systems in operation, the main ones being 
Holroyd-Smith in Blackpool, Siemens and Halske in Budapest and under 
1 Lewes: East Sussex County Council Archives, Hastings Council Minutes DH/818/3, p.220. 
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consideration in Berlin, Thomson-Houston under consideration in Berlin and 
Brussels, and in use in one part of New York, and the Love system which was an 
experimental line in Chicago and Washington. 
The main disadvantages of conduits was that they were very expensive to build 
and maintain, caused prolonged interference with streets during construction and 
repair, gave great difficulty in locating defects underground, and made sewerage 
and pipe laying difficult and expensive. Slots varying from 5/8" to 2" caused 
problems to bikes and other wheeled vehicles, and keeping the conduits clean and 
well insulated was difficult. Overall, the evidence was that they were at least four 
times as expensive as overhead systems to construct and operate. 
The Serpollet steam traction system was an improvement on the previous form but 
had obvious disadvantages compared with electricity. 
Compressed air was in use in Paris, but was expensive and not adapted to steep 
gradients. 
Gas cars were used experimentally in Blackpool, but were considered to be smelly 
and unreliable. 
Cable cars had advantages, especially in hilly areas, but were not as good as 
electrical traction. 
Accumulator cars had no overhead wires or slots, but had great extra weight, with 
accumulators weighing up to 3 tons. Their use was prohibitive on steep gradients 
due to their weight and resulting range reduction. They were costly to maintain, 
and needed constant recharging. They also gave off an objectionable smell of 
acid, and there was a possible risk of injury to passengers and damage to clothes. 
The cost of compensation involved for such damage could have been 
considerable. 
356 
The questionnaire also revealed that the costs of working double lines of track 
were less than single, excluding construction costs, but double track depended on 
the width of road available and the nature of the district traversed. 
The risk of accidents with overhead was much less as the speed of cars was 
restricted to eight miles per hour, wire breakages were low, and the Board of 
Trade limited currents to 500 volts, which was not considered to be fatal. 
It was better for municipalities to construct lines themselves as they could borrow 
cash at cheaper rates than public companies. The optimum solution was to build 
and lease to operators on agreed terms. 
The report recommended that overhead traction was the most suitable, and it 
could be worked in conjunction with street lighting. 
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Appendix 14 - Secret funding of anti-tram movement 
L ' " , , 
-- ... _-.... . 
Hastings & 5t Leonards Weekly Mail and Times, 25 March 18981 
1 Hastings& St Leonards Weekly Mail and Times, 25 March 1898, 
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Appendix 15 
Dolter Trams in the North 1 
The trams are here, my brothers 
The same we've looked for long 
Hurrah! We cry as they flash by 
The pleased admiring throng 
Hurrah for the graceful tramcar 
That glideth like a swan 
For the hidden might that gives it light 
And speeds it grandly on 
The trams are democratic 
We all 'first class' may ride 
The high and low together go 
And lose their bit 'a pride 
Then hail the smart conductor 
Your wife and bairnies bring 
And if you're square regarding fare 
He'll treat you like a king 
The trams are bright and pleasant 
Not like the ancient 'bus 
Whose lurch and shake oft made us ache 
And sometimes think a cuss 
The 'bus to some museum 
Of antiquated fads 
Posterity will smile to see 
How rode their great-grand-dads 
The trams in dear awd Rawmarsh 
What would our grand-sires say? 
They'd think the world was being hurled 
Upon some novel way 
No doubt they'd strictly warn us 
And maybe rate and ban 
Our latest code and 'a la mode' 
Of things Parisian 
But in this age of progress 
We flout these sages old 
And hail, elate, the up to date 
And seek an age of gold. 
The trams are here my brothers 
Success to them I say 
A people's boon, I trust they'll soon 
All enterprise repay. 
Poem about the Dolter System in Hastings2 
1 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 16 February 1907. 
2 Hastings & St Leonards Observer, 16 February 1907. 
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Have you felt the new sensation 
Trams are running by the sea 
They will give you palpitations 
If you board them, you will see 
Electric light bobs up and down 
And lightnings flash upon the ground. 
With a cling clang, rap tap tap. 
These blinking monsters are the choice 
Of Hastings' clever sages, 
A nuisance upon all to foist 
Our visual organ's dazes. 
Our nerves to shatter, to do their best 
And take from invalids their rest. 
With a cling clang, rap tap tap. 
Seven days and nights we have cling clang, 
A ceaseless whirl of tram wheels 
Electric fireworks with a bang 
And free galvanic shock feels. 
The lights go out and it is dark, 
A chance for thieves to make their mark. 
With a cling clang, rap tap tap. 
Allan Chase3 
This is an age of knowledge, for we find 
Our learned men resolved that she must reign 
Till everyone on earth of human kind 
Is subject to her rule and to obtain 
So great a victory, they are not content 
That steam the mighty purpose should display; 
They've snatched the lightning from its element 
And made it serve to speed her on her way. 
By John Corfield 
3 'The story of electrical supply In the Wolverhampton area', chapter 1, p.1 
http://wwwhistQrywebsit.CQuklarticles/electricity/Electricity.htm#meny (accessed on 10 July 2011) 
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Appendix 16 - Torquay Tramways 
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Appendix 17 - Mexborough tramways 
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----ELtCTAIC TAAMWAYS COHl11WCTto. ALL -4~.r GAUGE 
--------AUTHOItIS!O EXTENSIONS NOT I!IUILT 
·· ·················PI\OPOSED EXTENSIONS NOT AUTHORISED 
----RtStItVEO SLEEPE ... -TR .... CI< TRAMWAYS 
---TROLLEYBUS EXTrNSIONS BEYOND TUM ,,-ouns 
············· AUTHORISEO TROI.LEYBUS EXTENSIONS NOT BUI L.T 
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--,-CA/\ DEPOTS I; I III 
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DONCASTER CORPORATION TRAMWAVS 1S-ilI - 1JoA t·" 
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lU-D.C .• of ~II, Wat"-D, 8oIt .... ·_0, a TlIootMc~ 
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WH Brett and JH Gillham, The Tramways of South Yorkshire and Humberside, p.2 
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Appendix 19 - Tramway Statistics for Wolverhampton and Lincoln 
Capital expended Authorised length Length open 
! Years in 
which 
Acts Gauge On Lines under On On On Legal and Double Single Double Single 
passed opened construction horses locomotive tramcars Parliamentary Sundries Total line line Total line line Total 
lines engines 
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ m.ch. m.ch. m.ch. m. ch. m.ch. m.ch. 
18n-
1881 4ft 8Y.. 74.362 
-
2.236 - 4.558 3.397 569 85,122 1 70 6 75 8 65 1 70 6 65 8 55 
- ------------
~----- .. --
- ---
Within the same table, Clark also stated that mechanical power had been authorised for use on the network, subject to Board of Trade 
approval. At that time, the only instance had been a six-month steam traction experiment on the route to Tettenhall in 1881. An extension to 
the time was refused. Another enterprise, the Dudley, Sedgley, and Wolverhampton Tramways Company and its successors, operated the 
foilowing along the line from Dudley to Wolverhampton, a distance of 5.78 miles. This Company was also authorised to operate with 
mechanical power, subject to Board of Trade approval. 
Capital expended Authorised length Length open 
Years in 
which 
Acts Gauge On Lines under On On On Legal and Double Single Double Single 
passed opened construction horses locomotive tramcars Parliamentary Sundries Total line line Total line line Total 
lines engines 
m.ch. m.ch. m.ch. m.ch. m.ch. m.ch. 
1880- No information available 
1885 4ft8W 036 526 5 62 036 5 26 5.62 
------
Of the other towns which were later to consider the use of surface-contact electrification, only Lincoln appears in the statistics, as below: 
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ . - £ m.ch. m.ch. m.ch. m.ch. m.ch. m.ch . 
1881-
1882 3ft 6" 8.625 
-
298 - 860 420 - 10,203 o 22 1 42 1 64 o 22 1 42 164 
----- ----------
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Appendix 21- Conflicts in the decision making process 
WOLVERHAMPTON 
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